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1. Introduction
1.1 The Hofstadgroup – Islamist terrorism in the Netherlands
On the second of November 2004, Dutch filmmaker and publicist Theo van Gogh was shot 
and stabbed to death in broad daylight while cycling through Amsterdam. Shortly after nine in 
the morning, a twenty-six-year-old man approached Van Gogh, emptied a 9mm pistol at him 
and then attempted to sever his head as he lay dead or dying on the sidewalk. Without fully 
accomplishing this task, the assailant stuck his knife in Van Gogh’s chest. He also left behind a 
note in which he threatened Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali by stabbing it onto his victim’s body 
with a second blade. The attacker then calmly reloaded the magazine of his firearm and walked 
towards a nearby park, where a shootout with police officers ensued. Several minutes later he was 
taken into custody after suffering a bullet wound to the leg. As he was taken away, a policeman 
told him he was lucky to be alive. Van Gogh’s murderer replied that he did not agree; he had 
intended to die during the firefight.1
Van Gogh’s assailant was no stranger to the Dutch police or the General Intelligence and Security 
Service (AIVD). Since the fall of 2003, both organizations had come across this individual 
during their investigations into a group of young Dutch Muslims believed to be involved in 
terrorist activities. Because some of them lived and met each other in The Hague, a city also 
known in Dutch as the Hofstad (Court city), the AIVD began referring to these individuals as 
the ‘Hofstadgroup’ from October 2003 onward.2 The name has stuck, even though the group’s 
alleged members did not use it themselves.3 Until the day of the murder, however, the AIVD had 
not estimated that Van Gogh’s assailant was preparing a violent crime. In fact, it had regarded 
him as a peripheral member of the group.4 Moving swiftly on information provided by the AIVD 
after the attack on Van Gogh, the police arrested the other individuals thought to be part of this 
terrorist organization.5 Although most suspects were apprehended without incident, two resisted 
violently.
In the early hours of 11 November, a police arrest squad approached an apartment in The Hague 
where two suspects were staying. After making their presence known, the officers rammed the 
door only to find that it had been barricaded. Within moments, one of the occupants responded 
1 J.P.H. Donner and J.W. Remkes, “Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29854, nr. 1,” (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 2004), 
1-2; Frits Van Straelen, “Requisitoir in de strafzaak tegen Mohammed B.,” (Parketnr 129227-04: District Court 
Amsterdam, 2005), 10-27.
2 J.P.H. Donner and J.W. Remkes, “Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29854, nr. 3,” (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 2004), 
3, 5.
3 Janny Groen and Annieke Kranenberg, Women warriors for Allah: an Islamist network in the Netherlands 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 48-49.
4 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, “Toezichtsrapport inzake de 
afwegingsprocessen van de AIVD met betrekking tot Mohammed B.,” (The Hague: CTIVD, 2008), 2, 17.
5 Police Investigator 1, “Personal interview 6,” (Houten2012), 4.
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by throwing a hand grenade through the slender crack between door and door frame and was in 
turn shot at by the police. Both bullets missed their mark, but the grenade exploded on the street 
where it injured 5 policemen, one of whom seriously. Throughout the day that followed, the two 
suspects called for the police to come and get them and threatened to blow up the house. The 
standoff ended late in the afternoon when both individuals were induced to surrender after one 
of them had been shot in the shoulder by members of a military special forces unit. At the time 
of their arrest, both suspects were carrying additional hand grenades.6
It was quickly apparent that both Van Gogh’s murderer and the hand-grenade wielding individuals 
adhered to an extremist interpretation of Islam. The note that the murderer left on Van Gogh’s 
body and the will he had carried with him, titled ‘Baptized in Blood’, left little doubt that the 
attack had been inspired by his beliefs and that the perpetrator had hoped to die as a martyr 
for his cause.7 The two suspects in The Hague hastily wrote a will during the ‘siege’ of their 
apartment that similarly set out their wish to die fighting for Allah. Because their apartment had 
been wired by the AIVD, there are records of the various phone calls they made to friends and 
relatives announcing their imminent martyrdom.8 In fact, almost all of the other people arrested 
in connection with the Van Gogh killing were to a greater or lesser extent found in possession of 
documents, audiotapes, videos and Internet materials espousing radical and extremist views of 
Islam and glorifying terrorism.9 
These signs of an extremist ideology and the gruesome nature of Van Gogh’s death, led the events 
of November 2004 to have an impact on Dutch society and politics that is felt to this day.10 
They fueled an already heated debate about multiculturalism and the integration of Muslim 
minorities.11 But instead of being seen as a purely domestic affair, the Hofstadgroup was quickly 
interpreted within the context of the global ‘jihadist’ terrorist threat that had manifested itself with 
6 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, 2005), 01/13: 95-96; AHA07/24: 3087-
3127; AGV3001/3062: 17969-18005; GET: 18235-18237; The Hague Court of Appeal, “LJN BC2576,” (2008): 
26-29; M.J. De Weger, “Continuïteit en verandering: het Nederlandse stelsel van antiterreureenheden sinds zijn 
oprichting,” in Terrorisme: studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding, ed. E.R. Muller, U. Rosenthal, and R. 
De Wijk (Deventer: Kluwer, 2008), 630.
7 Ruud Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling van Mohammed B.,” (2005), 18; appendix: Overzicht 
teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 46-47; Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 65.
8 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHA07/24: 3088-3091, 3093-3103, 3107, 3124; AHB3001/3025: 3139-
3142; GET: 18235-18237.
9 Ibid., 01/01: 131, 134, 142-147, 160-161, 171-172; 101/113: 147.
10 Martijn De Koning and Roel Meijer, “Going all the way: politicization and radicalization of the Hofstad network 
in the Netherlands,” in Identity and participation in culturally diverse societies, ed. Assaad E. Azzi, et al. (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 221; Sander ‘T Sas and Jan Born, “Hoofdofficier: Mohammed Bouyeri handelde niet 
alleen,” in EenVandaag (2014).
11 F.J. Buijs and F. Demant, “Extremisme en radicalisering,” in Terrorisme: studies over terrorisme en 
terrorismebestrijding, ed. E.R. Muller, U. Rosenthal, and R. De Wijk (Deventer: Kluwer, 2008), 170-171.
13
the 9/11 attacks on the United States orchestrated by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization.12 
More specifically, Van Gogh’s assassin, his associates and the apparent 2005 attempts by some of 
the Hofstadgroup’s remnants to plot additional attacks, came to be viewed as prime examples of 
the rise of a new ‘homegrown’ dimension of jihadist terrorism in Europe.13
Homegrown jihadist terrorism first appeared in Europe in March 2004, when bombs exploded 
on commuter trains in Madrid, killing 191 people and injuring 1500.14 Almost a year and a half 
later, suicide bombers targeted London’s public transportation system, causing the deaths of 52 
victims.15 What the attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam and London had in common was that they 
were carried out by Islamist terrorists who lived, worked and, albeit to varying degrees, belonged 
to the countries they attacked. The perpetrators of the Madrid attacks were largely first generation 
immigrants; many of those involved in the Amsterdam and London attacks had been born and 
raised there.16 Whereas previously jihadist terrorism had emanated from places like Afghanistan, 
the tragedies in Madrid, Amsterdam and London revealed dangers much closer to home. 
1.2 Studying involvement in European homegrown jihadism
More than a decade after Van Gogh’s murder, jihadist terrorism continues to pose a threat to 
European societies.17 In 2011, American forces completed their withdrawal from Iraq while 
neighboring Syria fell into civil war. These events created opportunities for al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates, but especially for the so-called ‘Islamic State’, to make considerable gains in both 
countries. As thousands of European men and women joined these groups as ‘foreign fighters’, 
a second wave of European jihadism appears to have developed.18 The risk that battle-hardened, 
12 “Spanje ziet band met Nederland,” NRC Handelsblad, 17 November 2004; Rik Coolsaet, “EU counterterrorism 
strategy: value added or chimera?,” International Affairs 86, no. 4 (2010): 867-869; Beatrice De Graaf and Quirine 
Eijkman, “Terrorismebestrijding en securitisering: een rechtssociologische verkenning van de neveneffecten,” 
Justitiële Verkenningen 37, no. 8 (2011): 33; General Intelligence and Security Service, “From dawa to jihad: the 
various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order,” (The Hague: General Intelligence and Security 
Service, 2004), 5.
13 Marc Sageman, “The next generation of terror,” Foreign Policy, no. 165 (2008): 37-39; General Intelligence and 
Security Service, “Violent jihad in the Netherlands: current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat,” (The Hague: 
General Intelligence and Security Service, 2006), 29; Aidan Kirby, “The London bombers as “self-starters”: a case 
study in indigenous radicalization and the emergence of autonomous cliques,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, 
no. 5 (2007): 415.
14 William Rose, Rysia Murphy, and Max Abrahms, “Does terrorism ever work? The 2004 Madrid train bombings,” 
International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 186.
15 Andrew Silke, “Holy warriors: exploring the psychological processes of jihadi radicalization,” European Journal of 
Criminology 5, no. 1 (2008): 99.
16 Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe: patterns in Islamist terrorist cell formation and behaviour, 1995-2010 (Oslo: 
University of Oslo, 2012), 314, 333, 394, 397-405.
17 EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2014: European Union terrorism situation and trend report 2014 (‘s-Gravenzande: Drukkerij 
van Deventer, 2014), 21-22; Petter Nesser, “Toward an increasingly heterogeneous threat: a chronology of jihadist 
terrorism in Europe 2008-2013,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 5 (2014): 440-456.
18 General Intelligence and Security Service, “The transformation of jihadism in the Netherlands: swarm dynamics 
and new strength,” (The Hague: AIVD, 2014), 5; Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now 
exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 
icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.
14
paramilitary trained and ideologically extremist returnees will commit attacks in their countries 
of origin has become a prime concern for European authorities.19 In addition, there is the 
threat posed by extremists who chose to stay at home and by the relatively large, and apparently 
growing, circle of radical and extremist sympathizers that surround this militant core.20 Given 
this context, it is clear that research on (homegrown) jihadist terrorism in Europe continues to be 
relevant not just for academics, but also for those working to prevent attacks and reduce societal 
polarization.21 
Using one in-depth case study, this thesis asks how and why people become involved in European 
homegrown jihadist groups. As Sageman lamented in 2014, it is a question we are still unable 
to conclusively answer.22 For a topic as academically and societal relevant as terrorism this is a 
surprising state of affairs. After the 9/11 attacks, considerable new sources of funding became 
available and a large number of new researchers began studying terrorism, which led to a 
tremendous increase in research output.23 Why is a comprehensive understanding of what drives 
people to participate in this particular form of political violence still so far off?
This relative lack of understanding of how and why involvement in terrorism occurs is in fact 
not so surprising. ‘Terrorism’ continues to lack a commonly accepted definition, frustrating 
comparative research and theoretical development.24 The diversity in terms of terrorists’ 
goals, means, organizational structures and guiding ideologies imply that factors relevant to 
involvement in one typology of terrorism might be inconsequential to another.25 Crucially, while 
there are almost fifty separate hypotheses about how and why involvement in terrorism occurs, 
most of them lack the empirical verification necessary to determine their validity.26 This is due 
in large part to one of the most enduring problems in the study of terrorism; the scarcity of 
primary sources.27 The secondary literature and media reports, still the most prevalent sources 
19 Lorenzo Vidino, “European foreign fighters in Syria: dynamics and responses,” European View 13, no. 2 (2014): 
217-219.
20 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, “Jaarverslag 2014,” (The Hague: AIVD, 2015), 18-20; General 
Intelligence and Security Service, “The transformation of jihadism,” 28-34.
21 Paul Abels, “’Je wilt niet geloven dat zoiets kan!’ Het Nederlandse contraterrorismebeleid sinds 1973,” in 
Terroristen en hun bestrijders: vroeger en nu, ed. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Beatrice De Graaf (Amsterdam: Boom, 
2007), 127; P. Cliteur, “Waarom terrorisme werkt,” in Terrorisme: studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding, 
ed. E.R. Muller, U. Rosenthal, and R. De Wijk (Deventer: Kluwer, 2008), 308. 
22 Marc Sageman, “The stagnation in terrorism research,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 569.
23 Andrew Silke, “Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research,” in Critical terrorism studies: a new research 
agenda, ed. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning (New York / Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 
34-35; Alex P. Schmid, “The literature on terrorism,” in The Routledge handbook of terrorism research, ed. Alex P. 
Schmid (London / New York: Routledge, 2011), 458-460.
24 Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Why do we know so little about terrorism?,” International Interactions 40, no. 4 (2014): 
594-595.
25 Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid, “Theories of terrorism,” in The Routledge handbook of terrorism research, 
ed. Alex P. Schmid (Abingdon / New York: Routledge, 2011), 202.
26 Ibid., 261.
27 Andrew Silke, “The impact of 9/11 on research on terrorism,” in Mapping terrorism research: state of the art, gaps 
and future directions, ed. Magnus Ranstorp (New York / Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 76-80.
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in terrorism research, are generally not reliable and detailed enough to function as the empirical 
basis for academic research.28
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of how and why people become 
involved in European homegrown jihadist groups. It does so through an in-depth analysis 
of the structural, group and individual-level factors that facilitated, motivated and sustained 
participants’ processes of involvement in the Hofstadgroup. The Hofstadgroup has been 
chosen as a case study firstly because the author was able to gather extensive primary-sources 
based information on the group. Access to such data is seen as a prerequisite for making an 
empirically-substantiated contribution to existing knowledge on involvement in European 
homegrown jihadism. Secondly, the Hofstadgroup is interesting because it was part of what could 
be termed the first generation of homegrown jihadism in Europe, one that gave rise to similar 
groups in neighboring states.29 While chapter 4 argues that past research may have overstated the 
representativeness of the Hofstadgroup for this broader trend, there are sufficient similarities for 
the case to yield generalizable insights.
At the same time, the drawbacks of a single-case study research design must be acknowledged from 
the outset. The lack of a comparative aspect means the results presented here are first and foremost 
applicable to the Hofstadgroup itself. Although the present author argues that the similarities 
between the Hofstadgroup and other European homegrown jihadist entities that arose in the 
early 2000s allow the case to provide insights relevant to understanding this broader typology as 
well, it cannot simply be assumed that the explanations for involvement in the Hofstadgroup will 
all be equally relevant to European homegrown jihadism as a whole. However, although ‘n=1’ in 
terms of the number of groups studied, this thesis takes an in-depth and comparative look at the 
involvement pathways of dozens of Hofstadgroup participants. There is therefore an element of 
comparison and generalizability present within this study despite its focus on a single case study.
This chapter presents the research questions, methodology and sources used in this study. It 
concludes by setting out the thesis’ structure. First of all, however, it is necessary to explicate what 
new insights the Hofstadgroup case can yield with regard to involvement in European homegrown 
jihadism. Has more than a decade of research on this group not sufficiently addressed how and 
why its participants became involved? 
28 Andrew Silke, “The devil you know: continuing problems with research on terrorism,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 5-6.
29 Petter Nesser, “Chronology of jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: planned, prepared, and executed terrorist 
attacks,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 10 (2008): 934-940; Nesser, “Toward an increasingly heterogeneous 
threat,” 441-449.
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1.3 Existing literature on the Hofstadgroup
The Hofstadgroup has been the subject of a wide variety of publications, ranging from academic 
works to journalistic accounts and government documents. Within this literature, four issues 
are identified that legitimize the present in-depth analysis of the group. First and foremost, 
existing publications on the group reflect the broader trend in research on terrorism in their 
heavy reliance on secondary sources. Furthermore, research on the Hofstadgroup has tended 
to be descriptive rather than explanatory and it has predominantly focused on a small number 
of participants, leaving the backgrounds and motives of the wider group relatively untouched. 
Finally, there has been a tendency to use singular theoretical perspectives that focus only on one 
of the many potential factors influencing involvement in terrorism identified in the literature. 
In short, the Hofstadgroup’s potential to inform the debate on how and why involvement in 
European homegrown jihadism occurs has not yet been fully realized.
1.3.1 Journalistic accounts of the Hofstadgroup
Some journalistic accounts have provided descriptions and initial analyses of the main events 
and actors in the Hofstadgroup timeline.30 Others have produced in-depth biographies and 
background pieces on particular participants.31 Most of these pieces utilize at least some primary 
sources, such as interviews with former participants or their acquaintances,32 information 
derived from court cases33 or even data from police files.34 Particularly noteworthy is Groen and 
Kranenberg’s groundbreaking book on the various women in and around the Hofstadgroup. 
Based on interviews collected over two years, it offers invaluable first-hand perspectives on what 
drove these individuals to become involved.35 Similarly, Vermaat’s account of the trials against 
Hofstadgroup participants is especially valuable for its inclusion of verbatim transcripts of what 
was said during the proceedings.36
30 Jutta Chorus and Ahmet Olgun, In godsnaam: het jaar van Theo van Gogh (Amsterdam: Contact, 2005); Sanne 
Groot Koerkamp and Marije Veerman, Het slapende leger: een zoektocht naar jonge jihad-sympathisanten in 
Nederland (Amsterdam: Rothschild & Bach, 2006); Steven Derix, “Hoe kwam toch die vingerafdruk op B.’s brief?,” 
NRC Handelsblad, 27 July 2005; Jaco Alberts and Steven Derix, “Het mysterie van de onbekende extremist,” NRC 
Handelsblad, 29 October 2005; Emerson Vermaat, De Hofstadgroep: portret van een radicaal-islamitisch netwerk 
(Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2005).
31 Jutta Chorus and Ahmet Olgun, Broeders: tien jaar na de moord op Theo van Gogh (Amsterdam / Antwerp: 
Atlas Contact, 2014); Jutta Chorus and Ahmet Olgun, “Op de thee bij de jongens van de Hofstadgroep,” NRC 
Handelsblad, 10 September 2011; Arjan Erkel, Samir (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2007); Jaco Alberts et al., 
“De wereld van Mohammed B,” NRC Handelsblad, 9 July 2005; Mayke Calis, “’Iedereen wil martelaar zijn’; het 
avontuur van de Amsterdamse moslim Mo (16),” Rotterdams Dagblad, 29 March 2003.
32 Chorus and Olgun, In godsnaam; Groot Koerkamp and Veerman, Het slapende leger.
33 Vermaat, De Hofstadgroep; Emerson Vermaat, Nederlandse jihad: het proces tegen de Hofstadgroep (Soesterberg: 
Aspekt, 2006).
34 Siem Eikelenboom, Niet bang om te sterven: dertig jaar terrorisme in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 
2007), 10-11.
35 Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 17.
36 Vermaat, Nederlandse jihad.
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Many of these accounts provide informative introductions to the Hofstadgroup case and detailed 
descriptions of events. Yet on the whole, the journalistic literature on the Hofstadgroup is unable 
to provide a comprehensive explanation of the factors that governed the processes by which its 
participants became involved. Owing to their journalistic rather academic point of departure, 
these publications tend to focus on description and informed speculation rather than systematic 
and theoretically grounded analysis. Furthermore, the empirically most valuable works have 
limited their focus to specific individuals or segments of the group. Erkel’s biography of a 
leading participant, which mixes information derived from interviews with fiction, is a case in 
point. As is Groen and Kranenberg’s book; while it utilizes extensive interviews, it focuses almost 
exclusively on the women in the group. The journalistic literature offers a springboard into the 
Hofstadgroup’s world, but leaves considerable uncharted territory.
1.3.2 Primary-sources based academic research on the Hofstadgroup 
Within the academic literature on the Hofstadgroup, a general distinction can be made between 
studies that utilize primary sources and those that do not. The use of interviews or materials 
produced by participants makes works in the first category especially valuable. Peters, for instance, 
has used the texts written and translated by Van Gogh’s killer to write an in-depth analysis of 
the latter’s ideological development.37 Several other authors have used interviews to produce 
biographies of people in and around the Hofstadgroup that provide insights into how and why 
they became participants.38 There are also numerous descriptive and historical studies based on a 
mix of secondary sources and primary ones.39 Sageman’s account of the Hofstadgroup is a good 
example in this regard.40 Even though it contains no references whatsoever, it is so detailed that it 
strongly suggests that he had access to police or intelligence information.
De Koning et al. have produced three publications that are notable for utilizing primary sources, 
looking at the Hofstadgroup in its entirety and being explanatory rather than descriptive in 
focus. One uses social movement theory to argue that the Hofstadgroup’s development was 
37 Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling,” 1-87; Ruud Peters, “Dutch extremist Islamism: Van Gogh’s 
murderer and his ideas,” in Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge: European and American experiences, 
ed. Rik Coolsaet (Farnham / Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 145-159.
38 Beatrice De Graaf, Gevaarlijke vrouwen: tien militante vrouwen in het vizier (Amsterdam: Boom, 2012), 249-
290; Martijn De Koning, “Changing worldviews and friendship: an exploration of the life stories of two female 
salafists in the Netherlands,” in Global salafism: Islam’s new religious movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London / New 
York: Hurst, 2009), 372-392; Marion Van San, Stijn Sieckelinck, and Micha De Winter, Idealen op drift: een 
pedagogische kijk op radicaliserende jongeren (The Hague: Boom, 2010), 44-53.
39 Albert Benschop, “Chronicle of a political murder foretold,” Sociosite, http://www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_
en.php; Marieke De Goede and Beatrice De Graaf, “Sentencing risk: temporality and precaution in terrorism 
trials,” International Political Sociology 7, no. 3 (2013): 319-323; Beatrice De Graaf, “The nexus between salafism 
and jihadism in the Netherlands,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 3 (2010): 18-20; Beatrice De Graaf, “The Van Gogh murder 
and beyond,” in The evolution of the global terrorist threat: from 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s death, ed. Bruce 
Hoffman and Fernando Reinares (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 101-142.
40 Marc Sageman, “Hofstad case & the blob theory,” in Theoretical frames on pathways to violent radicalization, ed. 
Scott Atran, Marc Sageman, and Rogier Rijpkema (ARTIS Research & Modelling, 2009), 13-29, 82-99.
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influenced by the increasingly strident debate on the role of Islam in the Netherlands and 
the accommodating response of Dutch Salafist mosques.41 Another relies on the concept of 
governmentality to make a similar point and interprets the group as a rebellious response to the 
Dutch government’s integration and counter-radicalization efforts.42 A third contribution, based 
on the idea of transnationalism, posits that the behavior of Hofstadgroup participants reflected 
the transposition of global conflicts, in this case a presumed Western war against Islam, to a local 
setting.43
All of these primary-sources based academics studies have made valuable contributions to 
understanding the Hofstadgroup. But like the journalistic accounts discussed earlier, they cannot 
provide a comprehensive account of participants’ involvement processes. First of all because none 
of these works explicitly focus on this question. The publications that provide an overview of 
events are good at detailing what happened, but their descriptive focus means that they can only 
partially explain why or how the group came to be. In-depth studies of particular participants 
reveal a lot about these individuals’ motivations, their worldviews and involvement processes, 
but little about the rest of the group. De Koning et al.’s contributions usefully demonstrate the 
influence that particular factors had in bringing about involvement in the Hofstadgroup, yet as 
chapter 2 details, the factors that influence how and why people become involved in terrorism 
are interrelated and spread over several levels of analysis.44 While singular theoretical perspectives 
can illuminate the influence of a particular variable, they leave the potential influence of many 
others unaddressed.45
1.3.3 Secondary-sources based academic research on the Hofstadgroup
Only a small number of academic studies on the Hofstadgroup use primary sources. For the 
most part, this literature relies on newspaper articles or existing publications to substantiate 
the arguments being put forward. The questionable reliability of media reporting on terrorism, 
which is discussed in detail in chapter 2, has had the unfortunate result of casting doubt on the 
accuracy and completeness of many accounts of the Hofstadgroup found in this category. This 
41 De Koning and Meijer, “Going all the way,” 234-235; Martijn De Koning, “’Moge hij onze ogen openen’: de 
radicale utopie van het ‘salafisme’,” Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2, no. 2 (2011): 54-55.
42 Martijn De Koning, “’We reject you’ - ‘Counter conduct’ and radicalisation of the Dutch Hofstad network,” 
in Radikaler Islam im Jugendalter: Erscheinungsformen, Ursachen und Kontexte, ed. Maruta Herding (Halle: 
Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2013), 105.
43 Edien Bartels and Martijn De Koning, “Submission and a ritual murder. The transnational aspects of a local 
conflict and protest,” in Local battles, global stakes: the globalization of local conflicts and the localization of global 
interests, ed. Ton Salman and Marjo De Theije (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2011), 30-31, 33.
44 E.g.: Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, Islamist radicalisation: a root cause model (The Hague: Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009), 21-27.
45 Eyerman does use multiple theoretical perspectives to study the murder of Van Gogh but his work is not 
concerned with studying how involvement in the Hofstadgroup came about, nor does it utilize primary sources 
based data: Ron Eyerman, The assassination of Theo van Gogh: from social drama to cultural trauma (Durham / 
London: Duke University Press, 2008).
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problematizes how much we can confidently assert to know about what the Hofstadgroup was, 
what it did and what led its participants to become involved.46
The benefits of hindsight and access to primary sources reveal that numerous secondary-sources 
based explanations for the Hofstadgroup contain inaccuracies. This is a particularly prevalent 
issue in early studies of the group, where authors had little choice but to rely on media reports. For 
example, there is no reliable basis for the idea that Van Gogh’s murderer was directly motivated 
to kill by the escalation of the Iraq war,47 Dutch counterterrorism measures48 or European 
immigration policies.49 It is also disputable that the group was led by Van Gogh’s killer,50 that 
it had a distinct organizational structure,51 planned to assassinate Portuguese Prime Minister 
José Barroso52 or had links to al-Qaeda.53 Similarly, the claims that Van Gogh’s assailant became 
violent after being turned down by a girl,54 that his violent act followed unsuccessful attempts to 
carve out a place in Dutch society55 or that two individuals arrested in June 2005 were on their 
way to kill a Dutch politician lack a reliable empirical basis.56 
Of course, none of this is to say that the secondary-sources based literature on the Hofstadgroup 
should be dismissed out of hand. It includes many insightful overviews of events and interesting 
46 Frazer Egerton, “The Internet and militant jihadism: global to local re-imaginings,” in Cyber-conflict and global 
politics, ed. Athina Karatzogianni (Abingdon / New York: Routledge, 2008), 116-121; Frazer Egerton, Jihad in 
the West: the rise of militant Salafism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 75-83, 114, 121, 125, 129, 
150-151; Eyerman, The assassination of Theo van Gogh, 5; Lawrence E. Likar, Eco-warriors, nihilistic terrorists, 
and the environment (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 107-108, 113-115, 228-229; Clark McCauley and Sophia 
Moskalenko, Friction: how radicalization happens to them and us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 85-
88; Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, Eurojihad: patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 78, 130; Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: 
the homegrown threat,” (New York: New York Police Department, 2007), 24-25, 32-33, 38, 40, 47-48; Renée Van 
der Hulst, “Terroristische netwerken en intelligence: een sociale netwerkanalyse van de Hofstadgroep,” Tijdschrift 
voor Veiligheid 8, no. 2 (2009): 14-15.
47 Petter Nesser, “The slaying of the Dutch filmmaker - religiously motivated violence or Islamist terrorism in the 
name of global jihad?,” (Kjeller: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2005), 8-9, 20, 22, 24-25; Petter 
Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe after the invasion of Iraq: tracing motivational influences from the Iraq war 
on jihadist terrorism in Western Europe,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 332-337.
48 Nesser, “The slaying of the Dutch filmmaker,” 8, 20, 24.
49 Petter Nesser, “Lessons learned from the September 2007 German terrorist plot,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 4 (2008): 3.
50 Petter Nesser, “How did Europe’s global jihadis obtain training for their militant causes?,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 20, no. 2 (2008): 246.
51 Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 337-338, 340.
52 Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad group: the new face terrorist networks in Europe,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
30, no. 7 (2007): 583; Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s mujahideen: where mass immigration meets global terrorism,” 
(Center for Immigration Studies, 2005), 5; Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: the new battleground of 
international jihad (New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), 344-345.
53 Paul Wilkinson, “International terrorism: the changing threat and the EU’s response,” in Chaillot Papers 
(European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 22-23.
54 Transnational Terrorism Security & the Rule of Law Project, “The ‘Hofstadgroep’,” in TTSRL Contextual Papers 
(The Hague: TTSRL, 2008), 6.
55 Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: the death of Theo van Gogh and the limits of tolerance (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2007), 22-23; Michael Jacobson, The West at war: U.S. and European counterterrorism efforts, post 
September 11 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 6.
56 Katharina Von Knop, “The female jihad: Al Qaeda’s women,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 405.
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hypotheses on how and why involvement came about. This segment of the literature also 
encompasses publications whose value is primarily their ability to be thought provoking. For 
instance, Cliteur has argued that excessive political correctness has prevented a full appreciation 
of the group’s Islamist motivations.57 Likewise, there are various pieces that assert58 or dispute59 
that the Hofstadgroup can be linked to the failure of multiculturalism that are essentially societal 
critiques. Nevertheless, moving towards a more complete and accurate understanding of the 
various factors that underlay the involvement processes of its participants necessitates the use of 
more reliable sources of information.
1.3.4 Insights by proxy
A third set of publications provide insights by proxy. De Poot et al. have conducted a study on 
the various homegrown jihadist networks active in the Netherlands between 2001 and 2005, of 
which the Hofstadgroup was one.60 These authors use police files to provide insights into a range 
of factors relevant to these groups, such as their members’ socioeconomic backgrounds or their 
daily routines. However, because such findings are agglomerated and completely anonymized, it is 
difficult to isolate which are specific to the Hofstadgroup. The autobiography of Yehya Kaddouri, 
who was not a Hofstadgroup participant but was arrested in September 2004 on suspicion of 
preparing a terrorist attack, gives a first-hand impression of how a young Dutch Muslim became 
involved in militant Islamism.61 It draws particular attention to the role of the Internet, news of 
violence perpetrated by and against Muslims and feelings of discrimination as facilitating and 
motivating such involvement.62 
Several scholars have undertaken empirical studies of the Dutch Muslim community from which 
useful parallels with the Hofstadgroup can be drawn. Because the group’s participants were 
ideologically strongly influenced by the fundamentalist ‘Salafist’ interpretation of Islam, Roex et 
57 Paul Cliteur, “De ‘eigen-schuldtheorie’ en de betekenis van 10 november 2004,” Ethische Perspectieven 15, no. 
3 (2005): 185-197; Paul Cliteur, “Religieus terrorisme en de lankmoedige elite,” in Gaat de elite ons redden? De 
nieuwe rol van de bovenlaag in onze samenleving, ed. Krijn Van Beek and Marcel Van Ham (Amsterdam: Van 
Gennep, 2007), 207-235; Cliteur, “Waarom terrorisme werkt,” 307-345.
58 Robert Carle, “Demise of Dutch multiculturalism,” Society 43, no. 3 (2006): 68-74; Bart Jan Spruyt, “’Can’t we 
discuss this?’ Liberalism and the challenge of Islam in the Netherlands,” Orbis 51, no. 2 (2007): 320-321; Robert 
S. Leiken, “Europe’s angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005): 120-126; Leiken, “Europe’s mujahideen,” 
3-6; Abigail R. Esman, Radical state: how jihad is winning over democracy in the west (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 
2010); M. Wessels, De radicaal-islamitische ideologie van de Hofstadgroep: de inhoud en de bronnen (The Hague: 
Teldersstichting, 2006), 24; Geert Mak, Nagekomen flessenpost (Amsterdam / Antwerp: Atlas, 2005), 34-37.
59 Paul Aarts and Fadi Hirzalla, “Lions of Tawhid in the Polder,” Middle East Report, no. 235 (2005): 18-23; Geert 
Mak, Gedoemd tot kwetsbaarheid (Amsterdam / Antwerp: Atlas, 2005), 20.
60 C.J. De Poot et al., Jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands: a description based on closed criminal investigations (The 
Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers / Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, 2011).
61 Yehya Kaddouri, Lach met de duivel: autobiografie van een ‘rotte appel’-Marokkaan (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 
2011).
62 Ibid., 10-34.
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al.’s in-depth analysis of the Dutch Salafism provides several informative insights.63 These include 
a description of the core aspects of this branch of Islam and field-work derived information on 
Dutch Salafists’ attitudes towards democracy and the degree to which they support violence.64 
Buijs et al. investigated how the convictions of ‘democratic’ and ‘radical’ Dutch Muslims differed 
and what drove the latter to become radicalized.65 Among their conclusions are the findings that 
radicalization can be the result of a reaction to perceived injustice, a search for meaning in life or 
a desire for social solidarity.66 
Slootman and Tillie conducted a study on why some Dutch Muslims in Amsterdam became 
radicalized. Their research is based partly on interviews with 12 young men in the ‘periphery’ of 
the Hofstadgroup.67 Unfortunately, ‘periphery’ does not appear to mean that these individuals 
actually participated in any direct sense in the Hofstadgroup but, rather, that they shared its 
interpretation of Islam. Their conclusions that radicalization is tied to very orthodox religious 
convictions and the perception that Muslims are treated unjustly and that Islam as a whole is 
threatened, are valuable nonetheless.68 The main benefit of these and the other ‘insights by proxy’ 
is that they draw attention to factors that influenced the radicalization of groups and individuals 
quite similar to the Hofstadgroup, thus hinting at factors with above-average explanatory 
potential.
1.3.5 Research on the Hofstadgroup by government agencies
Reports written by the AIVD, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism 
(NCTV) and the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) 
constitute the last category of publications on the Hofstadgroup. Although the AIVD report on the 
Hofstadgroup is largely descriptive, it does raise several potential explanations for involvement, 
such as peer pressure and the influence of a charismatic religious authority figure.69 These 
hypotheses are worthy of further investigation not in the least because the conclusions are drawn 
from information collected by the agency itself. The NCTV study is concerned with Internet 
usage by jihadists in general, but provides some relevant information on the Hofstadgroup in 
63 Ineke Roex, Sjef Van Stiphout, and Jean Tillie, “Salafisme in Nederland: aard, omvang en dreiging,” (Amsterdam: 
Institute for Migration & Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, 2010).
64 Ibid., 274-276, 280-282.
65 Frank J. Buijs, Froukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2006), 18.
66 Ibid., 251.
67 Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie, “Processen van radicalisering: waarom sommige Amsterdamse moslims 
radicaal worden,” (Amsterdam: Institute for Migration & Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, 2006), 3, 
85-106.
68 Ibid., 4.
69 General Intelligence and Security Service, “Violent jihad in the Netherlands,” 9, 37, 39-41. See also: Algemene 
Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, “Jihadistisch terrorisme in Nederland: dreiging en bestrijding,” in Terrorisme: 
studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding, ed. E.R. Muller, U. Rosenthal, and R. De Wijk (Deventer: Kluwer, 
2008), 88.
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this regard.70 The CTIVD reports are arguably the most useful of the three, as they detail when 
the AIVD began collecting intelligence on the Hofstadgroup and what it knew of Van Gogh’s 
murderer and possible accomplices.71 
1.4 Claim to originality
From journalistic accounts to government reports, while the best studies on the Hofstadgroup 
provide key parts of the overall puzzle, a comprehensive and robustly empirical account that 
explains individual involvement in the group is lacking. This knowledge gap provides the primary 
rationale for the current study, which makes a threefold contribution to the existing literature. 
First of all, it aims to improve our understanding of the factors that governed involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup. Secondly, because this group was not a unique phenomenon but one example 
of the broader European homegrown jihadist trend, the research will also provide insights into 
processes of involvement in this typology of terrorism in a more general sense. Finally, by utilizing 
extensive primary sources, this thesis aims to contribute to moving terrorism research toward a 
more empirically robust basis.
1.5 Research questions
Two important premises drawn from the literature on terrorism form the foundation of this 
thesis. Explained in detail in chapter 2, the first of these is that involvement in terrorism is best 
understood as the end-result of a complex process rather than a sudden or clearly made decision. 
Secondly, the involvement process is predicated on multiple factors that reside at the structural, 
group and individual levels of analysis.72 Structural-level analyses focus on the broader social, 
political and economic influences that shape motives and opportunities for engaging in terrorism. 
Group-level explanations focus on how social psychological processes influence group formation 
and the establishment of a social reality conducive to the adoption of extremist worldviews and 
violent behavior. Individual-level accounts for terrorism have focused on the personal histories 
of terrorist and asked whether mental health issues or personality profiles offer explanations for 
their involvement in violence.
The overarching question guiding this thesis is: What factors governed the involvement processes 
of participants the Hofstadgroup during its 2002-2005 existence? Based on the premises 
70 National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, “Jihadists and the Internet: 2009 update,” (The Hague: 
NCTV, 2010), 69.
71 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, “Toezichtsrapport met betrekking 
tot Mohammed B.,” 8-24; Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, 
“Toezichtsrapport over eventuele handlangers van Mohammed B.,” (The Hague: CTIVD, 2015), 1-41.
72 Randy Borum, Psychology of terrorism (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004), 23; John Horgan, Walking 
away from terrorism: accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 7-10; Max Taylor and John Horgan, “A conceptual framework for addressing psychological process in the 
development of the terrorist,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006): 586.
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outlined in the previous paragraph, three subsidiary research questions are formulated which 
function as stepping stones towards addressing the main research question. These are: How did 
(1) structural-level factors, (2) group-level factors and (3) individual-level factors influence 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup? It should be noted that the emphasis is on understanding 
processes of involvement rather than a singular process. It is apparent from the outset that even 
within this one particular group, not all participants thought and acted similarly. The fact that 
only a minority of Hofstadgroup participants actually planned or perpetrated acts of terrorist 
violence, is the most obvious example of this fact. How can such different forms of involvement 
be explained?
1.6 Research method
This thesis combines the author’s background in history with the interdisciplinary nature of 
the study of terrorism. The historical method is reflected in the emphasis placed on analyzing 
primary sources; police files on the Hofstadgroup and interviews with former participants as well 
as Dutch government employees involved in the case. Rather than letting these materials speak for 
themselves, however, the author studies this material through the multidisciplinary literature on 
involvement in terrorism. Essentially, existing explanations for involvement in terrorism are used 
as ‘lenses’ through which to study the available empirical data. Over the course of five chapters, 
structural, group and individual level explanations for involvement in terrorism are applied to 
the Hofstadgroup to see whether they can illuminate distinct explanatory variables. Each relevant 
explanation is briefly introduced, its main assumptions are identified and then applied to the 
Hofstadgroup to see if it offers meaningful insights.
This research method is a form of ‘process tracing’ that uses existing hypotheses rather than 
relying exclusively on a detailed narrative to identify the mechanisms that can explain how and 
why involvement in the Hofstadgroup materialized.73 Process tracing ‘attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process (…) between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome 
of the dependent variable’.74 In this case, examples of the dependent variable being assessed are an 
individual’s decision to become involved in the Hofstadgroup or his or her decision to commit an 
act of violence. The independent variables being used to explain these outcomes are the various 
existing hypotheses about involvement in terrorism. For instance, did geopolitical grievances 
motivate involvement? Was peer pressure a factor in sustaining that involvement?
This variety of process tracing has three distinct benefits. First, it allows for a theoretically 
guided and robustly empirical understanding of the factors that influenced involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup’s to emerge. Second, it provides a reflection on the applicability of the various 
hypotheses on involvement in terrorism to European homegrown jihadism as represented by 
73 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge 
/ London: MIT Press, 2005), 211.
74 Ibid., 206.
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the Hofstadgroup. Although single-case studies cannot provide conclusive evidence of a theory’s 
explanative potential or lack thereof, they can provide important empirical evidence relevant to 
those theories. This form of theory testing is especially important in the context of terrorism 
studies, as various authors have pointed to a tendency to develop explanations without sufficiently 
assessing their empirical validity.75 
A third benefit is that theory-guided process tracing can highlight hypotheses of above-average 
explanatory potential. In this case, process tracing can fulfill this function by underlining the 
most salient processes of involvement in European homegrown jihadism and by accounting for 
the different forms of involvement. Why did a minority actually use or plan to use violence 
while for most of their compatriots remained militant in words only? Additionally, this approach 
can provide insights into how various explanations for involvement in terrorism fit together or 
complement each other. Finally, theoretically-guided process tracing can disprove the applicability 
of hypotheses thought to be of general relevance.76
No research method is without its drawbacks, however. Perhaps the most salient one to note 
here is the deliberate choice to focus on breadth rather than depth. By using existing insights as 
analytical tools to better understand the processes that led to involvement in the Hofstadgroup, 
a broad perspective is gained on the variety of factors on which individuals’ participation was 
based. A downside is that no single explanatory variable or theory is itself studied truly in-depth. 
Many of the explanations used in this thesis are at the heart of decades of debate and research. 
The multicausal approach utilized here requires reducing the complexity of individual theories 
to a short summary of their constituting elements and the main lines of scholarly argument 
for the sake of clarity and space. An in-depth and empirically grounded analysis of the many 
theories discussed in these pages would undoubtedly be a fruitful avenue for future research on 
involvement in European homegrown jihadism.
Following the main research question’s focus on the factors that brought about involvement 
in the Hofstadgroup, the unit of analysis is the individual participant. Whether the discussion 
is on the structural-level influences such as poverty or on group-based processes such as peer 
pressure, the (implicit) question is always to what degree these factors exerted an influence on 
the young men and women who constituted the Hofstadgroup. After all, it was these individuals’ 
convictions, their backgrounds, their actions and their interactions with each other and the 
world outside of the group that made the Hofstadgroup what it was. This study is thus primarily 
concerned with charting the processes that led these people to become interested in a radical or 
75 Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher, “Examining the role of religion in radicalization to violent Islamist 
extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 12 (2012): 849-850; Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, 
“The radicalization of homegrown jihadists: a review of theoretical models and social psychological evidence,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 616; Brynjar Lia and Katja H-W Skjølberg, “Why terrorism 
occurs - a survey of theories and hypotheses on the causes of terrorism,” (Kjeller: Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment, 2000), 28; McAllister and Schmid, “Theories of terrorism,” 261.
76 George and Bennett, Case studies and theory development, 207, 220.
25
extremist interpretation of Islam, brought them together with like-minded individuals and, in a 
small number of cases, motivated them to commit or plan an act of terrorism.
1.7 Sources of information
This thesis utilizes two types of primary-sources. The most important of these in terms of the 
amount of information they contain and the frequency with which they are referenced are the 
files that the Dutch National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD) 
assembled during its investigations of Hofstadgroup suspects.77 Permission to use this material 
was granted following the submission of a formal written request to the office of the Prosecutor 
General.78 This data is supplemented with semi-structured interviews with Dutch government 
officials who were involved in the Hofstadgroup investigation and former participants in the 
Hofstadgroup itself. The following paragraphs provide further information on these sources and 
a critical assessment of their utility.
1.7.1 Using police files to study terrorism
The police files contain thousands of pages of information obtained in a variety of ways. 
Principally, these are the police’s interrogation of suspects and witnesses, the results of house 
searches, phone and Internet taps and a limited degree of information provided by the AIVD. 
Much of this material can be considered a primary source of information as it is a verbatim record 
of what Hofstadgroup participants said, wrote and did. Particularly useful are wiretapped phone 
calls and transcripts of online chat conversations as they are unaffected by the wish to downplay 
culpability or provide post-event rationalizations, factors that may diminish the reliability of 
police interrogations and interviews with researchers.79 
Another benefit of the police files is that they represent the totality of information gathered 
during the various investigations into the Hofstadgroup’s participants that followed the various 
arrests in 2003, 2004 and 2005. This makes them less subjective than the easier to find public 
prosecutors’ indictments, which only contain that information best thought to fit the prosecution’s 
77 The various police investigations were collated into two dossiers; 2004’s ‘RL8026’ and 2005’s ‘Piranha’. References 
to these files always list one of these dossiers, followed by a section reference if applicable, and a page number. In 
2013, the KLPD was renamed the National Unit (LE).
78 The Ministry of Security and Justice gave written permission to use the files for research purposes on 8 March 
2013.
79 Simon Cottee, “Jihadism as a subcultural response to social strain: extending Marc Sageman’s “bunch of guys” 
thesis,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 5 (2011): 743; Shandon Harris-Hogan, “Australian neo-jihadist 
terrorism: mapping the network and cell analysis using wiretap evidence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 
4 (2012): 298-314; Pete Lentini, “’If they know who put the sugar it means they know everything’: understanding 
terrorist activity using Operation Pendennis wiretap (listening device and telephone intercept) transcripts,” in 
ARC Linkage Project on Radicalisation (Monash University, Melbourne, Australia: Monash University, 2010), 
1-12; Marc Sageman, Leaderless jihad: terror networks in the twenty-first century (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 76.
26
case against the suspects. The quantity and quality of the information in the police files means 
that they provide researchers with valuable data on Hofstadgroup participants’ backgrounds, 
worldviews, and actions, as well as intragroup dynamics. Yet care must be taken not to see these 
files as a ‘holy grail’ for terrorism researchers. There are distinct drawbacks to their use that must 
be acknowledged if they are to contribute to a well-balanced analysis.
Police investigations are intended to gather evidence that can be used to charge suspects. This 
means that there can be a certain bias in the way information is collected and presented.80 It also 
means that the questions investigators posed to suspects and witnesses often differ from what a 
researcher would have liked to address. There is more emphasis on potential criminal offenses 
than on, for instance, group dynamics or the why of how of involvement. A related problem is the 
questionable reliability of statements derived from the interrogation of suspects and witnesses. 
Suspects in particular are liable to deny the allegations leveled at them, to distort the truth or 
to tell outright lies in order to escape sentencing. These limitations necessitate a critical attitude 
towards the files and the use of complementary sources where possible.
A second limitation of using these police files is that, despite their considerable size, they still 
provide only glimpses of the Hofstadgroup phenomenon. The files are based on criminal 
investigations and therefore primarily illuminate those events that occurred around the various 
arrests of group participants in October 2003, June 2004, November 2004 and June and October 
2005. The details of what happened before or between these dates are much less well covered, 
underlining the need to complement the files with information derived from other sources. 
Perhaps most problematic of all is the fact that the police files in question are not publicly 
accessible. This is a serious shortcoming with regard to the transparency of the results presented 
here. Crucially, however, the files are not a secret source. Although the application process is 
lengthy and cumbersome, researchers and other interested parties can apply for access to the very 
same materials that the author used and thus verify the claims being made here. To further avoid 
allegations of ‘masquerading behind a thin façade of privileged access to secret sources’,81 and 
to increase the reliability of the analysis, references to the files are complemented with publicly 
available sources where possible.82 Additionally, it should be noted that the use of confidential 
data is quite common in the social sciences; full interview transcripts, or information about the 
interviewees themselves, are seldom provided in publications. Finally, many pieces of information 
from the police files on the Hofstadgroup have been leaked to the press over the years and can 
80 Lentini, “’If they know who put the sugar’,” 6-7.
81 Magnus Ranstorp, “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11: an academic field of old problems and new prospects,” 
in Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda, ed. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning 
(New York / Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 26.
82 See also: Cale Horne and John Horgan, “Methodological triangulation in the analysis of terrorist networks,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 2 (2012): 182-192.
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be easily accessed online. Wherever applicable, references to such sources in the public domain 
are provided.
1.7.2 Using interviews to study terrorism
Twelve semi-structured interviews have been used as sources. Seven of these were held with Dutch 
government employees involved in the Hofstadgroup case in some capacity and five were held 
with former Hofstadgroup participants. The government employees comprised of two public 
prosecutors, two police investigators, one NCTV analyst, one AIVD analyst and one community 
policing officer. In addition to these interviews, the author also spoke with academics and 
journalists who had previously conducted work on the Hofstadgroup and with defense attorneys 
involved in the case. It should be noted that another nine former Hofstadgroup participants 
were also approached for an interview but declined, did not reply or were not allowed to speak 
with the author due to the terms of their release on probation. One former participant could 
not be contacted because the Dutch prison authorities declined the request for an interview. 
One government employee involved in the case also declined to be interviewed. Unless explicitly 
stated otherwise, ‘interviews’ always refer to data collected by the author and not to police 
interrogations of suspects or witnesses. All the interviews were held in Dutch, which means that 
all direct quotations encountered in these pages have been translated to English by the author.
The semi-structured interview format used here has several advantages. The interviewer 
decides beforehand the topics he or she wishes to discuss but, in contrast to the more formal 
fully-structured interview, leaves room for the interview to develop in unforeseen directions.83 
This allows semi-structured interviews to generate information that the interviewer had not 
anticipated beforehand. By coming across more as a conversation than as a formal, question-
by-question interrogation, semi-structured interviews can also help make interviewees feel 
comfortable.84 This is especially beneficial when sensitive or controversial topics are discussed, 
such as someone’s past involvement in extremism or terrorism.
Interviewees were approached in several ways. The Dutch government employees were either 
contacted via publicly available e-mail addresses or introduced to the author via his professional 
contacts. The majority of former Hofstadgroup participants were found through the Internet 
and social media websites. Two were contacted through introductions. None of the interviewees 
were under any kind of obligation to speak with the author. Most seemed motivated by a simple 
willingness to help, a chance to speak about a formative period in their lives or professional 
careers or the ability to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the Hofstadgroup. 
83 Yan Zhang and Barbara M. Wildemuth, “Unstructured interviews,” in Applications of social research methods 
to questions in information and library science, ed. Barbara M. Wildemuth (Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited, 
2009), 222.
84 Jerrold M. Post and Anat Berko, “Talking with terrorists,” Democracy and Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 147.
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As most interviewees did not allow a recording device to be used, the author largely relied on 
handwritten notes.
Information gathered through interviews was utilized in several ways. The government employees 
were closely involved in investigating, monitoring or prosecuting the Hofstadgroup. Interviews 
with these individuals were primarily served to establish a detailed chronology of events and to 
assess the validity of information found in other sources, such as newspaper articles.85 Interviews 
with former Hofstadgroup participants were also used in these capacities, but held two additional 
benefits. Of particular importance was their ability to act as a counterweight to the ‘official’ take 
on events represented by the police files. Interviews with former participants restored a degree of 
balance to what would otherwise have been an almost absolute reliance on materials produced by 
the Dutch authorities. These interviews were also an ideal way of gaining more information on 
participants’ personal backgrounds and motives, as well as an insiders’ perspective on the group’s 
functioning and internal dynamics.86 
Like the police files, the use of interviews poses several concerns. One is their representativeness. 
Because most former Hofstadgroup participants were not willing to be interviewed or could not 
be found, the author essentially utilized ‘opportunity sampling’, interviewing only those who 
happened to be accessible and willing to talk.87 This means that it is unclear how representative 
these interviewees are for the group as a whole. Another issue with using interviews is assessing 
their reliability. Ulterior motives such as the wish to justify past conduct or to avoid admitting 
mistakes can degrade the truthfulness of interviewees’ accounts. Furthermore, to what degree 
can people be expected to accurately recall what they thought or how they felt many years ago?88 
While interviews can afford unique insights, these issues underline the need to remain critical of 
data gathered using this method. 
1.8 Ethical guidelines
The use of interviews and data taken from police files posed several privacy and security-related 
concerns. The author followed the guidelines for the use of personal data set out by the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (KNAW).89 In addition, the Dutch Ministry of 
Security and Justice, the police files’ owner, stipulated several conditions for their use. The most 
important measure taken to ensure the privacy and safety of the individuals discussed in this 
85 Oisín Tansey, “Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling,” Political Science & 
Politics 40, no. 4 (2007): 766.
86 John Horgan, “Interviewing the terrorists: reflections on fieldwork and implications for psychological research,” 
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 4, no. 3 (2012): 198-199; Post and Berko, “Talking with 
terrorists,” 146.
87 Silke, “The devil you know,” 8.
88 Tansey, “Process tracing and elite interviewing,” 767.
89 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Gedragscode voor gebruik van persoonsgegevens in 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003).
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thesis is anonymization. No interviewee or Hofstadgroup participant is referred to by their actual 
name. Although this measure negatively affects the thesis’ readability, it is a drawback that is 
outweighed by the benefits in terms of reliability and detail that access to these sources provides. 
The one partial exception is a Syrian preacher, who is referred to by his nom de guerre ‘Abu 
Khaled’. As a central figure in the group, using this moniker ensures a balance between anonymity 
and readability.
1.9 A note on terminology
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to one or even a handful of causes. 
To avoid the implied causality attached to the word ‘causes’, this thesis prefers to use the term 
‘factor’. However, because the literature on involvement in terrorism itself frequently uses the 
word ‘causes’, this term will still be encountered during discussions of existing explanations. 
With regard to ‘involvement’, this thesis utilizes a broad definition that sees it as the process of 
becoming a participant in an extremist or terrorist group in some capacity. As such, involvement 
encompasses a spectrum of activities, ranging from the relatively benign, such as attending group 
gatherings, to the clearly violent such as planning or perpetrating acts of terrorism. 
1.10 Thesis outline
The thesis consists of ten chapters. Chapter two presents a theoretical perspective on researching 
terrorism. It underlines the need for a primary-sources based approach and details why three 
levels of analysis are used to study the factors that governed involvement in the Hofstadgroup. 
Chapters three and four provide the necessary background on the group. The first of these 
presents a chronological overview of the most important events in the Hofstadgroup’s timeline 
to familiarize readers with what happened. The second contextual chapter takes a critical look at 
what the group was; to what extent are the labels ‘homegrown’, ‘jihadist’ and ‘terrorist’ actually 
applicable to the Hofstadgroup and how can it be characterized organizationally?
The empirical analysis is presented in chapters five through nine. The first of these looks at 
structural factors influencing involvement in terrorism, such as poverty, geopolitics and intergroup 
inequality. Because of the large number of hypotheses relevant to the Hofstadgroup, the group 
level of analysis is spread over chapters six and seven. The former deals with group formation 
whereas the latter looks at group-based motives for terrorist violence. The individual level of 
analysis is also spread over two chapters; chapter eight focuses on cognitive explanations for 
involvement in terrorism, essentially studying how distinct ways of thinking about and perceiving 
the world can contribute to involvement in terrorism. Chapter nine utilizes numerous theories 
that relate involvement in terrorism to psychological characteristics such as mental illness, or to 
the influence of emotions such as frustration, anger and fear of death. Chapter ten concludes 
the thesis by drawing together the main findings, assessing their implications for academics and 
policy makers and looking ahead to fruitful avenues for future research.
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2. Studying involvement in terrorism
2.1 Introduction
This chapter details the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the multicausal 
framework used to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup. This discussion is preceded by a look 
at the various issues affecting research on terrorism in order to underline the importance of using 
primary-sources based data. What are their benefits compared to secondary sources and why 
have terrorism researchers found it so difficult to incorporate them into their work? The chapter 
closes by providing definitions for commonly used but controversial terms such as ‘terrorism’, 
‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’.
2.2 Issues in terrorism research
Research on terrorism has a strong multidisciplinary character. Academic perspectives used to 
study this form of political violence range from psychology, sociology, political science, history, 
economics, criminology and anthropology to international relations, law, the military sciences 
and critical theory.90 Given this diversity in terrorism researchers’ backgrounds, the associated 
differences in the methodologies used and the thus far limited attempts at integrating these 
perspectives, it is not surprising to find scholarship on terrorism spread over several subfields.91 
However, the absence of a single field of terrorism studies is not necessarily an impediment 
to academic progress. As Schmid concludes his 2011 review of the literature on terrorism; a 
‘fairly solid body of consolidated knowledge has emerged’.92 More worrying are the various and 
longstanding concerns over the quality of this research.
Contrary to the claims of the recently created discipline of Critical Terrorism Studies,93 there 
is a long history of critical reflection among established terrorism scholars.94 In the 1980s, 
authors like Crenshaw, Reich and Schmid and Jongman critiqued existing research for being 
90 Schmid, “The literature on terrorism,” 458; Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “The role of history and continuity in terrorism 
research,” in Mapping terrorism research: state of the art, gaps and future directions, ed. Magnus Ranstorp (New 
York / Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 51-75; Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds., 
Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda (New York / Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); Jeffrey A. Sluka, Hearts 
and minds, water and fish: support for the IRA and the INLA in a Northern Irish ghetto (Greenwich / London: JAI 
Press, 1989).
91 Edna F. Reid and Hsinchun Chen, “Mapping the contemporary terrorism research domain,” International 
Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65, no. 1 (2007): 44, 53; Joshua Sinai, “New trends in terrorism studies: 
strengths and weaknesses,” in Mapping terrorism research: state of the art, gaps and future directions, ed. Magnus 
Ranstorp (New York / Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 32.
92 Schmid, “The literature on terrorism,” 470.
93 Richard Jackson, “The core commitments of critical terrorism studies,” European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 
244-246.
94 John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle, “A case against ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 
1 (2008): 51-53.
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unsystematic, a-historical and alarmist,95 prone to unwarranted overgeneralizations and attempts 
to explain complex behavior in monocausal terms96 as well as impressionistic, superficial and 
pretentious.97 More recently, critics have pointed to the discrepancy between the small number 
of dedicated terrorism scholars and the multitude of one-time contributors, many of whom are 
non-academics or lack terrorism-related expertise.98 The result, these critics claim, has been a 
post-9/11 deluge of ill-informed and methodologically naïve works. 
Fortunately, research on terrorism has seen important signs of progress and maturation in recent 
years.99 Improvements include an increase in collaborative research, a broadening of scholars’ 
interest beyond topics related to Islamist terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, a greater 
number of dedicated researchers and more variety in methodological approaches.100 Scholars 
have also drawn attention to the valuable knowledge gained since 9/11, for instance on risk 
factors for the occurrence of terrorism or the finding that radical beliefs alone are insufficient to 
explain involvement in this form of violence.101 Given these encouraging signs, the 2014 claim of 
a leading terrorism scholar that research on the subject has ‘stagnated’ seems overly pessimistic.102 
Yet his concern that terrorism research has been too heavily reliant on secondary sources of 
information for too long, cannot be overlooked.
2.2.1 An overreliance on secondary sources
In 1988, Schmid and Jongman remarked that ‘there are probably few areas […] where so much 
is written on the basis of so little research’.103 They were referring the fact that very few terrorism 
researchers actually collected new data on their subject. Instead, most of them used the existing 
secondary literature, consisting of other academic works on terrorism but also media reports, as 
95 Martha Crenshaw, “The psychology of political terrorism,” in Political psychology, ed. Margaret G. Hermann (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1986), 381.
96 Walter Reich, “Understanding terrorist behavior: the limits and opportunities of psychological inquiry,” in 
Origins of terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), 261-271.
97 Ranstorp, “Mapping terrorism studies,” 14.
98 Ibid., 14-15; Andrew Silke, “An introduction to terrorism research,” in Research on terrorism: trends, achievements 
and failures, ed. Andrew Silke (London / New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 1-2; Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining terror: 
how experts invented ‘terrorism’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7, 12-13, 44, 46.
99 M.L.R. Smith, “William of Ockham, where are you when we need you? Reviewing modern terrorism studies,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 44, no. 2 (2009): 334.
100 Silke, “Contemporary terrorism studies,” 39-41, 46-47; Adam Dolnik, ed. Conducting terrorism field research: a 
guide (London / New York: Routledge, 2013).
101 Jessica Stern, “Response to Marc Sageman’s ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 608; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Some things we think we’ve learned 
since 9/11: a commentary on Marc Sageman’s ‘The stagnation in terrorism research’,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 602; David H. Schanzer, “No easy day: government roadblocks and the unsolvable 
problem of political violence: a response to Marc Sageman’s ‘The stagnation in terrorism research’,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 598.
102 Sageman, “The stagnation in terrorism research,” 569.
103 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, 
theories, and literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 179.
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the basis for their own conclusions. More than a decade later, Silke found that little had changed; 
publications on terrorism were still characterized by an overreliance on secondary sources and 
the predominance of literature-review based methods.104 There has been little improvement 
since; a 2006 study found that just 3 percent of research on terrorism was based on empirical 
analysis.105 A 2008 publication reached the conclusion that only 20 percent of articles provided 
previously unavailable data106 and in 2014 Sageman lamented that terrorism researchers were still 
unable to access and utilize primary sources.107
An almost exclusive reliance on secondary sources means that researchers are developing theories 
that are insufficiently rooted in empirical evidence or rehashing existing findings rather than 
adding new insights. A second problem is that there is a marked qualitative difference between 
secondary and primary sources, especially when those secondary sources are newspaper articles 
rather than academic publications. Whereas primary sources typically provide information 
based on the direct observation of, or participation in, a certain subject, secondary sources relate 
information indirectly. The lack of a first-hand perspective may introduce inaccuracies and the 
subjectivity inherent in the act of relaying information may have diminished its reliability.108 The 
qualitative differences between primary and secondary sources become all the more pronounced 
when the complexity of the subject of study increases. 
There is little room for a reporter to make factual errors or misinterpret what happened when 
reporting on something as straightforward as a car crash. But the chances of this occurring when 
covering terrorism are considerably greater. The illegal and secretive nature of terrorism means 
that even such an ostensibly straightforward task as establishing a chronology of events can be 
a difficult undertaking. Journalists are often among the first to tackle these questions, a fact well 
illustrated by the numerous books on al-Qaeda written by investigative journalists shortly after 
the 9/11 attacks.109 When such accounts are well-researched, they can form valuable sources of 
information. The more problematic aspect of relying on the journalistic literature is terrorism 
scholars’ heavy use of much shorter and less extensively researched newspaper articles, which 
are frequently published mere hours after the events they relate transpired and thus raise critical 
questions concerning their accuracy and the comprehensiveness of the account presented.
On the one hand, media sources are a necessary staple in terrorism research as they are often the 
only readily available type of information. Yet their usefulness is marred by several concerns. First 
104 Silke, “The devil you know,” 4-9.
105 Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison J. Sherley, “The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies,” 
Campbell Systematic Reviews, no. 2 (2006): 8.
106 Silke, “Holy warriors,” 101.
107 Sageman, “The stagnation in terrorism research,” 569-572.
108 David W. Stewart and Michael A. Kamins, “Evaluating secondary sources,” in Secondary research: information 
sources and methods, ed. David W. Stewart and Michael A. Kamins (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1993), 17-32.
109 E.g.: Peter L. Bergen, Holy war: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001); Jason 
Burke, Al-Qaeda: casting a shadow of terror (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003).
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of all, newspapers and their reporters are selective in the stories they pursue.110 For instance, they 
tend to under-report or simply ignore failed or foiled terrorist attacks.111 Secondly, newspapers 
and other media outlets may be of questionable objectivity, colored by political leanings or a 
simple desire to attract readership through sensationalist reporting. Furthermore, the reliability 
and objectivity of reporters’ sources can be hard to ascertain.112 Perhaps most problematic of 
all, media sources too frequently contain factual errors.113 In sum, these problems make media 
sources unsuited to functioning as the main, let alone the only source of data used in academic 
research on terrorism.
Recent years have seen signs of a broadening of methodological approaches and indications that 
the overreliance on secondary sources may not be as pronounced in every subfield of terrorism 
research.114 These are promising trends, yet the scarcity of primary-sources based research 
remains a key concern in the academic study of terrorism.115 Given that most publications cite 
secondary literature that, in turn, refers to yet another set of academic works, and that at the end 
of this referral chain the empirical data often consists of media accounts, a worrisome situation 
has developed. Much research on terrorism resembles a ‘highly unreliable closed and circular 
research system, functioning in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop’.116 More empirical work 
that utilizes high-quality sources is urgently needed to move the study of terrorism forward.117
Why has this lack of primary-sources based research persisted? Crucially, terrorism is in a difficult 
subject to study empirically.118 One way to gather primary sources is through interviews with 
(former) terrorists. While these are more common than might be assumed,119 finding and gaining 
access to individuals that engage(d) in illegal and violent activities is time consuming and by no 
means guaranteed to succeed.120 All the more so when interviews are undertaken during fieldwork 
110 Roberto Franzosi, “The press as a source of socio-historical data: issues in the methodology of data collection 
from newspapers,” Historical Methods 20, no. 1 (1987): 6.
111 Schmid, “The literature on terrorism,” 461.
112 Silke, “The devil you know,” 6; Franzosi, “The press as a source of socio-historical data,” 6.
113 Silke, “The devil you know,” 5-6; Tom Quiggin, “Words matter: peer review as a failing safeguard,” Perspectives 
on Terrorism 7, no. 2 (2013): 71-81; Frederick Schulze, “Breaking the cycle: empirical research and postgraduate 
studies on terrorism,” in Research on terrorism: trends, achievements and failures, ed. Andrew Silke (London / New 
York: Frank Cass, 2004), 163.
114 Silke, “Contemporary terrorism studies,” 40-41, 48; Peter Neumann and Scott Kleinmann, “How rigorous is 
radicalization research?,” Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013): 372.
115 Schmid, “The literature on terrorism,” 460; Sageman, “The stagnation in terrorism research,” 565-580.
116 Adam Dolnik, “Conducting field research on terrorism: a brief primer,” Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 2 (2011): 
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abroad. Although the potential dangers of fieldwork are generally described as manageable, they 
cannot be overlooked.121 Fieldwork or interviews also require ethics approval, which may form 
a considerable obstacle in itself.122 Especially after the 2014 Boston College controversy, where 
researchers were forced to hand over interviews with members of the Irish Republican Army to 
the Northern Irish police, breaching the interviewees’ confidentiality and leading to the arrest of 
Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams.123
Government organizations such as law enforcement and intelligence agencies are another 
potential source of primary data on terrorism. However, most researchers lack security clearances 
and organizations involved in counterterrorism are generally reluctant to share their information 
for security and privacy related reasons.124 Databases with information on terrorists and terrorist 
events constitute a third source of empirical data.125 However, the media-based foundation of 
many databases raises critical questions about their reliability.126 Gaining primary-sources based 
data on terrorism is certainly not impossible, but these obstacles go some way towards explaining 
its scarcity.
2.3 Making sense of involvement in terrorism
No less important than high quality data is making sense of it.127 The rationale behind the 
multicausal approach to understanding involvement in the Hofstadgroup is built on a review 
of the literature on involvement in terrorism128, which revealed four key insights. First of all, 
there is no single, generally applicable ‘theory of terrorism’.129 Instead, with regard to its causes 
alone the literature is able to identify almost fifty separate hypotheses.130 Secondly, most of these 
explanations lack robust empirical verification.131 Both issues make it difficult to choose one 
121 Dolnik, “Conducting field research,” 4; Horgan, “The case for firsthand research,” 48-50; Schulze, “Breaking the 
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123 Jon Marcus, “Oral history: where next after the Belfast Project?,” Times Higher Education, 5 June 2014.
124 Lentini, “’If they know who put the sugar’,” 7; Marc Sageman, “Low return on investment,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 616; John Horgan, “Issues in terrorism research,” The Police Journal 70, no. 3 (1997): 
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particular theoretical approach to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup. After all, how to justify 
choosing one out of dozens of possible approaches, particularly when the validity of many of 
them has not been adequately ascertained?
Thirdly, studies that emphasize one particular hypothesis, such as a presumed link between 
poverty or discrimination and involvement in terrorism, tend to be unable to explain why only a 
minority of the individuals exposed to such factors turn to terrorism.132 Vice versa, monocausal 
approaches find it difficult to account for why not all of the people who do become involved in 
terrorism were exposed to the factor in question. For example, the ubiquitous use of ‘radicalization’ 
as an explanatory for terrorism obscures the fact that the majority of individuals with ‘radical’ 
ideas never act on them and that not all terrorists are strongly ideologically motivated.133 Because 
no single factor has been found that is both necessary and sufficient to explain involvement in 
terrorism, the potential factors underlying involvement in this phenomenon should be assessed in 
conjunction with one another, rather than independently or as mutually exclusive competitors.134 
A fourth reason for choosing a multicausal analytical framework is that it is well-established that 
involvement in terrorism is best understood as the result of a complex process in which multiple 
factors play a role.135 Not only that, but these causative factors reside at different levels of analysis 
and their relative importance may change over time.136 In other words, although a particular 
factor may convincingly explain why someone became involved in a terrorist group in the first 
place, it may be irrelevant to understanding how or why that person came to commit an actual 
act of violence. As Della Porta states, ‘different analytical levels may dominate different stages of 
the evolution of radical groups’.137
For these reasons, using a single theoretical perspective to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup 
would not only be challenging but difficult to justify. An alternative is to use a multicausal 
approach. Not only does this reflect the complexity of terrorism, it also utilizes the explanatory 
power of the body of literature on the various factors relevant to understanding involvement 
in this phenomenon to its fullest potential. Such an approach can count on considerable 
132 Edward Newman, “Exploring the ‘root causes’ of terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 756.
133 Max Abrahms, “What terrorists really want: terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy,” International 
Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78-105; Randy Borum, “Rethinking radicalization,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 
(2011): 1-2.
134 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 10; Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent radicalization in Europe: what we know and 
what we do not know,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 810.
135 Tore Bjørgo, “Conclusions,” in Root causes of terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward, ed. Tore Bjørgo (London 
/ New York: Routledge, 2005), 257; John Horgan, “Understanding terrorist motivation: a socio-psychological 
perspective,” in Mapping terrorism research: state of the art, gaps and future directions, ed. Magnus Ranstorp (New 
York / Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 111-114; Taylor and Horgan, “A conceptual framework,” 586-587. 
136 Bjørgo, “Conclusions,” 260; Donatella Della Porta, Social movements, political violence, and the state (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9-10; Horgan, Walking away from terrorism, 7-10.
137 Della Porta, Social movements, 10.
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support from the literature.138 In the words of Borum, ‘[a]ny useful framework [to understand 
radicalization] must be able to integrate mechanisms at micro (individual) and macro (societal/
cultural) levels’.139 Similarly, Stern argues that ‘[humans] catch the fire of terrorism in myriad 
ways – some environmental, some individual (or more likely, in most cases, a mix of the two)’.140
Many authors referenced in the previous paragraphs (implicitly) utilize three ‘levels of analysis.’ 
A concept borrowed from the field of international relations, which commonly distinguishes 
between individual, state and international system perspectives.141 The study of terrorism similarly 
utilizes a distinction between micro, meso and macro perspectives, but generally translates these 
as the individual, the group and structural or environmental conditions in which they operate.142 
That is not to say that there are no other useful analytical divisions that could be made.143 But it 
is this tripartite distinction that is most commonly used to capture the myriad potential factors 
that may lead to involvement in terrorism, making it most suited for the goals of this thesis. Its 
utility is also well demonstrated by Della Porta’s work on post-1945 left-wing terrorism in Italy 
and Germany, which shows that by studying these three levels in conjunction with each other, a 
fuller understanding can be generated of how and why people become and remain involved in 
such groups.144
2.3.1 Structural-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
Structural-level factors relate to specific characteristics of the social, cultural, economic and (geo)
political environment that can enable, motivate or trigger the use of terrorism.145 Examples include 
widespread poverty, profound social inequality, war or regional instability and lack of political 
freedoms.146 In addition to forming characteristics of the environment in which people live that 
exert their influence over a longer period of time, structural factors relevant to involvement in 
138 Crenshaw, “The psychology of political terrorism,” 380; Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent radicalization in Europe,” 
810; Horgan, “Understanding terrorist motivation,” 109, 113-114; Rex A. Hudson, “The sociology and 
psychology of terrorism: who becomes a terrorist and why?,” (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1999), 
15, 23; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of political radicalization: pathways toward 
terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 429; Gregory D. Miller, “Rationality, decision-
making and the levels of analysis problem in terrorism studies,” in ISA’s 50th Annual Convention ‘Exploring the 
past, anticipating the future’ (New York: International Studies Association, 2009), 3-4; Jeffrey Ian Ross, “A model 
of the psychological causes of oppositional political terrorism,” Peace and Conflict 2, no. 2 (1996): 129; Sinai, 
“New trends in terrorism studies,” 36-37; Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist radicalisation, 21-26.
139 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I: a review of social science theories,” Journal of Strategic 
Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 8.
140 Stern, “Response to Marc Sageman,” 607.
141 John T. Rourke, International politics on the world stage (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 65.
142 See also: Brynjar Lia and Katja H-W Skjølberg, “Causes of terrorism: an expanded and updated review of the 
literature,” (Kjeller: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2004), 1-82; Sageman, Leaderless jihad, 13-16.
143 Thomas Oleson and Fahrad Khosrokhavar, Islamism as social movement (Aarhus: The Centre for Studies in 
Islamism and Radicalisation, 2009), 10; McAllister and Schmid, “Theories of terrorism,” 255-260.
144 Della Porta, Social movements, 9-10.
145 Lia and Skjølberg, “Causes of terrorism,” 17-63; Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural causes of oppositional political 
terrorism: towards a causal model,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (1993): 317.
146 Newman, “Exploring the ‘root causes’,” 749-772.
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terrorism can also relate to specific events in which people become embroiled. A government’s 
violent crackdown on a protest can be considered an example of such an event as it leaves a 
significant number of people with little choice but to undergo the violence that has suddenly 
become a part of their surroundings. Such events can potentially form decisive moments in 
people’s lives that may set them on a path towards militancy and terrorism.
The above discussion is inspired by Crenshaw’s influential 1981 article on the causes of terrorism, 
in which she distinguishes between structural factors that function as preconditions and those that 
act as precipitants.147 Preconditions can provide both opportunities and motives for involvement 
in terrorism.148 With access to the Internet, for instance, people can easily find information on 
how to construct explosives, facilitating the acquisition of violent means. Ability alone, however, is 
unlikely to lead to an act of terrorism unless it is matched by a willingness to do harm. Structural 
factors that can motivate involvement in terrorism include widespread grievances against the 
government and intergroup inequality.149 The onset of Northern Ireland’s violent ‘Troubles’ in 
1968, for instance, was influenced by the Catholic population’s political underrepresentation and 
socioeconomic disadvantagement vis-à-vis their Protestant neighbors.150
Precipitants are what Crenshaw identifies as ‘specific events that immediately precede the 
occurrence of terrorism’.151 Excessive use of force by the authorities can instigate a violent 
response, but precipitants need not be violent in nature. As chapter 5 discusses in more detail, 
the broadcast of a controversial short film criticizing Islam was a key structural-level event 
for the Hofstadgroup as it exposed its participants to criticism of very closely held beliefs, 
triggering a violent response from one of them that led to the murder of Van Gogh. In more 
recent publications, the basic distinction between preconditions and precipitants that Crenshaw 
suggested in 1981 has been maintained, making this a valuable way of structuring the various 
explanations found at the structural level of analysis.152 Table 1 provides an overview of the 
most commonly encountered structural-level explanations for terrorism found in the literature, 
divided over the three categories described here.
147 Martha Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399.
148 Ibid., 381.
149 Lia and Skjølberg, “Causes of terrorism,” 17-63.
150 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The origins of the present Troubles in Northern Ireland (New York: Longman, 1997), 39-
41.
151 Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism,” 381.
152 Bjørgo, “Conclusions,” 258; Newman, “Exploring the ‘root causes’,” 751.
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Structural level explanations for involvement in terrorism
Preconditions: opportunities Preconditions: motives Precipitants
The Internet (Relative) Deprivation Govt’s excessive use of force
Popular support for terrorism Intergroup inequality Government attempts reforms
External assistance Political grievances
Social / cultural facilitation of 
violence
Clash of value systems
Ineffective counterterrorism Economic globalization
Political opportunity structure Cultural globalization
Modernization Urbanization
Population growth / youth bulge Modernization
Shifts ethnic/religious balance society Spillover from other conflicts
Urbanization State sponsorship of terrorism
Mass media Power structure internat. system
Organized crime – terrorism nexus Failed / failing states
Armed conflict 
Table 1
2.3.2 Group-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
As a form of ‘organized violence’, considerable attention has been paid to the role of group 
dynamics in initiating, sustaining and precipitating involvement in terrorism.153 Indeed, some 
authors believe this level of analysis to be an especially salient lens through which to study the 
phenomenon.154 In this thesis, explanations are categorized as belonging to the group-level of 
analysis when they have their basis in the interaction between individuals or in the tangible and 
intangible attractions that group participation offers. Peer pressure, which can push individuals 
towards participation in a terrorist group, is an example of the former.155 The possibility to 
acquire status, increased self-esteem and a sense of belonging are some examples of the latter.156 
Most explanations at this level of analysis focus on person-to-person interactions within the 
terrorist group itself. However, group effects can also stem from virtual connections such as 
enabled by the Internet.157
153 Martha Crenshaw, Explaining terrorism: causes, processes and consequences (New York / Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011), 69.
154 Scott Matthew Kleinmann, “Radicalization of homegrown Sunni militants in the United States: comparing 
converts and non-converts,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 4 (2012): 288; Sageman, Leaderless jihad, 22.
155 Donatella Della Porta, “Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism,” 
in Psychology of terrorism: classic and contemporary insights, ed. Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (New York 
/ Hove: Psychology Press, 2009), 310.
156 Clark McCauley and Mary E. Segal, “Social psychology of terrorist groups,” in Psychology of terrorism: classic and 
contemporary insights, ed. Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (New York / Hove: Psychology Press, 2009), 336.
157 Oleson and Khosrokhavar, Islamism as social movement, 19.
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A literature review of group-level factors relevant to involvement in terrorism identified a wide 
variety of possible explanations. Some of these account for the formation of terrorist groups; 
how and why do people become involved in these violent organizations? Research indicates that 
pre-existing social ties are especially important in this regard.158 Other explanations focus on how 
an actual act of terrorism comes about. What rationales underlie the decision of terrorist groups 
to commit attacks? One thing that this level of analysis lacks, however, is a broadly accepted 
way of distinguishing between the various explanations. Unlike the structural level of analysis, 
which could build on Crenshaw’s distinction between preconditions and precipitants, there is no 
common way of categorizing the various hypotheses to make for a more structured overview.
Instead, the author relies on work by Taylor and Horgan because it convincingly argues that the 
factors influencing people’s involvement in terrorist groups are distinct from those that govern 
a group’s decision to commit a terrorist attack.159 In other words, joining a terrorist group does 
not automatically lead to involvement in (preparations for) an act of terrorism itself. As a result, 
explanations for the former do not necessarily extend to cover the latter. The distinction between 
group-level factors that can account for the process of becoming and remaining involved in a 
terrorist group and those that can contribute to the rationale for committing an act of terrorist 
violence, forms the overarching structure for the group-level of analysis. Because both subjects 
cover a large number of relevant explanations, they have been turned into separate chapters 
(Tables 2 and 3). The second of these has been subdivided further based on the themes to emerge 
from the review of the relevant literature.
Group dynamics I: Becoming and staying involved in terrorist groups
Terrorist group formation
Social identity and the benefits of group membership
Socialization into a worldview conducive to terrorism
The underground life
Social learning theory
The influence of leaders
Peer pressures
Brainwashing
Table 2
158 Della Porta, “Recruitment processes,” 309-310.
159 Horgan, Walking away from terrorism, 13, 142-146; Max Taylor, “Is terrorism a group phenomenon?,” Aggression 
and Violent Behavior 15, no. 2 (2010): 125-126; Taylor and Horgan, “A conceptual framework,” 592.
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Group dynamics II: Committing acts of terrorist violence
Organizational lethality Overcoming barriers to violence Rationales for terrorism
Organizational lethality Diffusion of responsibility Strategic
Deindividuation Organizational
Authorization of violence
Table 3
2.3.3 Individual-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
The individual level of analysis seeks explanations for terrorism not in environmental conditions 
or group processes, but in the distinct psychological characteristics and ways of thinking of 
individual terrorists.160 During the 1970s and 1980s, as research on terrorism was emerging as a 
distinct subject of academic study, there was a strong focus on explaining terrorism as stemming 
from some form of psychopathology or as a result of psychological trauma incurred during 
childhood and adolescence.161 More recently, individual-level explanations have been particularly 
strongly wedded to the concept of ‘radicalization’. This is the idea that involvement in terrorism 
stems from the adoption of increasingly extremist political or religious ways of thinking.162 
Of the three levels of analysis, the individual one has been the most affected by the difficulties of 
gaining reliable data on terrorism. For instance, sound empirical evidence for the abnormality 
of terrorists has generally been lacking.163 Nevertheless, the individual perspective is a crucial 
complement to the other analytical lenses. As Crenshaw remarks, ‘terrorism is not the direct 
result of social conditions but of individual perceptions of those conditions’.164 Even though 
explanations at this level of analysis appear to be among the most poorly empirically substantiated 
ones, they cannot be dismissed out of hand.
The literature on individual-level explanations for involvement in terrorism is extensive. In 
keeping with this study’s goals, only those hypotheses that focus directly on involvement in 
terrorism have been included for analysis. Publications on, for instance, the psychological impact 
of terrorism, biological explanations for violent behavior or evolutionary psychology, which 
seeks to account for why certain behaviors exist in the first place, are not taken into consideration. 
In the end, two main areas of inquiry were identified that because of their size formed the basis 
for two separate chapters. The first of these deals with cognitive explanations for involvement in 
terrorism (Table 4). 
160 Della Porta, Social movements, 9, 12-13; Jeff Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist: a review and critique of 
psychological approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 3-42.
161 Crenshaw, “The psychology of political terrorism,” 384-390; Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 23-24.
162 Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: a conceptual discussion and literature 
review,” in ICCT Research Paper (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013), 1-91.
163 Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 31-32.
164 Martha Crenshaw, “Questions to be answered, research to be done, knowledge to be applied,” in Origins of 
terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 1990), 250.
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Individual level analysis I: Cognitive explanations
Radicalization
Fanaticism
Cognitive openings and ‘unfreezing’
Cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement
Table 4
It essentially looks at how particular ways of thinking about and perceiving the world can make 
it more likely that someone becomes involved in extremism and terrorism. The second chapter 
discusses explanations for involvement that center on terrorists’ presumed distinctiveness in 
terms of psychology, character or emotional state (Table 5).
Individual level analysis II: Terrorists as psychologically distinctive
Psychopathology
Psychoanalysis, significance loss and identity-related alienation
Terrorist personality or profile
Anger and frustration
Mortality salience
Table 5
2.3.4 Interrelated perspectives
Each level of analysis offers unique explanations for involvement in terrorism. Yet although they 
are each treated in separate chapters, this distinction is in reality quite artificial. Structural, group 
and individual level factors do not exert their influence independent of one another, but frequently 
operate in an interdependent and interrelated fashion. To gain a comprehensive understanding of 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup, it is not sufficient to analyze the various analytical perspectives 
separately. They must also be discussed in relation to each other. Although each chapter refers to 
other levels of analysis where relevant, drawing together the various explanatory strands is the 
primary purpose of the thesis’ conclusion.
2.4 Limitations
By studying the available empirical data on the Hofstadgroup through the various lenses provided 
by these three levels of analysis, a comprehensive understanding of how and why involvement 
in this group came about can be realized. However, several limitations should be acknowledged. 
A general first point is that, while the author has tried to be comprehensive in his approach, he 
does not claim to have found and utilized all possible explanations for terrorism. Undoubtedly, 
readers will remark upon omissions. Partly this may be because in the absence of clear naming 
conventions, the author has used unfamiliar designations, or because similar explanations have 
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been grouped together under a single heading. Given the large amount of literature on, or relevant 
to understanding involvement in terrorism, a truly exhaustive overview is practically unfeasible.
A more specific limitation is the omission of social movement theory as a potential explanation 
for involvement in terrorism. According to Arrow, social movements are ‘collective challenges, 
based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, 
and authorities’.165 While the Hofstadgroup’s adoption of a militant interpretation of Islam could 
be seen as a collectively mounted form of contention targeted at both the Dutch authorities, 
non-militant Muslims and unbelievers, a clearly defined common purpose was strikingly absent. 
This finding, which is discussed in considerable detail in later chapters, forms an impediment to 
viewing the Hofstadgroup from a social movement perspective.
In addition to lacking collective goals, the Hofstadgroup also failed to engage in collective action. 
According to Beck, terrorism can be seen as a form of collective action focused on making 
political claims and seeking political influence, which in turn allows terrorist groups to be 
studied as movements with political goals.166 The very absence of such claims and the associated 
instrumental use of violence problematizes seeing the Hofstadgroup’s activities in this light. The 
only terrorist attack to actually materialize was the murder of Van Gogh, which was not the 
result of a collective effort but the work of one man. Furthermore, there are no indications that 
the killer was pursuing political goals. While there were some signs that the Hofstadgroup was 
beginning to undertake collective efforts towards the end of its existence in 2005, later chapters 
will demonstrate that collective action, like a common purpose, was for all intents and purposes 
not part of the group’s repertoire.
A final reason why social movement theory is not used to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup 
is its emphasis on contention and social interactions, which leaves only a secondary role for the 
explanatory potential of ideas, beliefs and the biographies or characteristics of individuals.167 
This comes back to the assumption that involvement in terrorism is a multicausal process 
with explanations at the structural, group and individual levels of analysis. Focusing on one of 
these at the expense of another would go against the central aim of constructing a multifaceted 
understanding of involvement in the Hofstadgroup. None of this means, however, that social 
movement theory is abandoned altogether. Various elements, such as political opportunity 
structure and the importance of looking at how terrorist groups frame their causes and their 
justifications for violence are discussed in the relevant chapters.
165 Sidney Tarrow, Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 4, italics removed from original.
166 Colin J. Beck, “The contribution of social movement theory to understanding terrorism,” Sociology Compass 2, 
no. 5 (2008): 1566.
167 See, for instance: Charles Tilly, The politics of collective violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
7-8.
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2.5 A definitional debate 
The terms ‘terrorism’, ‘radical’, ‘extremist’ and ‘jihad’ are used throughout this thesis. Virtually all 
of them can be interpreted in multiple ways and constitute controversial subjects of an ongoing 
definitional debate. To avoid confusion, it is therefore important to make clear at the outset how 
these terms are understood here. On account of its especially controversial nature, ‘terrorism’ is 
discussed at some length whereas the other terms are introduced more succinctly.
2.5.1 Terrorism
The debate on what constitutes ‘terrorism’ and when individuals or groups become ‘terrorists’, is 
a very contentious one. After decades of discussion, a broadly accepted definition is still not at 
hand.168 Some authors believe that such efforts are futile because terrorism ‘is a term like war or 
sovereignty that will never be defined in words that achieve full international consensus’.169 This 
quote suggests that the study of terrorism is not the only discipline to be affected by definitional 
quandaries. But this observation does little to diminish the adverse effects produced by the 
absence of a clear understanding of what ‘terrorism’ is. This issue has stood in the way of the 
development of a general theory of terrorism, ‘scattered and fragmented’ the focus of research 
efforts and complicated the comparison of research results.170 Some scholars have even argued 
that ‘it is time to stop using the “t word”’ altogether.171 Why has achieving consensus on the 
meaning of terrorism proven so difficult?
An immediate problem with the word ‘terrorism’ is that it has strong negative connotations, 
conjuring an image of ‘cowardly violence, fear, and intimidation’.172 A closely related second issue 
is the politicized nature of the term. The ‘terrorism’ descriptor is frequently used to delegitimize 
an oppositional regime, movement or organization while simultaneously legitimizing violence 
against that opponent.173 Used in this fashion, the term terrorism becomes part of a ‘war of 
words’, aimed at condemning rather than understanding a certain form of violent behavior.174 
Such definitions are essentially political tools that serve the defining party’s interests, for instance 
by limiting the scope of ‘terrorism’ to an activity only non-state actors can engage in, even though 
168 Schmid, “The definition of terrorism,” 39; Harmonie Toros, “’We don’t negotiate with terrorists!’: legitimacy and 
complexity in terrorist conflicts,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (2008): 408-409.
169 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How terrorism ends: understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns (Princeton 
/ Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 7, italics in original.
170 Sánchez-Cuenca, “Why do we know so little?,” 594-595; Schmid, “The definition of terrorism,” 43; Silke, “An 
introduction,” 3-4.
171 Dominic Bryan, Liam Kelly, and Sara Templer, “The failed paradigm of ‘terrorism’,” Behavioral Sciences of 
Terrorism and Political Aggression 3, no. 2 (2011): 94.
172 James D. Kiras, “Terrorism and irregular warfare,” in Strategy in the contemporary world: an introduction to 
strategic studies, ed. John Baylis, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 210.
173 Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “The psychology of terrorism: ‘syndrome’ versus ‘tool’ perspectives,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 201.
174 Austin T. Turk, “Sociology of terrorism,” Annual Review of Sociology 30(2004): 271-273.
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states can and have used terror on a much larger scale than most non-state groups are capable 
of.175 The biases inherent in such definitions make them unsuitable for research purposes.
A third obstacle is that the interpretation of what constitutes terrorism is highly subjective. This is 
best represented by the classic dichotomy between freedom fighters and terrorists, with the choice 
for one or the other depending on the observer’s perspective and his or her stake in the conflict.176 
Tellingly, few violent oppositional groups call themselves terrorists and most prefer to describe 
their activities in much more neutral terms such as ‘liberation’ or ‘resistance’.177 Delineating where 
terrorism begins and ends constitute a fourth stumbling block. How to disentangle terrorism 
from insurgency, two forms of political violence that are often used in conjunction with one 
another?178 Similarly, how is terrorism different from organized crime? Criminals and terrorists 
both place a premium on secrecy, they both use force and intimidation against civilians to achieve 
their aims and both exert strong control over group members.179
These obstacles have not prevented the creation of many different legal, government and academic 
definitions of terrorism.180 Of these three types of definitions, only academic ones are expressly 
intended to guide non-partisan analysis, making them most suited to the task at hand.181 Within 
the subset of academic definitions of terrorism, it is hard to overlook the pioneering work of Alex 
Schmid, who has been working on the definitional question for decades.182 This thesis utilizes 
Schmid’s 2011 ‘revised academic consensus definition’ because it convincingly addresses the 
issues raised above.183 Its neutral wording avoids issuing a value judgment on terrorism. By being 
applicable to state as well as non-state actors, Schmid’s definition offers some protection against 
an overly politicized view of terrorism. Furthermore, its very detail allows it to differentiate 
terrorism from other forms of organized violence.
In this thesis, therefore, ‘[t]terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed 
effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on 
the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action 
without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for 
its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties’.184
175 Schmid, “The definition of terrorism,” 40.
176 Gus Martin, Understanding terrorism: challenges, perspectives, and issues (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
2003), 34-36.
177 Ibid., 35-36.
178 Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Mario Fumerton, “Insurgency and terrorism: is there a difference?,” in The character of 
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179 Schmid, “The definition of terrorism,” 64-67.
180 Ibid., 44-60; Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The challenges of conceptualizing 
terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (2004): 780.
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2.5.2 Radicalism and extremism
The terms ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ are repeatedly used to describe the convictions of Hofstadgroup 
participants. Because both are inherently subjective and frequently used interchangeably, clear 
definitions are in order.185 Schmid once again provides a thoroughly researched and well-
reasoned definition of both terms. Radicalism comprises ‘two main elements reflecting thought/
attitude and action/behaviour respectively: 1. Advocating sweeping political change, based on a 
conviction that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally different 
alternative appears to be available to the radical; 2. The means advocated to bring about the 
system-transforming radical solution for government and society can be non-violent and 
democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through coercion 
and revolution)’.186
Radicals may hold views that are deemed inappropriate, offensive or disagreeable for other 
reasons, but they do not necessarily justify or support the use of violence. This marks an important 
difference with extremists.187 ‘While radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, 
extremists are never democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diversity. They are also positively 
in favour of the use of force to obtain and maintain political power (…). Extremists generally 
tend to have inflexible ‘closed minds’, adhering to a simplified mono-causal interpretation of 
the world where you are either with them or against them, part of the problem or part of the 
solution.’188 
For extremists, violence constitutes the preferred means to an end. This distinction is important, 
as it allows for a nuanced discussion of the beliefs held by Hofstadgroup participants and their 
views on the use of violence. It should be noted that some scholars refer to these dispositions 
using the terms ‘non-violent extremism’ and ‘violent extremism’.189 The author finds that ‘radical’ 
and ‘extremist’ better convey the different mindsets associated with these positions which, as 
Schmid’s definitions make clear, encompass more than differing views on the use of violence 
alone.
2.5.3 Jihad & homegrown jihadism
Islam, which translates as ‘submission to the will of God’, constitutes one of the world’s three 
great monotheistic religions.190 There is, however, no singular way in which Islam is interpreted 
185 Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation,” 11; William M. Downs, Political extremism in democracies: 
combating intolerance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 13.
186 Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation,” 8.
187 Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, “The edge of violence: towards telling the difference between violent and non-
violent radicalization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 1 (2012): 1-21.
188 Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation,” 10.
189 Peter R. Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 873-893.
190 John L. Esposito, Islam: the straight path (New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 85.
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or practiced. This is reflected, for instance, in the division of the global community of believers, 
known as the ‘ummah’, between Sunnis and Shiites over the rightful successor to the Prophet 
Muhammad. Sunnis, who constitute the largest denomination within Islam, believe that 
essentially anyone can be proclaimed heir to the prophet. Shiites, on the other hand, accept only 
Muhammad’s descendants, specifically the progeny of the prophet’s son-in-law Ali and his wife 
Fatima, who was Muhammad’s daughter. The Sunni-Shia divide is Islam’s most well-known 
internal division. But there are a multitude of other, smaller, denominations such as the Druze 
and the Alawis, as well as the more mystical approach to Islam known as Sufism, that further 
undermine the idea of Islam as a homogeneous religion.191
Just as there is no one Islam, there is no one view on the conditions under which Muslims are 
allowed or required to use violence, who and what can justifiably be targeted and which means 
and methods of war are permitted.192 The use of violence by Muslims has been closely linked to 
the concept of ‘jihad’, the Arabic word for struggle or effort.193 As a contested concept that has 
been the subject of centuries of debate and varying interpretations, there is not one clear way 
in which to define jihad.194 Moghadam notes that the Quran’s coverage of jihad allows a broad 
distinction to be made between a peaceful and an aggressive interpretation.195 The first form, 
which has also been called the ‘greater’ jihad, refers to an individual believer’s personal struggle 
against temptation and sin, his or her quest to live in accordance with god’s will or a community’s 
efforts to better themselves.196 The aggressive or ‘lesser’ interpretation of jihad sees it as religiously 
sanctioned or mandated warfare.197 
Jihad is therefore not necessarily a violent undertaking. Unless specified otherwise, however, 
the use of the term jihad in this thesis refers to the ‘lesser’ or militant variety. Jihadist groups 
or individuals are thus those that believe their religious beliefs necessitate or sanction the use 
of violence against perceived enemies. Following Crone and Harrow’s definition, jihadists can 
be labeled ‘homegrown’ when they display a high degree of autonomy from internationally 
operating terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda, and a strong sense of belonging, e.g. through 
citizenship, to the countries they target.198 
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter began by highlighting several issues that have affected research on terrorism. In 
particular, the qualitative difference between primary and secondary sources and the longstanding 
scarcity of the former in existing research on terrorism. Given that terrorism is in many ways a 
difficult subject to study empirically, this situation is perhaps not that surprising. Nevertheless, 
it has had serious consequences. There exist many explanations for involvement in terrorism 
whose accuracy and reliability has been insufficiently ascertained due to the difficulties of the 
high-quality data required to do so. Consequently, this thesis sees the use of primary sources 
as a prerequisite for making a contribution to existing knowledge on the Hofstadgroup and 
understanding involvement in homegrown jihadism more broadly.
The bulk of this chapter was dedicated to explaining the decision to use a multicausal 
analytical framework for studying involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Using literature reviews, a 
comprehensive inventory was made of the various explanations for involvement in terrorism at 
the structural, group and individual levels of analysis. Applying these to the available data on the 
Hofstadgroup will allow for a multifaceted and detailed understanding of the factors that shaped 
participants’ involvement in this group. Following this discussion, the chapter concluded with an 
overview of several key terms that are used throughout the thesis.
One task remains before it is possible to move on to the analysis of the factors that influenced 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup proper. That is to familiarize readers with the Hofstadgroup 
and its activities. The next chapter provides a detailed chronology of the most important events 
in the group’s 2002-2005 existence in order to create the necessary factual background for the 
analysis that is to follow. Chapter four then rounds off the introductory section of this thesis 
by discussing the Hofstadgroup’s organizational and ideological characteristics and assessing 
to what extent it can be considered a group that engaged in (preparations for) terrorism in a 
communal sense.
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3. A history of the Hofstadgroup199
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a chronological description of the Hofstadgroup’s 2002-2005 lifespan 
and concludes with a brief overview of the court cases against the group’s participants. This 
discussion is intended to familiarize readers with the group and to act as a reference for the 
analytical chapters that follow. Although several good overviews of the Hofstadgroup exist, none 
are as strongly embedded in primary sources as the present account.200
3.2 The emergence of homegrown jihadism in the Netherlands
Developments both within the Netherlands and beyond its borders created conditions favorable 
to the emergence of homegrown jihadism. Some of these developments can be traced back years, 
such as the growing influence of the fundamentalist Salafist variety of Islam that was making 
headway in the country in part due to funding from Saudi Arabia, or the presence of small 
networks of veterans of jihadist conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia.201 Other underlying factors 
were rooted in the increasingly sharp and polarizing debates about immigration and Islam 
which came to dominate media headlines, especially after the rise of populist politicians such as 
Pym Fortuyn and Geert Wilders.202 As De Graaf remarks about the post-9/11 atmosphere in the 
Netherlands; ‘Moroccans, Turks and other immigrants were now framed as “Muslims” and were 
held responsible for jihadist attacks’.203 
As later chapters will explore in detail, the 9/11 attacks, the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ and the 
Dutch government’s decision to lend assistance to that fight were key geopolitical developments 
underlying the development of jihadist groups in the Netherlands. They drew attention to the 
ideas, ideologues and propaganda of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, especially so 
among some young Muslim citizens. Together, these factors created conditions favorable to the 
emergence of Islamist radicalism and extremism. In early 2002, two Dutch citizens of Moroccan 
descent were killed in Kashmir by Indian security forces, ostensibly after having been recruited 
by Islamist militants at a mosque in the Netherlands.204 That same year, dozens of people were 
arrested on suspicion of involvement in providing recruitment, financial and logistical support 
199 This chapter has been published in amended form as: Bart Schuurman, Quirine Eijkman, and Edwin Bakker, “A 
history of the Hofstadgroup,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 3 (2014): 65-81.
200 Sageman, “Hofstad case,” 13-29, 82-99; Vidino, “The Hofstad group,” 579-592.
201 De Poot et al., Jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands, 42-43; General Intelligence and Security Service, “Violent jihad 
in the Netherlands,” 15-16.
202 De Koning and Meijer, “Going all the way,” 223-224; De Koning, “’Moge hij onze ogen openen’,” 52-53.
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to internationally operating jihadist terrorist groups.205 Although the Hofstadgroup was the 
most infamous entity to arise in the Netherlands in the early 2000s, it was certainly not the only 
exponent of this broader trend.
3.3 2002: The Hofstadgroup’s initial formation
The earliest reference to the Hofstadgroup stems from 2002. Over the course of that year, a group 
of increasingly radical Muslims began to draw the attention of the Dutch General Intelligence 
and Security Service (AIVD).206 It was not until September 2003, however, that the Service began 
to label this particular set of people as the ‘Hofstadgroup’.207 The name refers to The Hague, a 
city colloquially known in Dutch as the ‘Hofstad’ (court city) and one of the places in which 
the group gathered. Little is known about the group’s activities in 2002, although it appears 
that gatherings were taking place by the end of the year. A middle-aged Syrian asylum seeker 
known by the moniker Abu Khaled took a prominent role during these so-called ‘living room 
meetings’ as a religious instructor.208 He does not appear to have spoken of the use of violence 
or participation in jihad directly, yet his teachings conferred a dogmatic and fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam. This formed a fertile base for some participants’ subsequent adoption of 
a decidedly extremist, pro-violence, interpretation of Islam.209
The group’s meetings were held in a variety of locations in addition to The Hague, with an 
internet café in Schiedam and the Amsterdam residence of the Hofstadgroup participant who 
would go on to murder Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh being used regularly.210 A first hint that 
elements within the group were developing extremist views manifested itself towards the end of 
2002. Information provided to the police by the AIVD suggests that in November of that year, 
one person who would feature prominently in the group’s extremist core spoke out in favor of 
a mass-casualty bombing.211 Regarding the group’s organizational development, it is interesting 
to note that initial group formation appears to have been based primarily on pre-existing social 
bonds. Many participants had grown up in the same neighborhoods, attended the same schools 
or knew each other through their local mosques.212 In the words of one former participant, the 
Hofstadgroup was a ‘circle of acquaintances’.213 
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3.4 2003: Would-be foreign fighters and international connections
At the start of 2003, a prominent Hofstadgroup participant and a friend of his who does not 
appear to have been involved in the group, made an attempt to join Islamist rebels in Chechnya. 
They were arrested by the Russian authorities just after they left Ukraine and were sent back 
home after questioning. Upon return to the Netherlands they were interrogated further by both 
the Dutch police and the AIVD.214 That summer, two other participants separately undertook 
travel to Pakistan where they allegedly met each other for the first time at a Quran school. Their 
travels appear to have been facilitated through another Hofstadgroup participant.215 Messages 
written after their return and intelligence information imply that both underwent or at least 
sought paramilitary training in Pakistan or Afghanistan.216 That this trip was more than an 
opportunity to study Islam abroad is underlined by a farewell letter one of the two men left his 
family, in which he expressed a desire to remain in the ‘land of jihad’.217
These two men returned from Pakistan separately in September. Later that month, AIVD 
intelligence revealed that one of the Pakistan-goers may have returned on the instigation of an 
unnamed ‘emir’ who tasked him with ‘collecting balloons’.218 According to the AIVD’s information, 
a fellow Hofstadgroup participant had mentioned that this particular traveler had returned to 
‘play a match’ before Ramadan that year (which began on the 27th of October). Around the same 
time, it was also discovered that this individual, together with the person who had tried to reach 
Chechnya and a third Hofstadgroup participant, were in contact with a Moroccan man living in 
Spain who was sought by the Moroccan authorities for his suspected involvement in the 2003 
Casablanca bombings and for his membership of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group 
(GICM).219 
The Hofstadgroup participant who may have been in touch with the unknown emir traveled 
to Barcelona in the first week of October to meet the Moroccan man, returning to Amsterdam 
on the 8th. While in Spain, he also met an acquaintance of the Moroccan suspect who Spanish 
authorities believed had ties to the Iraqi terrorist organization Ansar al-Islam. Another 
Hofstadgroup participant communicated with the Moroccan man via telephone from the 
Netherlands and apparently received instructions to procure ‘a notebook’ and ‘credit’.220 Other 
topics of conversation were ‘shoes class 1 and class 2’ and ‘things that come from Greece or 
Italy’.221 The Moroccan suspect also mentioned that he would send a man from Belgium to meet 
214 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 33; GET: 18061-18062; Calis, “Iedereen wil martelaar zijn.”
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the participant he had been phoning with. Whether this meeting occurred is unclear, although 
two of the participants who were in contact with the Moroccan individual from the Netherlands 
traveled to Belgium on the 15th of October for unknown purposes.222 On the 14th of October, 
the Spanish authorities arrested the Moroccan suspect. A day later, the AIVD informed the Dutch 
public prosecutor’s office about the travels to Pakistan/Afghanistan and the Spanish connection. 
The police then arrested five Hofstadgroup participants on the 17th of October. These included 
the three individuals who undertook travel abroad, two of whom were in contact with the 
Moroccan man, another person who was also in contact with the Moroccan individual and the 
middle-aged Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled. House searches turned up books, tapes and 
digital materials espousing an extremist interpretation of Islam, study notes on martyrdom, an 
at that point unknown person’s will expressing a desire to die as a martyr and, in the case of one 
of those arrested, materials suggestive of an interest in constructing an explosive device. However, 
all of the suspects were released at the end of October for lack of evidence.223
The Dutch police were thus unable to substantiate the possibility that the suspects were planning 
a terrorist attack or assisting foreign groups or individuals in doing so. Given that two of those 
arrested had in September and October been trying to encourage other young Dutch Muslims 
to travel to Pakistan, a likely explanation for the ‘emir’s’ task is that it was to inspire others to 
make a similar trip. The communication with the Moroccan suspect in Spain is harder to explain, 
although a source close to the investigation thought it likely that the Hofstadgroup participants 
were providing logistical assistance with acquiring a passport (‘notebook’) and money (‘credit’).224 
What the other terms referred to, and what type of ‘match’ was to be played before Ramadan has 
remained unclear.
On the very last day of 2003, one of the Pakistan travelers undertook a second journey to that 
country, this time accompanied by a fellow Hofstadgroup participant who had not been there 
before. Scarcely more than a week later, on the 9th of January 2004, both of them returned. The 
sources provide several different explanations for this rapid return.225 Regardless of which of 
these accounts is true, it is clear that this second trip abroad was not very successful, with little 
to indicate that the travelers were able to get any paramilitary training or make contacts with 
foreign jihadists.
Judging by the tone and contents of his writings and translations, 2003 also saw the man who 
would murder Van Gogh in November 2004 rapidly embrace more fundamentalist and radical 
views.226 This process was accompanied by a withdrawal from ‘mainstream’ Dutch society; he 
quit his job, stopped volunteer work for his local community in June and distanced himself 
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from non-religious old friends. Around the same time, he adopted the clothing and facial 
hair style of a fundamentalist Muslim, leading him to become known as ‘the Taliban’ among 
youths in his Amsterdam neighborhood. Of particular interest is the finding that he traveled to 
Denmark in October. Although the available sources do not reveal what the purpose of his trip 
was, it is possible that he visited a Syrian preacher who lived there. This preacher was a friend 
of the Hofstadgroup’s Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled and occasionally traveled to the 
Netherlands to visit him.227
3.5 2004: Individualistic plots and the murder of Theo van Gogh
The Hofstadgroup appears to have undertaken few, if any, communal activities during 2004. 
Burgeoning collective efforts involving at least parts of the group could be identified in 2003, 
such as the contacts with the Moroccan suspect and the attempts to encourage other Dutch 
Muslims to travel to Pakistan. Yet 2004 was characterized by distinctly individualistic initiatives. 
When accounting for this change, the impact of the October 2003 arrests cannot be overlooked. A 
former participant explained that the arrests resulted in an acutely heightened sense of paranoia 
and a preoccupation with personal safety. This was debilitating to the point that he described the 
Hofstadgroup as being effectively crippled in early 2004.228
While the realization that they were under surveillance dampened group-based activities, a small 
number of individuals were not deterred. Peters’ analysis of the writings of Van Gogh’s to-be 
killer shows that this participant moved from radical convictions to distinctly extremist ones 
around March 2004.229 His rapidly developing extremism would lead him, around the summer 
of that year, to embrace the view that blasphemers needed to be killed.230 This provided him with 
both the ideological motive and justification for murdering writer and filmmaker Van Gogh, who 
was very outspoken in his criticism of Islam and Muslims and often presented his arguments in 
a coarse fashion intended to cause offense.231
Several other notable developments took place before that time, however. On the 8th of April 
2004 a supermarket in Rotterdam was robbed by two men armed with automatic weapons. 
Although the suspicion could not be substantiated by concrete evidence, it seems likely that 
the robbers received help getting into the store from one of its employees; the Hofstadgroup 
participant who tried to reach Chechnya a year earlier. Minutes after the robbers got away with 
approximately 700 Euro’s, one of them was arrested and later confirmed as an acquaintance of 
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the store’s Hofstadgroup employee.232 Several Hofstadgroup participants have since claimed that 
the second robber was also involved in the group and only managed to ‘evade’ the police because 
he was in fact an AIVD informant.233 Concrete evidence to support this claim has, however, not 
been encountered.
On the 18th of May, the police received information which suggested that the supermarket 
employee was involved in preparations for a terrorist attack. On the 7th of June, that same 
individual was captured on security cameras walking around the AIVD’s headquarters in 
Leidschendam, apparently measuring distances by taking equally spaced steps. These events 
contributed to his second arrest, on the 30th of June. Among the items encountered in the ensuing 
house search were photographs, maps and directions of the AIVD headquarters, the nuclear 
reactor in the Dutch town of Borssele, the House of Representatives, the Ministry of Defense, 
Amsterdam Schiphol airport and the barracks of the Dutch commando’s in Roosendaal. Other 
finds included a bulletproof vest, two magazines and a silencer that could be fitted to the weapons 
used in the supermarket robbery, electrical circuits, night-vision goggles, household chemicals, 
fertilizer, documents espousing an extremist interpretation of Islam, jihad ‘handbooks’ and a 
hand-written will in the suspect’s name.234 
While indicative of an interest in improvised explosive devices (IEDs), it should be noted that the 
electrical circuits and chemicals were everyday, over-the-counter items that had not (yet) been 
combined into an explosive device or its precursor components. It should also be emphasized 
that the particular type of fertilizer found turned out to be unsuitable for making an explosive 
substance.235 Hence, the individual in question does not appear to have had the capability to 
construct an actual bomb at that point in time. Interestingly, in the same month two other 
Hofstadgroup participants had inquired after fertilizer at a garden store. Whether this was related 
to an intention to construct an IED remains unclear. However, it is striking that the individual 
arrested on the 30th was found in possession of a list of addresses of that particular chain of 
stores.236 
On the 6th of June, two other Hofstadgroup participants, in the company of two acquaintances 
who do not appear to have been directly involved in the group, traveled to Portugal. On a tip-
off likely provided by the AIVD, which raised the possibility that the goal of this trip was to 
commit a terrorist attack during the European soccer championships or to kill Portuguese Prime 
Minister Barroso, the four travelers were arrested by the Portuguese police on the 11th and their 
whereabouts searched. No evidence was uncovered to substantiate any of the terrorism related 
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233 Erkel, Samir, 209; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke vrouwen, 262; Alberts and Derix, “Het mysterie.”; Janny Groen and 
Annieke Kranenberg, “’Saleh B. wel terroristisch actief ’,” De Volkskrant, 2 June 2007.
234 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 38-45.
235 Ibid., 01/01: 48-49.
236 Ibid., 01/01: 40; 01/13: 175.
55
allegations or a later claim by a witness that the trip’s goal was to acquire weapons. In light 
of the lack of incriminating evidence, it may simply have been the case that the Hofstadgroup 
participant who came up with the idea for the trip in the first place, an illegal immigrant from 
Morocco, was telling the truth. He claims to have wanted to benefit from a Portuguese amnesty 
for asylum seekers. Similarly, there is little to contradict his companions’ assertion that they went 
along to enjoy a holiday.237
Despite the lack of incriminating evidence, all four travelers were handed over to the Portuguese 
immigration police on the 14th of June for ‘visa irregularities’ and sent back to the Netherlands 
several days later. Upon his arrival at Schiphol airport, the trip’s initiator was questioned by 
the Dutch police. One particularly interesting aspect of this conversation is that he warned the 
police of a friend of his who, he claimed, spoke a lot of jihad, adhered to the ideology of ‘takfir’ 
(declaring other Muslims apostates) and who wanted to join Islamist insurgents in Chechnya. 
This friend would later commit the murder of Van Gogh.238 What motivated the person being 
questioned to divulge such information is unknown.
Two other developments complete this overview of the eventful month of June 2004. On the 
14th, the mother of two Hofstadgroup participants filed a report with the police declaring that 
she and her daughters felt threatened by her sons’ extremist and violent behavior to the point 
that they moved out of their own home.239 Investigations conducted later in 2004 also revealed 
the 14th of June to be the first day on which an AIVD interpreter leaked confidential information 
to two Hofstadgroup participants; one of them received a ‘weekly report’ on the group in June 
and the other a wiretap in August.240 The leak was discovered in September 2004 when a Dutch 
newspaper, which had also acquired the materials, faxed a part of the weekly report back to 
the AIVD. The interpreter was a prior acquaintance of one of the Hofstadgroup’s participants, 
for whom the AIVD employee had bought a ticket from Al Hoceima (Morocco) to Amsterdam 
in May 2003.241 Why he leaked this information and what, if any, effect the files had on the 
Hofstadgroup remains unknown. 
3.5.1 Towards the murder of Theo van Gogh
On the 29th of August 2004, the Somali-born Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali appeared for an in-
depth interview on the TV-program Zomergasten (summer guests). As part of the show, a short 
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Islam-critical film she had recently made with Van Gogh called Submission, part 1 was broadcast.242 
The film contains fragments in which Quranic verses are projected on semi-naked women and 
was supposedly met with either disgust or indifference by the Dutch Muslim community.243 But 
among the Hofstadgroup the film evoked much stronger reactions, all the more so since, having 
renounced her Muslim faith, Hirsi Ali was already a particularly hated public figure.244
A day after the film was broadcast, a message appeared on MSN Group MuwahhidinDeWareMoslims 
(‘Muwahhidin the True Muslims’245). This website was administered and frequented by 
Hofstadgroup participants, for instance to propagate the increasingly extremist texts written by 
Van Gogh’s to-be killer. The message, titled ‘The unbelieving diabolical mortada [apostate], Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali’, was posted by an individual on the group’s edges. In it, the author claimed that the 
‘Muwahhidin Brigade’ had uncovered Hirsi Ali’s residence, proceeded to publish that presumed 
address in full and also posted a picture of Van Gogh.246 A second message followed on the 4th of 
September and was openly threatening. Writing of Hirsi Ali, the author claimed that ‘wherever 
she hides, death shall find her!’247 The messages’ author was arrested on the 14th of September.
On the 15th of September, the Dutch police received an anonymous e-mail warning them 
that two individuals were potentially preparing a terrorist attack. The anonymous source 
had supposedly been asked by two ‘terrorists’ to commit attacks in the Netherlands, with the 
House of Representatives in The Hague and Amsterdam’s red light district as possible targets. 
Unfortunately, the available sources divulge no further information on this potential terrorist 
plot.248 Interestingly, however, one of the two supposed terrorists was an active participant in 
the Hofstadgroup. In September, he responded affirmatively to a question posted on his website 
‘TawheedWalJihad’249 inquiring whether it was a Muslim’s duty to kill those who insulted the 
Prophet Muhammad. To substantiate his argument, the participant relied on a translation of 
the influential 14th century Salafist scholar Ahmad ibn Taymiyya’s argument to this extent. This 
translation had been written by Van Gogh’s to-be killer. The individual acting as an ‘online help 
desk’ on extremist matters was arrested on the 8th of November because he had issued death 
threats to Dutch politician Geert Wilders using the aforementioned website.250
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On the second of November 2004, Van Gogh was murdered while cycling to work in his 
hometown of Amsterdam. The killer cycled up alongside Van Gogh, shot him several times with 
a pistol and then tried to decapitate his dead or dying victim with a kukri knife. Without having 
accomplished this task, he decided to pin a note to the dead man’s chest with another knife in 
which he threatened Hirsi Ali with death. Calmly reloading the magazine of his HS model 95 
pistol, the killer then walked towards a nearby park where a shoot-out with police officers ensued. 
After running out of ammunition and being shot in the leg, Van Gogh’s murderer was arrested. 
Three other people were also hit by the killer’s bullets; one bystander in the leg, another in the 
heel and one police officer in his bulletproof vest. Upon being taken into custody the killer was 
told that he was lucky to be alive; he responded that he had hoped to die.251
Van Gogh’s murder was a premeditated act of terrorism. The attacker utilized deadly violence 
against a civilian with the distinct intent of achieving propagandistic and psychological goals. For 
the attacker, Van Gogh’s death was not just an aim in itself, but an extreme form of communication 
that guaranteed him the attention of those he considered Islam’s enemies and those who he hoped 
to inspire to rise up in its defense. This follows not just from the ritualistic manner in which 
Van Gogh was killed in a public place in broad daylight, but also from the various letters that 
his assailant left behind for his compatriots to propagate. These alternately threatened death to 
specific Dutch politicians and the general public and encouraged Muslim youngsters to embrace 
militancy.252 According to Schmid’s definition used in this thesis, this differentiation between 
the immediate victim and a wider target audience to whom the violent act is meant to speak is a 
defining characteristic of terrorism.253
Nine witnesses later reported having seen the killer at different locations along the route Van 
Gogh usually traveled to work between early October and the day of the murder. Two witnesses, 
independently of each other, claim to have seen the killer on the 1st of November standing with 
his bike along Van Gogh’s usual route, observing passing cyclists. This implies that Van Gogh’s 
attacker had carefully chosen where to strike and perhaps even that the second of November was 
not his first attempt to kill the filmmaker.254
There has been considerable speculation about the rest of the group’s involvement in or knowledge 
of the attack.255 In September 2014, a public prosecutor involved in the case voiced his suspicion 
that multiple people had been involved in the murder.256 In November 2015 a new report by 
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Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services revealed that the AIVD had 
received ten pieces of information in the years after the murder indicating that others were aware 
of the murder, had assisted in preparations for it or had even ordered it.257 While the report is 
careful not to dismiss this information out of hand, nine out of ten pieces of intelligence were 
based on hearsay and speculation; there was no concrete evidence to suggest the involvement of 
others.258 
Consequently, this thesis takes the position that the currently available evidence indicates that 
the murder was planned, prepared and executed solely by the attacker himself.259 Based on his 
explanation in court, he appears to have been primarily driven by a sense that it was an individual 
believer’s duty to behead those who insulted Allah and his prophet, as he felt Van Gogh had done 
with his movie and writings. He took full responsibility for his actions and claimed that he would 
have done exactly the same had the blasphemer been his brother or father.260 
The authorities responded to the murder by arresting most of the suspected members of the 
Hofstadgroup on the day of the attack. Two, however, managed to evade apprehension. One was 
Abu Khaled, the middle-aged Syrian man who had provided religious instruction to the group. 
Aided by several acquaintances, he left for Syria the day that Van Gogh was killed, traveling 
via Belgium and Greece and entering the country illegally from Turkey. Despite the striking 
coincidence, the police investigation was unable to ascertain whether Abu Khaled was aware 
of the murderer’s plans. The second participant who got away was a member of the group’s 
extremist core and who featured earlier as the initiator of the trip to Portugal. Although precisely 
where he went after evading arrest has remained unclear, he may have traveled back to his family 
in Morocco in November 2004 or spent the time until his arrest in June 2005 alternately living in 
Brussels and possibly Luxembourg, from where he would occasionally travel to the Netherlands.261 
3.5.2 Violent resistance to arrest
The most dramatic episode in the arrests of alleged Hofstadgroup members occurred during the 
early hours of the 10th of November 2004. As a police arrest squad tried to force the door on the 
apartment of two suspects in The Hague around 02:50 in the morning, they found that it had 
been barricaded from within and could only be partially opened. The two men had prepared 
for the police’s arrival and discussed beforehand how to respond to it. Mere moments after the 
squad’s attempt to force entry to the apartment, one of its occupants threw a hand grenade 
through the crack between door and door frame, which passed the officers standing on the 
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landing and bounced down an outdoor stairwell to explode on the street below. Moments after 
realizing a grenade had been thrown at them, one of the officers fired twice at their attacker, both 
shots just missing his head. The grenade’s ensuing explosion injured five policemen, one of whom 
seriously, and forced the squad to pull back.262 
During the day that followed, the suspects spoke on the phone with friends and family, 
announcing their imminent martyrdom. They hastily wrote a will and made several prank calls 
to the emergency services asking for the police to come and rescue them from the ‘masked scary 
men’ surrounding their home.263 Additionally, they threatened to blow up the entire street with 
twenty kilograms of explosives, provoked officers to shoot them and were seen waving a sword 
and a firearm that would later turn out to be a fake. Towards the end of the afternoon, a military 
special forces unit went into action. After 18 tear gas canisters were fired into the apartment, the 
two suspects clambered onto a balcony. Soldiers in an opposite building then ordered them to 
raise their hands and fired a warning shot. The suspects were told to undress and descend into 
the garden via a ladder. Instead, one of them reached into his jacket pocket, prompting him to 
be shot in his shoulder. Subsequently, both suspects complied with the soldiers’ orders, climbed 
down and were taken into custody. No explosives were found in the apartment but both suspects 
were carrying additional grenades in their pockets.264
3.6 2005: From ‘Hofstad’ to ‘Piranha’
The November 2004 arrests ended what could be called the ‘first wave’ Hofstadgroup. Yet from 
approximately April 2005 onward, a small group re-emerged that, with regard to its participants, 
ideological convictions and practical intentions, was a direct successor to the 2002-2004 
Hofstadgroup. This ‘second wave’ has become known under the name of the police investigation 
into its activities as the ‘Piranha’ group. Despite the separate investigations and court cases, the 
Piranha group was essentially a continuation of the Hofstadgroup and is treated here as such.
The 2005 resurgence was made possible by three factors. First of all, the individual arrested in 
June 2004 after reconnoitering the AIVD headquarters was acquitted and released from custody 
in April 2005. Thus, one of the most extremist individuals in the Hofstadgroup was able to 
continue his activities. Secondly, another member of the Hofstadgroup’s extremist core had 
evaded arrest in November 2004 and remained at large until his apprehension in June 2005. 
During this interval, he contributed to the new group’s operational capabilities by procuring 
three firearms. These two men appear to have formed the new group’s main protagonists and 
are referred to here as its ringleaders. Of the remaining nine individuals ultimately earmarked as 
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alleged members of the Piranha group, all but two had been on the original Hofstadgroup’s edges. 
The arrest of most of the original participants seems to have brought these peripheral individuals 
forward into positions of increased prominence.265
The Piranha group displayed some interesting differences from its predecessor. Most importantly, 
there appeared to be a burgeoning sense of hierarchy, tenuous indications of a return to more 
group-based efforts and clearer signs that these efforts were in the service of terrorism related 
goals.266 Police and intelligence information reveals that as many as three tentative terrorist plots 
may have been considered, all three of which were being shaped under the overall guidance of 
the individual released in April 2005. One of these potential plots targeted Dutch politicians, 
with particular emphasis on Hirsi Ali. The second aimed to bring down an El-Al airplane, while 
the third envisioned a double strike; first at the AIVD headquarters and then at several Dutch 
politicians.
One of the first things the individual released in April 2005 did was to approach an old acquaintance, 
someone who had been in contact with Hofstadgroup participants from approximately the end 
of 2003. During the trial against the Piranha suspects, this person claimed to have been coerced 
and threatened by the group’s two ringleaders, for instance into renting a house for the group in 
Brussels and occasionally supplying participants with money.267 In contrast, the other suspects 
in the Piranha case claimed that this individual was in fact very radical, not at all involuntarily 
associated with them and purely motivated to give incriminating testimony in court to avoid 
being sentenced.268 Although the currently available data does not allow these conflicting claims 
to be convincingly resolved, it should be noted that this was one of the witnesses whose testimony 
a Dutch court qualified as unreliable.269
Police intelligence from early April 2005 indicated that the individual recently released from 
detention had gathered a new group around him, that he wanted to die as a martyr and that 
he was driven to rectify the ‘1-0’ in the unbelievers’ favor.270 This latter point suggests that he 
may have been at least partially motivated by a personal desire for revenge for his arrest and 
incarceration. This motive also appears in various writings by and about this individual, which 
highlight his experience of poor treatment by the Dutch justice system and police and, especially, 
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his adversarial relationship with the AIVD.271 Given this background, it is unsurprising that one 
of the three potential plots overseen by this person appears to have targeted the AIVD.
3.6.1 Spring and summer 2005: Renewed signs of terrorist intentions
May 2005 brought signs of a renewed interest in pursuing acts of terrorism in the Netherlands 
among some of the Piranha group’s participants. For instance, the Piranha ringleader who had 
been a fugitive since the murder of Van Gogh allegedly told two other participants that he had 
a CD-ROM with instructions on how to make a suicide vest and that the required components 
could be bought in Germany. This person also turned up in possession of three firearms; a 
CZ ‘Skorpion’ version 61 submachine gun (also referred to as a ‘baby Uzi’), an Agram 2000 
submachine gun with a separate silencer and a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver. In May, he 
instructed a participant to visit the group’s other leader, the man released from custody in April, 
to pick something up. This turned out to be a piece of paper printed in an internet café which 
listed the names, addresses and telephone numbers of several Dutch politicians.272
Events in June provided further indications that both the intent and capability to use terrorist 
violence was being developed, again with a particular focus on Dutch politicians. On or around 
the 15th, the fugitive and his female companion took two other participants to a large park in 
Amsterdam to fire one of the submachine guns at a tree.273 Several days later, on the 20th, the 
aforementioned companion phoned a family member who worked at a pharmacy in The Hague. 
She asked for the addresses of the politicians who frequented it and was particularly interested 
in Hirsi Ali’s, but was not given the information.274 The next day, police officers conducting 
surveillance in The Hague recognized the fugitive they had sought since November 2004. At the 
time, he had been staying with someone who appears to have been pressured into providing him 
and his companion with shelter and transportation.275 
This was also the case a day later, on the 22nd of June, when the acquaintance was instructed to 
drive the fugitive and his companion to Amsterdam. Both seemed tense and the fugitive twice 
made their driver attempt to shake off any possible tails. In Amsterdam, he took over the wheel 
and drove towards train station Amsterdam Lelylaan, where he and his companion got out. Upon 
reaching the platform, both were apprehended by a police special intervention unit. At the time, 
the fugitive was carrying the loaded Agram 2000 in his backpack. In the driver’s home, the police 
found a handwritten and coded note listing the addresses of four Dutch politicians that appears 
to have belonged to the two people who had just been arrested. Their interest in the whereabouts 
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of Dutch politicians and Hirsi Ali in particular, something corroborated by the statements of two 
inmates who met them in prison, lends further credence to the idea that they were considering 
plans to assassinate one or more of these individuals.276
Two days after the arrests the group’s remaining ringleader phoned one of his imprisoned 
Hofstadgroup friends. He mentioned being unable to sleep since the arrests, that ‘the earth is 
very warm at this moment’ and that there was a story which had not yet made the newspapers 
and which would astound his friend.277 The next day he phoned again and cryptically talked of a 
‘soup’ that was still boiling but would make it onto television soon.278 Suspicions that the caller 
was involved in preparations for an act of terrorism were strengthened a month later. Just after 
midnight on the 26th of July, police officers observed this person enter a park in The Hague in 
the company of an unknown male. Not much later a bang was heard. Its source has never been 
discovered, leaving it uncertain whether this was potentially some kind of firearms or explosives 
test. Two days later the AIVD officially informed the police that they had indications that the 
group’s remaining leader was involved in terrorist activities.279
3.6.2 The second and third potential plots come to light
In early August, signs of a second potential terrorist plot began to manifest themselves. Police 
intelligence reports indicated that a group of young men of Moroccan descent in Amsterdam 
West, including two Piranha participants, were working on a plan to shoot down an El Al plane 
at Schiphol airport, possibly using some type of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). The reports 
raised the possibility that one individual had been tasked with conducting a reconnaissance of a 
particular area of Schiphol airport and that the plot was being funded by a levy on the criminal 
proceeds of acquaintances of the remaining Piranha ringleader. The intelligence information, 
however, could not be marked as ‘reliable’.280 Furthermore, subsequent police investigations were 
unable to substantiate the intelligence. This suggests that the potential second terrorist plot 
attributable to the Piranha never proceeded beyond a conceptual phase.281
In contrast to the ‘first wave’ Hofstadgroup, ‘living room meetings’ did not feature as prominently 
in its 2005 continuation. Participants did visit each other and some individuals provided religious 
instruction, yet relatively large-scale group meetings such as those that were held at the house 
of Van Gogh’s killer were not encountered in the available sources. A likely explanation is that 
the Piranha group had developed a much more acute sense of safety and was wary of indoor 
gatherings for security reasons. This is supported by several meetings held outdoors in public 
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places, such as on the 24th of August in The Hague, when four Piranha participants were observed 
together, on the 7th of September in Amsterdam, when two individuals met and exchanged a 
package, and on the 11th of October when five suspected members of the Piranha group met in 
The Hague.282
Arguably the most interesting such meeting occurred in September 2005, when the Piranha 
group’s principal protagonist met a Belgian national of Moroccan descent at a train station 
in The Hague. According to police information, the Belgian man declined the protagonist’s 
request to participate in a suicide attack against the AIVD on the grounds that he was already 
planning something in Morocco.283 A different take is given by investigative journalists Groen 
and Kranenberg. They describe the Belgian man as a cousin of a participant of the ‘original’ 
Hofstadgroup and as supposedly offering three female suicide bombers to his Piranha contact, 
who declined the offer because he wanted men only for his attack on the AIVD.284 The Belgian 
man was arrested in Morocco in November 2005 on charges not related to the Piranha case. 
The available data offers no further information on the meeting, leaving it unclear exactly what 
happened.
Signs of the third potential terrorist plot came to the fore in October. AIVD information from 
the beginning of the month indicated that the Piranha group’s participants were, to differing 
degrees, involved in preparations for a terrorist attack. This potential attack was to occur before 
the 31st of October, the date set for the main protagonist’s appeals hearing. The plot was thought 
to consist of two parts; one group of attackers would target politicians while the second would 
force entry to the AIVD headquarters and blow it up. None of the perpetrators expected to 
survive the attacks. The AIVD information also indicated that the Piranha ringleader was looking 
for additional weaponry; ten AK-47 assault rifles, two silenced pistols and ten vests containing 
eight kilograms of explosives each. The individual in question apparently expected a call from 
someone to discuss delivery of these goods. Phone intercepts revealed that a meeting between 
a possible supplier and the ringleader was arranged for the 12th of October. However, despite 
agreeing to a time and place over the phone, the Piranha participant did not show up.285
The next day, the police received additional information from the AIVD that precipitated the 
remaining suspects’ arrest. Most important was a videotaped will in which the group’s main 
protagonist, seated next to the Skorpion submachine gun, threatened the Dutch state and its 
citizens for, among other things, the country’s involvement in the Iraq war. Until the Dutch 
‘left Muslims alone and chose the path of peace’ the ‘language of the sword’ would reign.286 
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He also appeared to bid his family farewell by stating that he ‘commits this deed out of fear 
for the punishment of Allah’.287 In addition he called upon other Muslims to rise up in defense 
of oppressed Muslims worldwide and spoke out in support of his incarcerated Hofstadgroup 
friends.288 Just how the AIVD got its hands on this video has remained unclear. The person seen 
on the video claims that an AIVD informant assisted him with the recording and then supplied 
it to the AIVD after staging a break-in of his home as cover for the tape’s disappearance.289
Acting on the above information, the police arrested the remaining Piranha suspects on the 
14th of October without incident. Among the items found during house searches were three gas 
masks, several balaclava’s, radical and extremist materials and, notably, a document made by one 
of the suspects called ‘lessons in safety’ which belied the Piranha group’s greater awareness of and 
concern for the authorities’ interest in them.290 The remaining two firearms – the Skorpion and 
the revolver – were, however, not recovered at this time. They were found on the 28 August 2006 
in a cellar belonging to one of the Piranha suspects by plumbers called in to address flooding on 
the premises.291 The October 2005 arrests effectively put an end to the Hofstadgroup; its most 
extremist elements were imprisoned and the remainder made no attempt to resuscitate the group 
a third time.
3.7 An overview of the court cases
The first decade of the 21st century saw the Dutch government enact various legal and policy 
measures intended to increase its counterterrorism effectiveness.292 One of these was the Crimes 
of Terrorism Act, which was passed in August 2004. This Act enabled judges to pass heavier 
sentences on suspects if they were found to have committed their crimes with terrorist intent. 
It also specified recruitment for terrorism and membership of an organization that intended to 
commit terrorist crimes as distinct offenses. The latter became known as article 140a of the Dutch 
Criminal Code, which was based on article 140 that deals with organized crime.293 
On the 26 July, 2005, Van Gogh’s assassin was found guilty of, inter alia, murder with a terrorist 
intent, multiple counts of attempted murder on bystanders and police officers and threatening 
Hirsi Ali with terrorist intent. He was sentenced to life in prison.294 In March 2006, the first 
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judgment was passed on whether the Hofstadgroup had constituted a terrorist organization. On 
the 10th of that month, the Rotterdam District Court found nine out of fourteen suspects guilty 
of membership of a terrorist organization as described in the recently minted Article 140a.295 
However, in early 2008 The Hague Court of Appeal acquitted seven of them on this particular 
count, arguing that ‘[t]he Hofstadgroup had insufficient organizational substance to warrant the 
existence of an organization as intended in articles 140 and 140a’.296 This judgment was in turn 
revoked in February 2010, when the Supreme Court ordered a partial retrial after ruling that the 
Court of Appeal’s grounds for acquittal had been partly based on an incorrect interpretation of 
the law.297 The cases of these seven individuals were referred to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. 
In December 2010 that Court ruled that the defendants had indeed participated in a criminal and 
terrorist organization.298 After another referral to the Supreme Court, however, the Den Bosch 
Court of Appeal ruled in June 2015 that two of these suspects had not been members of a terrorist 
organization after all.299
The trials against the six Piranha suspects followed a similar course. On the 1st of December 
2006, the Rotterdam District Court found five of the defendants guilty of preparation for or 
furtherance of a terrorist offense. However, the Court did not convict them of constituting a 
terrorist organization. One suspect was acquitted of the charges brought against him.300 On the 2nd 
of October 2008, however, The Hague Court of Appeal ruled that four of those convicted in 2006 
had indeed been members of a terrorist organization.301 In late 2011, the Supreme Court decreed 
a retrial for three of them. In one case, the Supreme Court found that the defense had not been 
given access to all relevant intelligence sources.302 With regard to the other two individuals, the 
Court ruled that participation in a terrorist organization had been insufficiently demonstrated.303 
On 25 March 2014, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal once again convicted two of these three 
individuals for membership of a terrorist organization, but acquitted the third on this count.304
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3.8 Conclusion
The preceding pages reveal more about the Hofstadgroup than simply the most prominent 
activities of its participants. For instance, this overview has made clear that on the whole the 
Hofstadgroup did very little that had any direct bearing on (preparations for) terrorism. Only 
a small inner circle of extremist participants showed signs of interest in conducting an attack 
or joining jihadist insurgents overseas. Secondly, even among the minority of participants who 
(appeared to) be interested in conducing acts of terrorism, there were very few signs of communal 
efforts. After initial signs of working together in 2003’s trips abroad and the connections that 
were established with a jihadist suspect in Spain, 2004 was characterized by individual and ad hoc 
activities. Not until 2005’s ‘Piranha’ continuation did the Hofstadgroup once again show signs of 
a communal pursuit of shared goals. 
These findings thus provide insights into the group’s organizational characteristics, providing 
a link to the focus of the next chapter. They also suggest that involvement in the Hofstadgroup 
could take on a variety of forms. Only a minority of participants actually became involved in 
(preparations for) acts of terrorism. This underlines the importance of keeping in mind that 
‘involvement’ and the processes that preceded it were distinctly heterogeneous in nature. A crucial 
question this poses is what distinguished those who planned or perpetrated acts of terrorism from 
those who did not. Before the analysis can turn to the factors underlying the various involvement 
processes, however, the descriptive part of this thesis needs to be completed. To that end, the next 
chapter delves deeper into what the Hofstadgroup was by discussing the group’s ideological and 
organizational nature, as well as shedding further light on the degree to which it was communally 
involved in terrorism.
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4. The ideological and organizational nature of 
the Hofstadgroup305
4.1 Introduction
The Hofstadgroup is frequently described as a homegrown jihadist terrorist network306 and has 
even been labeled a ‘quintessential’ one.307 But to what extent is this designation justified? Before 
examining how and why involvement in this group came about, it must be made clear what 
participants were becoming involved in. The present chapter discusses what the Hofstadgroup 
was by critically examining the characteristics commonly attributed to it, beginning with its 
‘homegrown’ dimension and continuing to its ideological convictions. Subsequently, the chapter 
discusses the Hofstadgroup’s organizational characteristics and finally the degree to which it was 
communally involved in terrorism. 
4.1.1 Drawing the Hofstadgroup’s boundaries
When discussing what the Hofstadgroup was, a first difficulty is defining the group’s size; who 
exactly were its participants? Due to its ambiguous organizational structure and lack of anything 
resembling a formal list of ‘members’, this is a difficult question to answer. Here, the Hofstadgroup 
is assumed to have encompassed approximately 38 individuals.308 This number includes all 
those arrested as suspected group members during the various investigations, witnesses who 
participated in group meetings at least once, as well as any individuals listed in suspects’ or 
witnesses’ statements that also matched this criterion. This definition of ‘participation’ is by no 
means definitive but it provides a basic way of demarcating the group’s boundaries. It is also 
supported by an interviewee, who explained that the group was broader than those arrested 
following Van Gogh’s murder.309 It appears that the public prosecutor was aware of this, but 
decided to keep several individuals out of the criminal case against the Hofstadgroup in order to 
keep it manageable.310
4.2 Homegrown jihadism
What exactly makes a jihadist group a homegrown one? Crone and Harrow argue that the concept 
of homegrown terrorism has two dimensions; belonging, or the extent to which the terrorists are 
305 This chapter has been published in amended form as: Schuurman, Eijkman, and Bakker, “The Hofstadgroup 
revisited,” 1-23.
306 E.g.: Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 332-333; Silber and Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West,” 6.
307 Vidino, “The Hofstad group,” 579.
308 Sageman comes to a similar conclusion, see: Sageman, “Hofstad case,” 24.
309 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 3-4.
310 Police Investigator 2, “Personal interview 1,” (Amsterdam2012), 1.
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raised in or attached to the West, and their degree of operational autonomy from foreign terrorist 
groups.311 The 9/11 attacks, for instance, were clearly not a homegrown operation, as the attackers 
were foreign nationals rather than U.S. citizens and because the attacks were not entirely of their 
own making but instead coordinated by and executed on behalf of al-Qaeda. Seen from this 
perspective, how ‘homegrown’ was the Hofstadgroup?
4.2.1 The Hofstadgroup’s homegrown aspects
Looking at ‘belonging’ first, the majority of the 38 participants were born in the Netherlands or 
held double nationalities. However, there was a sizable minority of foreigners (seven Moroccans, 
one Syrian). Some of these foreign nationals had spent a significant part of their lives in the 
Netherlands, making it likely they felt a considerable degree of belonging to the country despite 
not being citizens. Yet two of the foreign nationals with prominent positions in the group’s radical 
and extremist inner circle were recent immigrants and thus unlikely to have felt a strong sense of 
belonging to the country; the middle-aged Syrian man known as Abu Khaled who first arrived 
in Germany as an asylum seeker in 1995 and a young Moroccan man who played an important 
role in the group’s 2005 resurgence.312 The group was thus mainly but not exclusively a Dutch 
phenomenon.
Similarly, the Hofstadgroup seems to have enjoyed a high, but not absolute, degree of autonomy. 
Several participants had connections to foreign nationals whose backgrounds suggest a possible 
link with Islamist terrorist groups. For instance, Van Gogh’s murderer was acquainted with 
two Chechen men, one of whose uncle was suspected by the American Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) of supplying Chechen jihadists with weapons.313 In addition to Abu Khaled, 
the Syrian preacher mentioned above, three other middle-aged Syrian men with ties to the 
Muslim Brotherhood also appeared on the group’s fringes.314 Characterizing the nature of these 
connections is difficult as they were never investigated in detail. It appears, however, that none of 
these men tried to exert any kind of direct control over the Hofstadgroup, leaving its autonomy 
intact.
The clearest examples of foreign extremists exerting some form of operational control over (parts 
of) the group stem from October 2003. The first concerned an Islamist militant residing in Spain, 
the second centered on an unnamed Pakistani or Afghan ‘emir’ who had apparently instructed one 
of the Hofstadgroup participants to return to the Netherlands to ‘collect balloons’.315 Suspicions 
that these connections might be in some way related to an impending terrorist attack could not 
be substantiated. Instead, it seems likely that the militant in Spain sought the group’s assistance 
311 Crone and Harrow, “Homegrown terrorism in the West,” 521.
312 Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 40.
313 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 93-96; Derix, “Hoe kwam toch.”
314 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 32, 37; VERD: 19664-19825; GET: 18349, 18415.
315 Ibid., 01/01: 23.
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with acquiring a passport and finances and that the emir’s instructions revolved around trying to 
motivate other young Muslims to travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan. The latter point is supported 
by the fact that two other Hofstadgroup participants undertook a ‘recruitment drive’ via the 
internet during the fall of 2003 with precisely that purpose in mind.316
As detailed in the previous chapter, the first round of arrests in October 2003 and the failure of the 
second trip to Pakistan or Afghanistan at the end of the year made the group more cautious and 
inward looking. While some participants continued to have connections with foreign nationals 
suspected of extremist views or even terrorist intentions, there were no indications that such links 
impinged on the group’s autonomy in any clear sense. In short, it appears that the Hofstadgroup 
was predominantly an autonomously operating group and that it became relatively more so from 
late 2003 onward. At the same time, the small number of examples of outside interference and 
the prominent positions held by at least two foreign nationals mean that the group was not a 
homegrown ideal type.
4.3 Ideology and terrorism
Maynard defines ideology as ‘a distinctive system of normative, semantic, and/or reputedly factual 
ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which underpins their understandings 
of their political world and shapes their political behavior’.317 Ideologies are cognitive frameworks 
that provide a way of ordering information about the world and imbuing it with meaning.318 
Extremist ideologies can justify violence through their ability to provide motives, (e.g. by 
painting a specific group as a dangerous threat) legitimacy (e.g. by depicting the use of force 
as the only option) and rationalizations (e.g. utopian ideals justify using violence).319 Extremist 
ideological beliefs are also an effective way of attenuating individuals’ inhibitions against killing 
or harming others by coupling an acute sense of crisis with a black and white worldview; the in-
group’s existence is threatened by implacable foes; exceptional circumstances that legitimize and 
necessitate the use of violence.320
As later chapters will explore in detail, ideological convictions alone are insufficient to explain 
involvement in a terrorist group or participation in an act of terrorism. Ideological beliefs may 
directly motivate such behavior, but they are generally one of many factors and not a sufficient 
explanation in and of themselves. That being said, ideological beliefs can play an important 
316 Ibid., 123-126.
317 Jonathan Leader Maynard, “Rethinking the role of ideology in mass atrocities,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
26, no. 5 (2014): 4.
318 Crenshaw, Explaining terrorism, 90.
319 Maynard, “Rethinking the role of ideology,” 8-10.
320 Crenshaw, Explaining terrorism, 90; Della Porta, Social movements, 174-176; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the 
mind of god: the global rise of religious violence (Berkeley / Los Angeles / London: University of California Press, 
2003), 149-163, 174-179; Peter R. Neumann, “Chapter four: the message,” The Adelphi Papers 48, no. 399 (2008): 
47-48; Tom Pyszczynski, Matt Motyl, and Abdolhossein Abdollahi, “Righteous violence: killing for God, country, 
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role in guiding behavior. As Sageman writes, the global jihadi movement is driven by a ‘Salafi 
ideology [that] determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics’.321 A group’s ideology 
can therefore provide important clues to its stance on the use of political violence, detailing 
perceived enemies and allies, clarifying the goals being strived for and, crucially, the conditions 
under which the use of violence is seen as legitimate. Examining a terrorist or extremist group’s 
ideology is therefore a key aspect of reaching a more accurate understanding of its nature.
The Hofstadgroup is commonly designated a ‘Salafi’, ‘jihadist’ or ‘Salafi-Jihadist’ group.322 Salafi-
Jihadists form the militant branch of the heterogeneous and international Salafist movement. Its 
devotees share a desire to return to a ‘pure’ Islam as practiced by the faith’s earliest adherents (the 
Salafs) and place a strong emphasis on a strict and literalistic adherence to the precepts found 
in the Quran and the examples set by the Prophet Muhammad.323 Contemporary Salafists also 
share a stringent form of monotheism that stresses the concept of ‘tawhid’, or the oneness of 
god and his exclusive right to be worshiped as the sole creator and lawmaker in the universe. As 
such, secular laws and institutions are rejected as idolatry in the sense that they violate tawhid by 
worshiping the man-made instead of the divinely-inspired.324
Reflecting the multiple perspectives from which Islamist thinkers throughout history have looked 
to the Salafs for guidance on worldly problems, several key distinctions can still be drawn in 
today’s Salafist movement. These distinctions stem not so much from key principles or the goals 
being pursued, but from disagreements on how to achieve them. Wiktorowicz has popularized a 
three-fold division of the Salafist movement into ‘politicos’ who strive to achieve their theocratic 
ideals through political participation, ‘purists’ who eschew politics in favor of proselytization 
and religious education and ‘jihadists’ who believe revolutionary violence is necessary to bring 
about change and safeguard a community of believers beleaguered by apostasy, heresy and the 
aggressive geopolitics of unbelievers such as the United States.325 
Although their ultimate goal is to bring about change in Muslim lands, prominent Salafi-Jihadist 
groups such as al-Qaeda have internationalized their struggle. This development is at least partly 
based on the idea that the ‘near enemy’ of corrupt, un-Islamic Middle Eastern regimes cannot 
be toppled until the ‘far enemy’ of Western governments that support them, and which have 
invaded Muslim states, have been forced to withdraw their influence and presence from the 
321 Marc Sageman, Understanding terror networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 1.
322 Romain Bartolo, “Decentralised leadership in contemporary jihadism: towards a global social movement,” 
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Islamic regions of the world.326 As such, Salafi-Jihadist ideology provides a justification for the 
use of political violence against Western targets based on a fusion of geopolitical and religious 
motives. A second ideological justification for violence that is important for understanding the 
Hofstadgroup revolves around the practice of ‘takfir’, or excommunication. Because apostasy is a 
grave offense within Islam, denouncing Muslims as unbelievers is a powerful theological weapon 
that legitimizes the use of violence against rulers and people who are ostensibly co-religionists.327
It should be pointed out that Salafi-Jihadists are themselves not a homogeneous group. Important 
differences in terms of strategy and principle remain. For instance, although al-Qaeda eventually 
focused its efforts on fighting the ‘far enemy’ epitomized by the United States, the organization 
was initially hamstrung by internal discord over this matter. Another important distinction to 
keep in mind for the discussion of the Hofstadgroup’s ideology is that although the principle 
of takfir is recognized by a broad range of radical and extremist groups, they differ in their 
interpretation of when the criteria for excommunication are met.328 As the following paragraphs 
illustrate, many of the divisions within the contemporary Salafist movement, and discussions 
over the legitimate use of takfir, were mirrored among the Hofstadgroup’s participants.
4.3.1 The Hofstadgroup’s ideology
Shared religious beliefs were the most important factor binding Hofstadgroup participants 
together.329 In a general sense, the entire group can be positioned within the broad Salafist 
revivalist movement. This is evidenced first and foremost by the primacy attached to a strict 
interpretation of tawhid and the related necessity to reject all secular governments and institutions. 
These themes appear to have been the most frequent subjects of group meetings, and the essence 
of the teachings of Abu Khaled, the middle-aged Syrian man who provided the group with 
religious instruction.330 Equally revealing, one interviewee declared that the first question asked 
of newcomers was ‘do you know what tawhid means?’331 Many participants possessed (parts of) a 
large digital ‘library’ containing a wide range of works by Islamic scholars, jurists and theologians 
326 Steven Brooke, “Jihadist strategic debates before 9/11,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 3 (2008): 212-218; 
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representing various strands of Salafist thinking.332 These ranged from the influential 13th century 
jurist and Salafist scholar Ahmed Ibn Taymiyya to more contemporary and politicized scholars 
such as Sayyid Qutb, an erstwhile militant leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. 
Surprisingly, however, the Hofstadgroup’s participants were largely but not exclusively drawn to 
the Salafi-Jihadist strand of thinking.333 For instance, two persons with misgivings about the ideas 
espoused by the more extreme elements within the group asked a Dutch Salafist imam loyal to 
the Saudi-Arabian regime for advice, thereby displaying an allegiance to such religious authority 
reminiscent of ‘purist’ sensibilities.334 Two others candidly declared during police questioning 
that they supported the introduction of Islamic law, but only if a majority of people in the 
Netherlands voted for it, thus hinting at opinions more in line with politicos than jihadists.335 
Another three seem to have had little interest in radical or fundamentalist interpretations of 
Islam altogether.336 
Within the confines of a largely Salafist interpretation of Islam, there appears to have been a 
surprising degree of tolerance for differing opinions. It appears that this was due in part to a sense 
among the more extremist participants that newcomers could not be expected to immediately 
embrace ‘true’ Islam.337 Once someone was considered a true brother or sister in the Hofstadgroup’s 
extremist views on Islam, dissension was treated less with indifference than with verbal outrage.338 
Still, the lack of a singular and exclusively extremist ‘Hofstadgroup ideology’ is striking.
The above findings add a degree of nuance to discussions about the beliefs of the Hofstadgroup’s 
participants. But they should not detract from the overarching conclusion that most of the 
group’s participants displayed an affinity with an extremist Salafi-Jihadist interpretation of Islam. 
This can be gleaned from their possession of documents, videos and audio recordings which 
emphasized the legitimacy and necessity of waging armed jihad and their adoration of key figures 
in the jihadist movement such as Bin Laden and the deceased leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi.339
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Although a large segment of the Hofstadgroup subscribed to an ideology that legitimizes and even 
calls for the use of violence against Western states and impious Muslims, this did not immediately 
translate into a desire to commit terrorism. Initially, the group’s most militant participants took 
from Salafi-Jihadism the understanding that jihad was a personal duty, yet saw it as a defensive 
form of warfare against foreign aggressors. In 2003 this led four participants to attempt to reach 
conflict zones in Chechnya and Pakistan / Afghanistan.340 There is little to suggest that these trips 
were made to prepare for a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. Instead, the available data, such 
as a farewell letter left by one of them, indicates they intended to stay with the insurgents.341 
Essentially, for the main part of 2003, core participants in the Hofstadgroup were would-be 
foreign fighters, but not yet would-be terrorists.342 
Towards the fall of 2003, the group’s most militant participants increasingly began to see jihad 
as something that could be waged offensively as well. Two developments were central to this 
change. In October 2003, the Dutch police arrested several participants and found one of them in 
possession of materials indicating an interest in constructing an improvised explosive device.343 
Based on an unfinished autobiography written while in custody and a martyr’s video recorded in 
2005, this individual came to justify violence against the Netherlands for its (military) support 
of the United States and what he saw as unwarranted aggression against Muslim countries.344 
Numerous other participants developed a strong sense of antipathy towards the Dutch 
government for similar reasons.345 One interviewee explicitly named the Dutch military presence 
in Iraq as contributing to changing the group’s focus from participation in the international jihad 
to using violence in the Netherlands.346 Catalyzing this shift was 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid. 
To the group’s most militant participants, the bombing showed that terrorism in Europe was 
both possible and permitted.347 
Late 2003 also saw the group’s extremist inner circle begin to consider terrorism in the Netherlands 
for religious reasons. During the fall, one individual jubilantly chatted online about slaughtering 
‘all those fake Muslims’ and in a later conversation claimed that Dutch Member of Parliament 
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Geert Wilders, known for his strong criticism of Islam, should be killed for insulting Islam.348 
Another condemned ‘90 percent of the mujahedeen in Chechnya’ as apostates.349 At this time, 
however, other participants including Abu Khaled who led many gatherings still advocated a 
modicum of restraint in wielding takfir as a theological weapon.350 Based on participants’ 
accounts, it seems that the use of takfir became increasingly indiscriminate from 2004 onward, 
leading to internal disagreements, and causing several participants to distance themselves from 
the group.351 According to one former participant, judging whether other Muslims’ actions and 
words were grounds for excommunication was an almost everyday practice.352
Some participants went so far as to excommunicate virtually everyone who was not a part of their 
group; one allegedly even ‘did takfir’ on Bin Laden while others excommunicated each other.353 
The extremes to which some took takfir problematizes the extent to which these individuals 
can be considered as falling within the Salafi-Jihadist ideological current. While a broad range 
of Islamist groups wield takfir, they usually use it to delegitimize Muslim governments in order 
to justify violent resistance.354 Excommunicating vast swathes of Muslims appears to be more 
in line with extremist sects such as Egypt’s now defunct Takfir wal Hijra.355 There are no signs 
that (elements of) the Hofstadgroup ever claimed to be successors to this extremist offshoot of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. However, some former participants did refer to the Hofstadgroup’s 
most avid excommunicators as ‘takfiris’, and one interviewee classified the group as ‘sect like’.356 
Like the Salafists and jihadist that inspired it, the Hofstadgroup was clearly not an ideologically 
homogeneous entity, but one in which various currents of thought were reflected.
Crucial in sustaining and strengthening this trend towards a greater emphasis on religious 
justifications for violence, was the to-be murderer of Van Gogh. In July 2004, he translated a 
section of Ibn Taymiyya’s work which postulates that it is a Muslim’s duty to kill anyone who 
insults the Prophet Muhammad.357 This led the assassin to believe it was his personal duty to 
commit violence in defense of his faith. Although the murderer was the only one to act on 
his beliefs, his ideas on religiously justified violence were shared by at least the group’s inner 
circle. Several other participants made explicit statements in favor of murdering Ayaan Hirsi Ali, 
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especially after the short Islam-critical film she had made with Van Gogh, Submission, part 1, was 
broadcast at the end of August 2004.358 Likewise, sources also suggest tacit and even outspoken 
support for the killing of Van Gogh on religious grounds. One inner circle participant openly told 
the police that Van Gogh deserved to be executed for his offenses to Islam.359
Given these developments, it is interesting to note that the participants in 2005’s ‘Piranha’ 
resurgence of the Hofstadgroup appear to have reverted to predominantly geopolitical motives 
as justification for terrorist attacks in the Netherlands. Not only did the police find evidence 
that the suspects had been gathering information on the addresses of several Dutch politicians, 
most of whom did not have an outspokenly ‘anti-Islam’ profile, but in a martyr’s video one 
of the ringleaders strongly condemned the Dutch government for its involvement in the Iraq 
war and threatens violence against the Dutch people for their complicity in this endeavor.360 
These fluctuations in the justifications for violence, from an emphasis on geopolitics in 2003, to 
religious motives in 2004 and back to geopolitics in 2005, indicate just how difficult it is to speak 
of a clearly defined or commonly shared ‘Hofstadgroup ideology’.
Like the militants and scholars who inspired them, the group’s most extremist participants held 
differing and changing views on the form jihad was to take. While some were narrowly motivated 
to punish blasphemers, others were inspired by geopolitical events to defend the Muslim ummah; 
while some practiced takfir without restraint, others acknowledged at least some boundaries. 
While in 2003 militant participants saw jihad in a defensive light and sought to aid overseas 
Islamist insurgents in their fight against foreign aggressors, an ‘offensive’ interpretation of 
jihad that legitimized violence in the Netherlands began to take hold from late 2003 onward. 
Furthermore, while most participants adhered to the Salafi-Jihadist current, a minority more 
closely resembled its political and purist strands of thought.
These conclusions are important not just because they infuse some nuance into the debate about 
the group’s nature. The relative ‘tolerance’ for views not completely in line with Salafist-Jihadist 
principles, the sect-like elements that took the excommunication of Muslims to extremes, and 
the different opinions on how to implement jihad meant that the Hofstadgroup remained an 
ideologically somewhat ambiguous entity. As a result, there was never a concrete blueprint 
for what the group hoped to achieve, no clear plan of action that could form the basis for 
communal efforts. This relative diversity of ideological views also contributed to ambiguity in 
an organizational sense, as at least initially it appears that essentially anyone who subscribed to 
basic Salafist principles could participate. Ideologically, the Hofstadgroup was largely but never 
exclusively wedded to views that supported the use of terrorist violence.
358 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/13: 74, 161-162.
359 Ibid., VERD: 20462; Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 21; Vermaat, Nederlandse jihad, 41. 
360 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “PIRANHA,” 34-35; NOVA, “Videotestament Samir A.”; Janny Groen and Annieke 
Kranenberg, “Samir A. in afgesplitste terreurgroep,” De Volkskrant, 28 January 2006.
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4.4 Defining terrorist organizations
The Hofstadgroup’s organizational characteristics are assessed using three contrasting 
perspectives found in the literature on terrorism. The first is Crenshaw’s view of terrorist groups 
as organizations characterized by a defined structure, a systematic decision making process, 
clearly defined roles and tasks for members, recognized leadership and authority and, lastly, the 
collective pursuit of clearly defined organizational goals.361 Second, there is Sageman’s concept 
of contemporary jihadist groups as ambiguously defined networks.362 One of the few specific 
definitions of a jihadist network is given by the Dutch intelligence service AIVD, who describe it 
as a ‘fluid, dynamic, vaguely delineated structure comprising a number of interrelated persons 
(radical Muslims) who are linked both individually and on an aggregate level (cells/groups). They 
have at least a temporary common interest, i.e. the pursuit of a jihadism-related goal (including 
terrorism).’363 Finally, Ligon et al. describe groups as social arrangements that lack shared efforts 
directed at attaining a commonly held goal.364
4.4.1 The Hofstadgroup’s organizational structure
Evidence for a defined organizational structure is almost entirely absent in the case of the 
Hofstadgroup until its second incarnation in early 2005. To begin with, many participants have 
categorically denied the existence of any kind of formal group or organization.365 Furthermore, 
no ‘official’ list of participants was ever encountered and there does not appear to have been an 
initiation process for aspirants nor any other sort of semi-formal mechanism for distinguishing 
between those within the group and those outside of it.366 Instead, the Hofstadgroup resembled 
an amorphous community of like-minded individuals spread over several nearby cities.367 It was 
not truly one group but a collection of smaller subgroups, principally revolving around one a 
nucleus in The Hague and one in Amsterdam.368 As a result of this lack of centralization, not 
all participants knew each other.369 The spread-out nature of the group further underlines the 
ambiguity of its organizational structure.
361 Crenshaw, Explaining terrorism, 69.
362 Sageman, Leaderless jihad, 140-143.
363 General Intelligence and Security Service, “Violent jihad in the Netherlands,” 14.
364 Gina Scott Ligon et al., “Putting the ‘O’ in VEOs: what makes an organization?,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 
6, no. 1-3 (2013): 120.
365 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” VERD: 19476-19477, 19866, 19918, 20005, 20017, 20080, 20228, 20363; 
GET: 18415; 19401/19417: 14099-14100; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 3-4; 
Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 14-15.
366 Although one participant did drink the breast milk of the Syrian preacher’s wife, this seemingly ritualistic act 
of bonding was not performed by others within the group and appears to have affirmed a private bond of 
friendship bordering on kinship rather than a pledge of allegiance. Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 
VERD: 19744-19745; Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 345.
367 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 3-4; Van der Hulst, “Terroristische netwerken,” 8-27.
368 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, “Personal interview 2,” 1.
369 Vermaat, Nederlandse jihad, 164; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, “Personal interview 1,” 1.
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There is even considerable confusion over whether a commonly accepted name for the group 
existed. Some publications, videos and websites related to Hofstadgroup began to feature a logo 
bearing the titles ‘Lions of Tawheed’ and ‘Polder Mujahideen’370 from early 2004 onward. Yet there 
are contradictory accounts regarding the degree to which these monikers were used by the wider 
group.371 While one witness recalled hearing one or two individuals referring to themselves as 
‘Lions of Tawheed’, an interviewee mentioned that this term was used largely in jest.372 Another 
former participant did identify himself as a ‘Lion of Tawheed’ but implied that it was not so 
much a specific group name as a broader term used to express one’s adherence to this core tenet 
of Salafist Islam.373 The name ‘Lions of Tawheed’ seemed to play a more prominent role during 
2005’s Hofstadgroup resurgence, where it turns up in association with numerous publications 
and videos produced and promulgated by one of the core participants.374 It remains unclear, 
however, whether the other participants in the Piranha group designated themselves as such.
In the wake of Van Gogh’s murder, two individuals within the extremist inner circle were overheard 
identifying themselves with the murderer and using the name the ‘Brigades of the Islamic 
Jihad’.375 Like the ‘Lions of Tawheed’ designation, it remains unclear whether this truly reflected a 
commonly-used group name or merely individual braggadocio. Based on the currently available 
data, it seems likely that these examples reflect the shared kinship of the group’s extremist inner 
circle and indicate some early and ad hoc attempts at forging a stronger collective identity among 
them. It is unlikely, however, that these designations reflected the existence of a tangible group 
structure or that they encompassed the wider Hofstadgroup. 
The Hofstadgroup lacked true leadership or even a rudimentary hierarchical structure for 
the better part of its existence.376 But it did have individuals who stood higher on the social 
pecking order through, for example, their greater command of Arabic. Van Gogh’s murderer 
was esteemed for his knowledge of Islam, yet he does not appear to have occupied a leadership 
position and is frequently referred to as a rather quiet and withdrawn individual.377 The person 
who most closely resembled the group’s leader was Abu Khaled, the middle-aged Syrian man 
mentioned earlier. His role as a religious instructor gave him a prominent and well-respected 
370 A ‘polder’ is a characteristic feature of the Dutch landscape.
371 The logo may not even have been made by a participant: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, “Personal interview 
2,” 1.
372 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4099; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 
5.
373 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 17.
374 Meijer, “Inhoud van de religieuze en ideologische documenten aangetroffen in het beslag van verdachten in het 
Piranha-onderzoek,” 29-30.
375 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHA07/24: 3082; Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 353-354.
376 Public Prosecutor 1, “Personal interview 1,” 51; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 
4; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 31-32; Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 
VERD: 19479, 19876.
377 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 4; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal 
interview 2,” 13; NCTV Employee 1, “Personal interview 2,” 2; Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” VERD: 
19868, 20212, 20227; Vidino, “The Hofstad group,” 586-587; Public Prosecutor 2, “Personal interview 1,” 4.
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position within the group and a good deal of authority.378 At the same time, there is little to 
suggest his influence extended beyond providing religious instruction; there are no concrete signs 
that he took a leadership position in the sense of shaping the Hofstadgroup organizationally 
or setting out operational goals.379 Two former participants labeled the Syrian as an important 
source of religious knowledge and a good teacher, but not a leader or even a particularly inspiring 
individual.380
The conclusion that the Hofstadgroup lacked clear leadership needs to be qualified somewhat 
when looking at 2005’s Piranha case. This ‘second wave’ of the group brought with it tentative 
signs of a burgeoning hierarchy. Most notably, two individuals who had belonged to the ‘original’ 
Hofstadgroup’s inner circle began to direct the activities of some other group participants, for 
instance by them rent an apartment in Brussels that was used to hold meetings.381 Additionally, 
there were signs that these two ringleaders provided direction to group participants on matters 
related to the planning of as many as three tentative terrorist plots.382 The Piranha group never 
developed a formal hierarchy, but these developments indicate it might have been headed in that 
direction had arrests in June and October 2005 not put an end to the group.
Two other attributes of terrorist organizations, a systematic decision making process and the 
distribution of clearly defined organizational roles and tasks, were also largely absent. For the 
most part, the group did little beyond hold frequent meetings where they discussed their religion 
or simply chatted and relaxed.383 Whatever activities were undertaken were initiated on an ad 
hoc basis by individuals or by small groups of two or three, such as the attempts to reach foreign 
conflict zones during 2003.384 There is little to indicate that these attempts were the result of a 
collectively made decision. Perhaps the strongest reference to a decision making process stems 
from one of the letters left by Van Gogh’s murderer, in which he advises the group to discuss 
whether or not to publish a pamphlet in which he threatens the Dutch people.385 Examples of 
a distribution of tasks and roles are similarly weak and limited to the joint administration of 
at least one website and one participant’s avowedly self-appointed task of publishing online 
anything written by Van Gogh’s to-be assassin.386 
No data was encountered to suggest that participants in the 2005 Piranha case had developed a 
systematic decision making process. There were, however, some indications that tasks relevant 
378 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” VERD: 19480, 19705-19706, 19747; 19401/19417: 14095.
379 NCTV Employee 1, “Personal interview 1,” 2; Public Prosecutor 1, “Personal interview 1,” 8.
380 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 33; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal 
interview 1,” 4.
381 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “PIRANHA,” 63, 187, 11782-11785.
382 Ibid., 34-35, 8357-8359, 8382-8383, 8388, 8390-8391; Vidino, “The Hofstad group,” 584.
383 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 5; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal 
interview 3,” (Amsterdam2012), 2.
384 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/13: 140-143; Erkel, Samir, 194-197.
385 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHB03/27: 4043.
386 Ibid., AHA04/21: 1324-1343; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 32.
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to the preparation of the three terrorist plots under consideration were distributed among 
participants. For instance, one participant was used as a courier, fetching a package containing 
information on potential targets for an attack from one of the group’s ringleaders and bringing it 
to the other.387 Likewise, the Islamic wife of one of these main protagonists actively tried to gather 
information on the addresses of several Dutch politicians.388 Once again it should be stressed that 
these signs of a division of tasks were distinctly tentative. Even so, they do mark a change from 
the ‘first wave’ Hofstadgroup that again underscores the Piranha group’s development towards a 
slightly more organizationally defined entity.
To summarize, until the Hofstadgroup’s resurgence during 2005’s Piranha case, it appears to 
have lacked virtually all of the characteristics of a terrorist organization as defined by Crenshaw. 
Its boundaries were vague and ambiguous and there was no hierarchy to speak of. Neither 
does the available data allow for the existence of a decision making process or anything but 
the most basic division of tasks. While some of these organizational aspects became noticeably 
more pronounced in 2005, this development fell well short of qualifying the Hofstadgroup as an 
actual organization. The very absence of clear organizational aspects points instead towards the 
greater applicability of viewing the Hofstadgroup as a jihadist network. But the accuracy of this 
qualification revolves around the existence of one crucial element from the AIVD’s definition of 
a jihadist network that has not yet been discussed in detail; namely, a common effort directed 
towards preparing an act of terrorism.
4.5 Group involvement in terrorism?
From the fall of 2003 until the final wave of arrests in October 2005, the available evidence 
suggests that several participants considered committing acts of terrorism in the Netherlands. 
One of them carried out his intentions and murdered Van Gogh, whereas the other alleged plots 
did not advance beyond rudimentary planning stages. For the ‘network’ label to be applicable to 
the Hofstadgroup, these plots and the murder of Van Gogh need to have represented a communal 
effort. The crux of the matter is, however, that the only actual terrorist attack that took place 
appears to have been the work of an individual and that the majority of all the other potential 
or alleged attempts to plan an attack were likewise solo-projects. Clear group involvement in 
terrorism was almost entirely absent until 2005’s Piranha case.
For instance, the house searches of October 2003 and June 2004 both uncovered materials 
indicative of an interest in constructing an explosive device, but on both occasions those items 
belonged to one individual.389 Although two other participants had made inquiries about fertilizer 
in a garden store in June 2004 as well, it is unclear whether this was a related development.390 In 
387 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “PIRANHA,” 61.
388 Ibid., 36, 40-64, 156-162.
389 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 38-45.
390 Ibid., 01/01: 40; 01/13: 175.
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any case, the police did not uncover evidence to substantiate a suspicion that the wider group 
was involved with the arrested individual’s attempts at constructing a bomb. This was the same 
person who, also by himself, carried out the potential reconnaissance of the AIVD headquarters 
in June 2004.391 Similarly, as the chronological overview of events described in more detail, the 
police investigation failed to uncover any concrete evidence to support a conclusion other than 
that the murder of Van Gogh was planned, prepared and executed by a single person.392 
The hand grenade thrown at police officers in November 2004 was a premeditated act of violence. 
The two Hofstadgroup participants who occupied the apartment that was stormed by the police 
had discussed beforehand that they would use the weapon to resist arrest.393 But as an essentially 
defensive measure, the intended effect of the violent act was limited to keeping the police at bay. 
It was not meant as a means of communicating with audiences beyond the direct targets of that 
violence and can therefore not be classified as an act of terrorism. As such, this incident is not 
used to evaluate whether the Hofstadgroup was communally involved in (preparing) acts of 
terrorism.
In April 2005, the individual who had been found in possession of materials indicating an interest 
in constructing an explosive device was released from custody. Together with another extremist 
participant of the Hofstadgroup who had evaded capture following Van Gogh’s murder, he tried 
to breathe new life into what was left of the Hofstadgroup. With the assistance of several other 
individuals who had been on the fringes of the Hofstadgroup during 2004, as many as three 
rudimentary plots appear to have been considered. The first, which came to the police’s attention 
in June, revolved around attacking specific politicians. The second potential plot came to the 
fore in August and centered on shooting down an El-Al plane at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport. 
In October 2005 the police received information indicating the possible existence of a third plot 
aimed at striking the AIVD headquarters. It was the brainchild of the remaining key player within 
the group, the same individual who was suspected of plotting a terrorist attack in October 2003 
and June 2004.394
None of these plots appear to have developed beyond basic planning and preparatory stages 
and the alleged plan to attack an El-Al plane using an RPG comes across as distinctly fanciful. 
Given the controversial use of intelligence information as the evidentiary basis for these terrorist 
conspiracies, care must be taken not to accept their existence as simple facts.395 Nevertheless, 
while during 2003 and 2004 such plots as there were and the attack on Van Gogh remained 
predominantly the work of individuals, the revitalization of the Hofstadgroup during 2005’s 
391 Ibid., 01/01: 38-45.
392 Van Straelen, “Requisitoir in de strafzaak tegen Mohammed B.,” 6-7. 
393 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHA07/24: 3034, 3047.
394 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “PIRANHA,” 40-41, 44, 49, 51-53, 60, 158, 1056, 6386, 7273, 7278, 8326, 11404.
395 Quirine Eijkman and Bibi Van Ginkel, “Compatible or incompatible? Intelligence and human rights in terrorist 
trials,” Amsterdam Law Forum 3, no. 4 (2011); “Hoge Raad vernietigt veroordeling Soumaya S.,” De Volkskrant, 
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Piranha case produced the first tentative signs that terrorist aims were being developed 
communally. This marks 2005 as the first time that the Hofstadgroup clearly began to resemble 
a jihadist terrorist network. 
Given the necessary time and freedom of operation, it is likely that the Hofstadgroup would 
have developed into a more clearly defined terrorist network. One former participant opined 
that there was within the group a clear trend towards to the communal use of violence.396 
However, there is a risk in attaching too much importance to such statements and succumbing 
to ‘what if ’ history. Given the tentative nature of the signs toward communal involvement in 
terrorism, and the fact that they did not manifest themselves until late in the group’s lifespan, 
the Hofstadgroup’s organizational nature is best captured by Ligon et al.’s use of the term ‘group’, 
which expressly omits the communal focus on the achievement of a shared goal.397 Consequently, 
the Hofstadgroup is deliberately labeled as a group throughout this thesis.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined to what degree the ‘homegrown’, ‘jihadist’, ‘network’ and ‘terrorist’ 
descriptors commonly ascribed to the Hofstadgroup were accurate reflections of its nature. The 
results suggest the need for a nuanced perspective on all these elements, undercutting claims that 
the group was a ‘quintessential’ example of this typology of terrorism.398 Instead, it was in many 
ways an ambiguous entity; not entirely homegrown, not exclusively Salafi-Jihadist in ideological 
orientation, neither clearly a network nor an organization but more accurately described as a 
‘group’, and largely lacking signs of communal involvement in terrorism until its 2005 ‘Piranha’ 
resurgence.
Nevertheless, some contours can be drawn. Throughout its existence, the group resembled a 
set of concentric circles. At its core was a relatively small number of participants who married 
Salafi-Jihadist beliefs to the conviction that jihad was a personal duty. Surrounding them was 
a larger group of individuals who shared an interpretation of Islam largely in line with Salafi-
Jihadist beliefs but who showed no real interest (yet) in becoming involved in acts of violence. A 
much smaller third group of participants adhered to Salafist principles but did not see the use of 
violence as legitimate. Finally, there was a very small minority of individuals who appear to have 
had very little interest in fundamentalist, radical or extremist interpretations of Islam altogether.
A second important conclusion is that the Hofstadgroup was never static but undergoing 
a continuous process of ideological and organizational development. Although the group 
had very few identifiable organizational characteristics between 2002 and 2004, it began to 
develop a rudimentary hierarchy and division of tasks in 2005. Crucially, the Hofstadgroup 
396 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, “Personal interview 2,” 4-5.
397 Ligon et al., “Putting the ‘O’ in VEOs,” 120.
398 Vidino, “Radicalization, linkage, and diversity,” 4.
82
was in an ideological sense not always and never entirely a terrorist group. In 2003, it most 
militant participants wanted to become foreign fighters, not terrorists conducting attacks in the 
Netherlands. That changed from late 2003 onward, as several began to show a clear interest in 
carrying out acts of violence at home. 
Although the group showed clearer signs of communal involvement in terrorism from 2005 
onward, it always contained participants who did not fully, or even not all, share the inner-circle’s 
beliefs in the legitimacy and personal necessity of engaging in this form of political violence. These 
nuances make it difficult to close this chapter with a single, clear response to the question of what 
the Hofstadgroup was. On the one hand its extremist and militant inner-circle made it a terrorist 
network under construction. On the other, for most of its participants the Hofstadgroup was a 
venue to meet like-minded individuals and a place where both world affairs and religion were 
discussed from a point of view that was always fundamentalist, often radical but not necessarily 
violent. 
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5. Structural-level factors: facilitating and 
motivating involvement399
5.1 Introduction
Following the multilevel analytical framework set out in chapter 2, this second part of the thesis 
begins by looking at the influence of structural-level factors. Terrorist groups are shaped by the 
social, political and economic environment in which they find themselves. How did such factors 
influence involvement processes in the Hofstadgroup? This chapter is organized using Crenshaw’s 
division of structural-level factors into those that enable and those that motivate involvement in 
terrorism. Consequently, the analysis begins with a discussion of facilitating conditions such as 
popular support for terrorism and counterterrorism shortcomings. It then turns to motivational 
ones such as relative deprivation and political grievances before concluding with a brief look at 
the structural-level event that most likely triggered the murder of Theo van Gogh.
5.1.1 Structural-level factors influencing involvement in terrorism
The structural level provides an ‘ecological’ understanding of involvement in terrorism based on 
the relationship between terrorists and their surroundings.400 There is no simple causal relationship 
between structural-level factors, such as illiteracy or political grievances, and terrorism.401 
After all, of the millions of people exposed to such factors, only a handful become involved in 
terrorism. That is why referring to such structural as ‘root causes’ of terrorism, as some politicians 
are apt to do, is misleading.402 Structural conditions are not a ‘special’ category of explanatory 
variables. They must be complemented with insights from the group and individual levels of 
analysis to provide a holistic understanding involvement in terrorism. Their contribution to this 
understanding, however, is an important one. Structural-level factors influence the opportunities 
and motives for involvement in terrorism as well as potentially precipitating an actual attack.
This tripartite distinction is based on Crenshaw’s classic work on the causes of terrorism. It 
distinguishes between ‘preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and 
precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism’.403 Crenshaw 
399 An amended version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as: Bart Schuurman, Edwin Bakker, 
and Quirine Eijkman, “Structural influences on involvement in European homegrown jihadism: a case study,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence (Forthcoming 2017). 
400 Lia and Skjølberg, “Causes of terrorism,” 40.
401 John Horgan, The psychology of terrorism (London / New York: Routledge, 2014), 85-86.
402 James J.F. Forest, “Exploring root causes of terrorism: an introduction,” in The making of a terrorist, volume III: 
root causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport / London: Praeger Security International, 2005), 1-2; Edwin Bakker, 
“Zin en onzin van de zoektocht naar oorzaken van terrorisme,” Internationale Spectator 58, no. 2 (2004): 542-
547.
403 Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism,” 381. Emphases in original.
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further distinguishes between preconditions that ‘provide opportunities for terrorism to happen’, 
and those that ‘directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns’.404 This distinction usefully 
emphasizes that structural factors can provide opportunities and motives for involvement in 
terrorism, as well as triggers for an actual attack. Indicative of the staying-power of Crenshaw’s 
subdivision of terrorism’s structural factors, is that it has been maintained in more recent 
publications.405 Consequently, it is used here to organize the discussion of the various structural-
level hypotheses.
A review of the literature indicates a large number of potential structural-level factors relevant 
to understanding involvement in terrorism (Table 6). After undertaking an initial assessment 
of their applicability to the Hofstadgroup case study, it became apparent that several of them 
could be excluded as potential explanations at the outset. These omissions were based on one 
of two considerations: either the explanation’s applicability to the Netherlands as a country was 
too limited, or there was simply too little data to suggest relevance to the Hofstadgroup and 
its participants. Examples of the former include absolute poverty, sudden marked population 
growth and state collapse; conditions that have simply not existed in the Netherlands for decades. 
Neither was the country undergoing a process of urbanization or modernization, beset by war or 
violent social unrest or suddenly exposed to the vagaries of a globalized economy. 
With regard to the Hofstadgroup, it rapidly became apparent that its participants did not attempt 
to manipulate the mass media for their own ends and there was no evidence that an overlap 
between criminal and terrorist networks exerted an influence on the group’s development. 
Furthermore, despite the Dutch involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, the 
Hofstadgroup cannot be seen as ‘spillover’ from those conflicts as the group was predominantly 
Dutch, not Afghan or Iraqi in origin. Rather than introduce and discuss all of the structural-level 
factors listed in Table 6 in detail only to conclude their irrelevance, the discussion limits itself to 
those that are in theory applicable to the Netherlands as a country and for which there is at least 
some empirical support in the data. Those excluded from analysis have been struck through. 
404 Ibid.
405 Bjørgo, “Conclusions,” 258; Newman, “Exploring the ‘root causes’,” 751.
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Structural level explanations for involvement in terrorism
Preconditions: opportunities Preconditions: motives Precipitants
The Internet (Relative) Deprivation Govt’s excessive use of force
Popular support for terrorism Intergroup inequality Government attempts reforms
External assistance Political grievances
Social / cultural facilitation of 
violence
Clash of value systems
Ineffective counterterrorism Economic globalization
Political opportunity structure Cultural globalization
Modernization Urbanization
Population growth / youth bulge Modernization
Shifts ethnic/religious balance society Spillover from other conflicts
Urbanization State sponsorship of terrorism
Mass media Power structure internat. system
Organized crime – terrorism nexus Failed / failing states
Armed conflict 
Table 6
5.2 Preconditions: providing opportunities for terrorism
The preconditions discussed in this section influence the opportunities for engaging in terrorist 
activities. The qualification is important. While the primary contribution of the factors discussed 
in this section was to enable involvement in the Hofstadgroup, they frequently also exerted an 
(indirect) motivational influence.
5.2.1 The Internet 
The Internet can provide opportunities for involvement in terrorism in several ways. It can be used 
to gain knowledge about the construction and use of explosives. It can bring together like-minded 
individuals regardless of their physical distance from one another and it can link local militants 
to broader global movements, all of this while providing at least a degree of anonymity.406 The 
web can also function as an easy-to-use propaganda platform, making a terrorist group’s message 
instantly available to a potential audience of millions. By projecting images of war and injustice 
across the globe, the Internet invites some of its users to suffer vicariously.407 As such, the Internet 
can have a crucial influence on what Egerton calls the construction of a ‘political imaginary’ in 
406 Marc Sageman, “The turn to political violence in the West,” in Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge: 
European and American experiences, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Farnham / Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 122-123; Anne 
Stenersen, “The Internet: a virtual training camp?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008): 216-231.
407 Oleson and Khosrokhavar, Islamism as social movement, 28.
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which young Muslims from Western countries establish common cause with ‘brothers and sisters’ 
they will most likely never meet.408
5.2.1.1 The Internet and the Hofstadgroup
All of these functions of the Internet facilitated the Hofstadgroup’s growth. By providing easy 
access to large amounts of information on Islam, jihadist groups and geopolitical affairs, the 
Internet first of all became a key enabler of participants’ adoption of radical and extremist 
views.409 Data suggests that for some, the Internet became a source of answers to questions 
that parents and imams were unwilling or unable to discuss.410 Questions such as: Does Islam 
condone terrorism? What is the cause of the Palestinians’ plight? Why had the United States 
and its allies intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq? Secondly, the World Wide Web made available 
information of a more practical sort. One participant was found in possession of photographs 
and maps of Dutch government buildings and critical infrastructure that he had downloaded 
from the Internet, possibly as part of a reconnaissance of potential targets.411 Several others had 
downloaded bomb-making manuals.412 
A number of participants met each other online before developing ‘real world’ connections.413 In 
the fall of 2003, two participants used the web to reach out to other young Muslims in order to 
entice them to travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan.414 From the summer of 2004 until early 2005, one 
member of the group’s inner circle in particular utilized online communication tools to instill the 
‘right’ interpretation of tawhid and the necessity of takfir in aspirants.415 Thus, the Internet also 
provided opportunities for the group’s organizational and ideological development and enabled 
its activities. Finally, the Internet served as a propaganda tool.416 Hofstadgroup participants made 
and administered simple websites that expounded radical and extremist interpretations of Islam, 
advocated the rejection of democracy and glorified terrorism. Such sites also offered practical 
408 Egerton, Jihad in the West, 92, 94-96; Egerton, “The internet and militant jihadism,” 116, 124-125.
409 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 12; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal 
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and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 21; Benschop, “A political murder foretold”.
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2,” 11-12.
411 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 40, 42.
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“Personal interview 1,” 7; Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 22.
414 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 123-126; 101/113: 134-136.
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advice on preparing for jihad, advertized materials published by participants, in particular Van 
Gogh’s to-be murderer, and threatened the group’s enemies in texts and videos.417
The Internet was thus an essential enabling factor for the Hofstadgroup’s emergence. It provided 
an easy way for (future) participants to meet each other, propagate their views and gain access 
to ideological and practical information that fueled their increasing radicalism. That is not to 
say the group was entirely dependent on this medium. For instance, as later chapters will show, 
pre-existing ties of friendship, introductions and chance encounters were also crucial group 
formation mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that the group’s participants would 
have experienced the same degree of exposure to extremist’s ideologies, terrorist propaganda and 
vicarious experiences of injustice had they not had access to the Internet. 
5.2.2 Popular support for terrorism
The importance of popular support for groups who violently challenge a state’s power has 
long been recognized in the context of guerrilla warfare and, more recently, counterinsurgency 
operations.418 Popular support can be seen as a vital resource for terrorist and insurgent groups, 
providing them with the weapons, finances, recruits and intelligence information necessary to 
carry out a prolonged campaign of violence.419 Conversely, when such non-state actors lose the 
support of the people they claim to represent, they are frequently unable to persevere against the 
materially stronger government forces that hunt them.420
5.2.2.1 Popular support for the Hofstadgroup
Leiken has claimed that the Hofstadgroup enjoyed far more popular support than ‘marginal’ 
terrorist groups such as the Italian Red Brigades (BR) or the German Red Army Faction (RAF).421 
However, the truth is that both these groups could count on substantial support, especially among 
students, while there simply is no evidence that the Hofstadgroup was receiving similar support 
from the Muslim community in the Netherlands.422 Unlike the BR and RAF, the Hofstadgroup 
did not inspire imitation; no follow-up generations of terrorists materialized after the October 
417 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 163, 200-203; 101/113: 165-167; AHA104/121: 1326-1327, 
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2005 arrests.423 The group’s extremist stance on what constituted ‘true’ Islam and the (implied) 
allegations of apostasy that it leveled against the majority of (Dutch) Muslims, effectively ruled 
out the possibility of it acquiring broad support among Dutch Muslims.424 The Hofstadgroup was 
not a popularly supported vanguard movement but a fringe group that intimidated its potential 
supporters almost as much as it threatened declared enemies.425 Popular support was therefore 
not a factor that meaningfully enabled participants’ involvement processes.
5.2.3 External assistance
External sources of support, whether other terrorist groups, state sponsors, transnational private 
support networks or communities that back militancy, can significantly increase opportunities 
for engaging in terrorism.426 These parties can make available funding, weapons and access 
to paramilitary training camps. They can also provide guidance or even outright operational 
leadership that can facilitate preparations for a terrorist attack.427 The next two sections assess 
whether the Hofstadgroup was subject to external guidance and whether external sources of 
support provided practical benefits conducive to involvement in terrorism. 
5.2.3.1 The Hofstadgroup’s external connections
The police files make numerous suggestions that the Hofstadgroup was under some form of 
external guidance. At one point the Dutch intelligence service AIVD claimed that the group’s 
religious instructor belonged to a group that ‘could be seen as a successor or branch of the 
Bin Laden organization’.428 The files contain no information of any kind to support this claim, 
however. Another intelligence report held that a second participant had links to unspecified 
foreign terrorist organizations.429 Although this individual did have an uncle who was detained in 
Guantanamo Bay, there is nothing to suggest that this had any bearing on the events surrounding 
the Hofstadgroup.430 The absence of factual evidence to corroborate claims such as these suggests 
that they should be treated as highly speculative. 
The Hofstadgroup was also acquainted with three middle-aged Syrian men who like its religious 
instructor, held fundamentalist views. At least one of them had been involved with the Muslim 
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Brotherhood before he fled Syria in the 1990s.431 Yet, once again, there is nothing to actually suggest 
that these men provided leadership or that there was a connection between the Hofstadgroup 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. Then there is the Chechen man whose fingerprints were found 
on the farewell letter of Van Gogh’s killer and whose uncle the American Federal Bureau of 
Investigation suspected of being an illegal arms dealer involved with Chechen terrorist groups.432 
This individual was arrested in early 2005, together with a countryman whose fingerprints had 
also been found on the murderer’s belongings. Both were quickly released for lack of evidence of 
involvement in the Van Gogh murder. While it has remained a mystery how the fingerprint got on 
the letter, the absence of evidence to suggest they had a role in the murder is another argument 
against the notion that the Hofstadgroup was under external guidance.433
Of all the possible ties between the Hofstadgroup and foreign extremists or even terrorist 
organizations, the most plausible are those that came to light in October 2003. Intelligence 
information and the behavior of the participants concerned bore out that there were contacts 
between the travelers to Pakistan or Afghanistan and an unnamed ‘emir’, as well as with a Moroccan 
man in Spain who was suspected of involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings.434 Yet there 
is no concrete evidence to suggest that these ties amounted to outside operational guidance. The 
‘emir’ most likely tasked the Hofstadgroup participants in question with convincing other Dutch 
Muslims to travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan and the Moroccan man appears to have solicited 
the group’s help in order to remain at large. 435 Beyond speculation, there is little to suggest these 
men were instructing the Hofstadgroup to carry out acts of terrorism.
There are also numerous pieces of information in the police files which suggest that external parties 
provided the Hofstadgroup with practical benefits conducive to carrying out acts of terrorism. 
Several intelligence reports raise the possibility that the group received funding. Possible donors 
were Saudi-Arabians, Dutch Muslim extremists who wanted Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh killed and a 
leading participant’s criminal associates.436 Given the absence of any supporting evidence, these 
claims should once again be treated as distinctly speculative. Investigations also failed to support 
the idea that the group’s weapons were externally supplied.437 A Hofstadgroup participant did 
claim that the hand grenades were provided by an AIVD informant. These accusations led to the 
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alleged informant’s arrest in late 2005, but charges were dropped in March 2006 due to lack of 
evidence.438
Another instance of possible external support stems from September 2005. At that time, the 
Piranha group’s main protagonist met a Belgian national at a train station in The Hague. 
Accounts of what transpired differ. The Dutch police believe that the Belgian man asked his 
Dutch counterpart to participate in a suicide operation while investigative journalists claim that 
the Belgian offered three female suicide terrorists to the Hofstadgroup participant but was turned 
down.439 As neither of these scenarios materialized, there is little basis to assume this meeting had 
any actual influence on the Piranha group’s possibilities for engaging in terrorism. 
The most plausible claim of external assistance concerns the possibility that two participants 
underwent paramilitary training during their 2003 trip to Pakistan or Afghanistan. A trip 
that may have been facilitated by an individual who some participants later claimed had been 
working on behalf of the AIVD.440 Although the paramilitary training hypothesis is similarly 
based on intelligence information, it is corroborated by at least some circumstantial evidence; a 
participant’s statement that he heard one of the travelers claim as much and this same traveler’s 
repeated online bragging about his proficiency with weapons.441 In November 2004, the latter also 
threw a hand grenade at the police officers that came to arrest him and used a mirror to peek 
at them while remaining behind cover.442 Both of these actions may be further hints that he had 
received at least some basic training.
In short, the Hofstadgroup’s emergence does not appear to have been enabled by either external 
guidance or support. The one possible exception being that the two participants who traveled to 
Pakistan or Afghanistan may have undergone some basic paramilitary training. Several participants 
clearly had the desire to travel to foreign jihadist battle zones and they would probably have 
reveled in the chance to receive guidance from actual jihadist militants or ideologues. Why such 
connections did not materialize remains grounds for speculation; perhaps the trips to Pakistan 
or Afghanistan were simply too short to make meaningful connections, perhaps their youth and 
lack of experience with militancy made the Hofstadgroup’s travelers unappealing to potential 
foreign handlers. Whatever the case, the inapplicability of external support underlines the group’s 
homegrown status.
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5.2.4 Social or cultural facilitation of violence
Individuals exposed to cultural or social values that convey a negative attitude towards out-groups 
or glorify violence may be more likely to see the use of terrorism as justifiable.443 Several empirical 
studies indicate that Muslims in general are not more likely than non-Muslims to commit or 
suffer from political violence.444 At the same time, research also suggests that fundamentalist 
and militant interpretations of Islam can inculcate intolerance, hatred and a positive disposition 
towards the use of force as a means of dealing with perceived enemies.445 
A 2015 study by Koopmans indicates that fundamentalist views are widespread among Sunni 
Muslims in a variety of European countries, including the Netherlands, and that these views 
correspond with hostility toward out-groups.446 For instance, more than fifty percent of Muslims 
polled believed that the West was out to destroy Islam, a figure that rose to more than seventy 
percent among ‘very religious fundamentalist Muslims’.447 The data for this particular study were 
collected in 2008 and it presents an aggregate of several countries, meaning that the findings are 
not directly applicable to the situation in the Netherlands as encountered by the Hofstadgroup’s 
participants. However, it seems reasonable to assume that these views did not suddenly develop 
and thus that many participants grew up in a social environment in which similar views 
were prevalent. All the more so since numerous participants attended mosques in which the 
fundamentalist Salafist brand of Islam was preached.448
Koopman’s study is not the only one that provides insights into the attitudes and beliefs of Dutch 
Muslims. A 2004 report commissioned by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) 
concluded that there was a trend towards secularization among Dutch Muslims of Moroccan and 
Turkish origin.449 This finding seems to contradict Koopman’s work, however the SCP report also 
noted that close to 100 percent of respondents indicated that Islam was very important to them, 
57 percent of respondents with a Moroccan background felt individuals should follow Islamic 
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rules and 30 percent of this same group thought Islam and ‘modern life’ were incompatible.450 
Additionally, a majority of Moroccans adhered to an orthodox interpretation of their faith.451 
Interestingly, a 2012 follow-up study by the SCP criticized the ‘secularization’ thesis, finding instead 
that mosque attendance was no longer declining and that there were relatively few differences in 
the strictness of religious attitudes between first and second generation Muslim immigrants.452 
Neither the 2004 nor the 2012 SCP report directly supports Koopmans’ conclusions. However, 
by providing indications of the prevalence of orthodoxy among Dutch Moroccan Muslims and 
the great importance this group attached to its Islamic identity, they do lend further credibility 
to the findings presented by Koopmans.
5.2.4.1 Social facilitation for violence and the Hofstadgroup
The above discussion leads to the tentative conclusion that, by instilling a sense of hostility 
towards the Western world, social facilitation of fundamentalism likely lowered Hofstadgroup 
participants’ threshold to seeing the use of violence as legitimate. This is anecdotally supported 
by the finding that family members of the murderer who resided in Morocco, together with some 
of the other residents of their village, showed support for the murder.453 
However, it would go too far to argue, on what is circumstantial evidence, that exposure to 
fundamentalist Islam facilitated the use of violence. After all, with so many Dutch Muslims 
exposed to similar attitudes, how can it be explained that only the Hofstadgroup displayed such 
outspokenly militant views and behavior? Furthermore, the fundamentalist Salafist variety of 
Islam to which the Hofstadgroup by and large subscribed, comes in at least three varieties of which 
only the Salafi-Jihadist one openly advocates the use of force.454 Explaining some participants’ 
(intended) acts of violence therefore necessitates broadening the analysis beyond structural-level 
factors to incorporate social dynamics and personal backgrounds, as the next chapters will do.
5.2.5 Ineffective counterterrorism
According to Crenshaw, one of the most important permissive causes of terrorism is a 
government’s ‘inability or unwillingness’ to prevent it.455 The various police investigations into the 
Hofstadgroup’s activities and the AIVD’s monitoring of the group indicate the Dutch authorities 
were certainly not unwilling to address the threat posed by this group. But can hindsight indicate 
areas where the response was ineffective or counterproductive?
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5.2.5.1 Counterterrorism lapses as enablers for the Hofstadgroup
After Van Gogh’s death, the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services 
(CTIVD) concluded that the AIVD had incorrectly dismissed the filmmaker’s murderer as a 
peripheral member of the Hofstadgroup.456 A conclusion shared by the Service’s acting director at 
the time.457 Although the AIVD had possessed information that the to-be killer fulfilled a central 
role in the Hofstadgroup, had a history of violent outbursts and was writing increasingly extremist 
tracts, this data had not been analyzed in its totality before the murder.458 The CTIVD was careful 
to stress that the AIVD did not possess information indicating that Van Gogh’s murderer was 
planning to commit an attack.459 Whether extra attention from the AIVD would have prevented 
Van Gogh’s killer from striking therefore remains highly speculative. But at the very least, the 
AIVD’s misdiagnosis benefited the killer by allowing him to carry out his preparations largely 
unnoticed.
What clearly did enable Van Gogh’s killer to strike was the fact that his target was easily 
accessible. As a public figure, Van Gogh was easily recognized and because he cycled to his work 
in Amsterdam he was also easy to find. Crucially, he had steadfastly refused the Dutch authorities’ 
offer of increased personal protection in the wake of the negative fallout produced by the airing 
of Submission, part 1 in August 2004. By contrast, the film’s co-author Hirsi Ali had been under 
round-the-clock protection since November 2002.460 This difference probably explains why the 
killer chose Van Gogh over Hirsi Ali, whose status as an apostate would otherwise have made 
her the more attractive target.461 Arguably, Van Gogh’s decision not to accept personal protection 
provided a larger opportunity for his killer to strike than the AIVD’s misdiagnosis. The attack on 
the filmmaker cannot simply be put down to ‘counterterrorism failure’.
On 10 November 2004, five police officers were wounded when a Hofstadgroup participant threw 
a hand grenade at them during an arrest attempt. The AIVD had wired the apartment sometime 
prior to the raid and, read after the fact, one of the recorded conversations strongly hints that the 
occupants possessed grenades and planned to use them against the police; ‘you wait until they 
enter and then you throw one, yes?’462 Having gotten hold of this text during the spring of 2005, 
the Dutch television program Netwerk reported that the AIVD could have known grenades were 
present in the apartment, implying that the service had failed to properly alert the police.463 In 
October 2005, the Hofstadgroup participant who threw the grenade told Netwerk that he had 
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gotten the weapon through an acquaintance who, he claimed, worked for the AIVD. His lawyer 
and those of other Hofstadgroup participants shared these suspicions, leading to the alleged 
AIVD agent being heard in court as a witness.464
As previously mentioned, charges against the alleged informant were dropped in early 2006. There 
was no forensic evidence tying him to the hand grenades. Neither could it be proven that he had 
been the elusive second perpetrator of the supermarket robbery conducted by a Hofstadgroup 
participant in early 2004; one Hofstadgroup defendant claimed the individual in question only 
‘got away’ because he was already working for the AIVD.465 Other than the testimony of an 
individual with a stake in alleging that the AIVD had enticed his use of violence by supplying 
him with grenades through an informant, and a wiretapped conversation that makes an implicit 
reference to the weapons, there is no concrete evidence to support the notion that the AIVD 
could have forewarned their police partners. On the whole, ineffective counterterrorism does not 
appear to have been a major enabler of the Hofstadgroup’s activities. However, had the Service 
not misdiagnosed Van Gogh’s killer, it might arguably have made it more difficult for the latter 
to plan and prepare his attack.
5.2.6 Political opportunity structure
The ‘political opportunity structure’ concept essentially bridges the gap between preconditions 
that provide opportunities and those that supply motives for involvement in terrorism.466 
Adherents of the ‘strategic school’ posit that the openness of democratic societies can enable 
violent acts of resistance.467 Institutions such as a free press and an independent judiciary limit 
the power of the government over its citizens; basic rights such as freedom of assembly and the 
largely unrestricted movement of people and goods make it easier to prepare acts of violence.468 
By contrast, because autocratic regimes lack such freedoms and suffer no restraints on their 
executive power, the opportunities for engaging in terrorism are fewer.469
With regard to motive, the ‘political access school’ argues that democracies discourage terrorism 
because they provide avenues for the non-violent resolution of conflicts and afford citizens 
influence in the political process.470 Here it is the autocratic regimes that are at a disadvantage, 
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as their lack of freedoms, frequent human rights abuses and the absence of opportunities for 
peaceful political participation make violent opposition the only option for people wishing for 
change.471 While this seems to put democracies ahead on paper, there is considerable empirical 
evidence that democratic states are no less vulnerable to terrorism.472 This may at least in part stem 
from the fact that, while democratic states are less likely to experience domestic terrorism, their 
frequently assertive foreign policies increases their exposure to international or transnational 
terrorism.473
5.2.6.1 Political opportunity structure and the Hofstadgroup
The Hofstadgroup benefited from the democratic freedoms available to it. Arguably it would 
have been far more difficult in an authoritarian regime to hold frequent private meetings, use 
the Internet to espouse extremist views and attract like-minded individuals and to travel abroad 
to Belgium, Spain and even Pakistan or Afghanistan. At the same time, the Dutch authorities did 
not stand idly by. Tempering the opportunities provided by the Dutch political system was the 
fact that group participants were effectively under AIVD surveillance from mid-2002 onwards. 
Combined with numerous rounds of arrests between 2003 and 2005, this proved a considerable 
impediment to its ability to operate.474 One former participant described the October 2003 arrests 
as having a paralyzing effect on the group, leading to such a preoccupation with personal safety 
that group meetings became less frequent and attempts to reach foreign conflict zones ceased 
altogether.475
The second conclusion is that access to the political system had little dampening effect on 
the Hofstadgroup’s more committed participants’ motivation to use violence. Initially, some 
participants appeared to have a modicum of faith in democratic forms of protest. Two attended 
rallies; one in support of Palestine in 2002, and one against the Iraq war in 2003.476 One of 
these individuals was also temporarily a member of the Arab European League (AEL) in 2003, 
but quickly disowned it because ‘[they] want everything via democracy’.477 Other participants 
never even considered such avenues. One interviewee argued vehemently that the AEL had never 
held any appeal for himself or the others because its leader was a Shiite, a denomination they 
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considered heretical and worse than unbelievers.478 More generally, data suggests that the group 
saw democratic means for voicing dissent or achieving change as ineffective and even illegitimate 
as it meant working with and within a man-made democratic system rather than a divinely-
inspired one.479 
Civil liberties and constraints on the executive enabled the Hofstadgroup’s emergence, yet not 
to the degree that the authorities were powerless. As the multiple arrests and prison sentences 
indicate, the authorities were still able to mount an assertive response. Despite access to the 
political system, the country’s political opportunity structure also motivated involvement in 
militancy because democratic laws and institutions were seen as unpalatable and illegitimate. The 
net effect of these various influences cannot be quantified, yet it seems clear that the Netherlands’ 
political opportunity structure both enabled involvement in the Hofstadgroup and helped bring 
about the adoption of radical and extremist views.
5.3 Preconditions: providing motives for terrorism
Opportunities alone are unlikely to lead to terrorism unless groups or individuals with the motive 
to carry out acts of violence make use of them. It is to this second category of structural-level 
preconditions that the discussion now turns. 
5.3.1 (Relative) deprivation and intergroup inequality
A common-sense assumption frequently voiced by politicians is that poverty and lack of 
education are causes of terrorism.480 Scholarship on the issue provides a more nuanced picture. 
Some studies lend support to this view, finding that countries experience less terrorism as they 
become economically more developed481 and that increased personal wealth is linked to decreased 
support for political violence.482 For instance, in research based on opinion polling, Fair and 
Shepherd found that the moderately poor were more likely to support terrorism.483 Looking 
478 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 29; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal 
interview 1,” 2.
479 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 28-30; Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 
AHB02/26: 3776-3777; AHD3702/3731: 5611; De Koning, “’We reject you’,” 98-99; Peters, “De ideologische en 
religieuze ontwikkeling,” 4.
480 See the examples in: James A. Piazza, “Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and social 
cleavages,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 159-160.
481 Quan Li and Drew Schaub, “Economic globalization and transnational terrorism: a pooled time-series analysis,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (2004): 254; Carlos Pestana Barros, João Ricardo Faria, and Luis A. Gil-
Alana, “Terrorism against American citizens in Africa: related to poverty?,” Journal of Policy Modeling 30, no. 1 
(2008): 56, 66; Mete Feridun and Selami Sezgin, “Regional underdevelopment and terrorism: the cause of south 
eastern Turkey,” Defence and Peace Economics 19, no. 3 (2008): 229.
482 Robert MacCulloch, “The impact of income on the taste for revolt,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 
4 (2004): 843; Ayla Schbley, “Torn between god, family, and money: the changing profile of Lebanon’s religious 
terrorists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 23, no. 3 (2000): 182.
483 C. Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd, “Who supports terrorism? Evidence from fourteen Muslim countries,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 1 (2006): 52, 71.
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specifically at homegrown jihadism, Bakker’s study shows that most individuals in his sample 
came from a relatively low socioeconomic background.484 
Conversely, Piazza finds no significant relationship between low economic development and 
terrorism.485 Various scholars posit that terrorists are less likely to come from impoverished 
backgrounds than their peers.486 In contrast to the Bakker study, the jihadists in Sageman’s 
sample mostly enjoyed a relatively well-off middle-class existence.487 Although Sageman looked 
at internationally operating jihadists and Bakker focused on European jihadists, the differences 
are still striking. A similar dichotomy emerges with regard to the relationship between education 
and terrorism. Some studies encourage the idea that terrorism attracts the uneducated.488 Others 
fail to support such hypotheses or reach diametrically opposed conclusions.489 Given these 
conflicting findings, it is unclear whether poverty and lack of education as such can function as 
motives for terrorism.
Research suggests that deprivation’s ability to contribute to the onset of political violence is 
particularly pronounced when it is experienced relative to other individuals or groups. Gurr 
defines relative deprivation as the perceived discrepancy between the ‘values’ people expect to 
achieve, such as political influence or material well-being, and their actual capacity for doing 
so.490 When groups perceive that they are unfairly economically disadvantaged or politically 
disenfranchised vis-à-vis another class, religious group or ethnic minority, relative deprivation 
can become a powerful motivation for political action and, potentially, violence.491 Poverty or 
484 Edwin Bakker, “Characteristics of jihadi terrorists in Europe (2001-2009),” in Jihadi terrorism and the 
radicalisation challenge, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Farnham / Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 140.
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(2003): 131, 135; Robert A. Pape, Dying to win: the strategic logic of suicide terrorism (New York: Random House, 
2006), 215.
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socio-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology: when hatred is bred in the bone,” in Root causes of 
terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward, ed. Tore Bjørgo (London / New York: Routledge, 2005), 64; Karin Von 
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socioeconomic disadvantages become markedly more potent motivational preconditions for 
terrorism when they overlap with intergroup inequality.492 
Relative deprivation has become a frequently encountered explanation for involvement in 
political violence and terrorism. However, it should be noted that the theory has also attracted 
considerable criticism. As a form of deprivation that exists primarily in the perception of individuals 
or groups, objectively assessing its presence can be difficult. Furthermore, most people are bound 
to experience relative deprivation, albeit to varying degrees, at various points in their lives.493 As 
the vast majority of those individuals never even consider turning to political violence, the theory 
can by itself not provide a sufficient explanation for involvement in terrorism or extremism. 
A 2005 report on the integration of minorities in the Netherlands indicated that non-Western 
immigrants and their children were socioeconomically disadvantaged compared to the 
indigenous population. For instance, they had lower educational qualifications, were more likely 
to be unemployed, earned less income, underperformed at school and were disproportionally 
represented in statistics on crime.494 Another report showed that Dutch Muslims also faced 
discrimination on the labor market.495 Given the predominance of Dutch Moroccans in the 
Hofstadgroup, it is interesting to note that the Moroccan community is frequently cited as the one 
most strongly affected by these problems.496 Researchers have also argued that the increasingly 
vituperative debate on Islam and multiculturalism in the Netherlands has engendered feelings 
of alienation among (young) Dutch Muslims.497 Was such relative deprivation also a factor 
underlying involvement in the Hofstadgroup?
5.3.1.1 Relative deprivation and the Hofstadgroup
Perhaps surprisingly, there are virtually no indications that income inequality, lack of access to 
educational opportunities, political representation or other examples of intergroup inequality 
played a role in the adoption of radical or extremist views or motivated involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup. Admittedly, one individual’s involvement began when he failed to obtain an 
internship through what he believed was discrimination because of his Moroccan heritage.498 
However, this person was quick to emphasize that this experience did not motivate his involvement 
492 James A. Piazza, “Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism,” Journal of Peace Research 
48, no. 3 (2011): 348-350; S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates, “Spatial-horizontal inequality and the Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal,” Review of Development Economics 9, no. 1 (2005): 132-133.
493 Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 19; Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 54-56.
494 Jaarrapport integratie 2005, (The Hague: SCP, WODC, CBS, 2005), 45, 50-51, 75-76, 83, 85-86, 89, 90-91, 98, 100-
101, 132-144, 148-162.
495 Iris Andriessen et al., Liever Mark dan Mohammed? Onderzoek naar arbeidsmarktdiscriminatie van niet-westerse 
migranten via praktijktests (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2010), 11-22.
496 General Intelligence and Security Service, “Violent jihad in the Netherlands,” 35-36; Jaarrapport integratie 2005, 
45, 83, 148-162.
497 Edwin Bakker, “Islamism, radicalisation and jihadism in the Netherlands: main developments and counter-
measures,” in Understanding violent radicalisation: terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe, ed. Magnus 
Ranstorp (London / New York: Routledge, 2010), 169-170; De Koning and Meijer, “Going all the way,” 223-224.
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but indirectly facilitated it. Without an internship to go to he simply had more time to spend on 
other pursuits, one of which turned out to be a growing interest in radical Islam that in time 
would lead him towards the group.499
There are, however, several indications that participants experienced a sense of being second-rate 
citizens because of their faith. It is here that emphasis must be placed on the polarizing influence 
of the debate on Islam and the integration of (Muslim) minorities that had been waged in Dutch 
society since the late 1990s. Politicians such as Pim Fortuyn, Rita Verdonk and later Geert Wilders 
led a debate that was increasingly critical of Islam and immigration. Moreover, it was often voiced 
in crude or harsh tones; Theo van Gogh’s writings being a case in point. These developments not 
only had a polarizing influence on Dutch society by seemingly setting Muslim immigrants and 
their children against the ‘autochthonous’ population, but also strengthened feelings of exclusion 
amongst young Muslim citizens in particular.500 Keeping this socio-political context in mind, 
several findings stand out. 
Particularly telling is the reaction of one Hofstadgroup participant to news that a Dutch prisoner 
who murdered an Iraqi man was released from jail; ‘your blood is blood, but our blood is water’.501 
Several encountered (verbal) aggression aimed at their religious convictions or Moroccan 
heritage.502 During police questioning, one suspect lamented that the murder of Van Gogh would 
only increase the gulf between Muslims and non-Muslims.503 Another told officers that Dutch 
society had become more intolerant and callous towards Muslims after 9/11.504 Others spoke 
out angrily against what they saw as the media’s unfavorable portrayal of Islam, its perceived 
tendency to under-report Muslim suffering around the globe and its vilification of men like Bin 
Laden as terrorists.505 In some of his writings, Van Gogh’s to-be murderer criticized the Dutch 
government’s integration policies, which he saw as thinly veiled attempts to encourage Muslims 
to abandon their faith.506
Such experiences with discrimination strengthened participants’ convictions and fed their hatred 
for unbelievers. But, one potential exception notwithstanding,507 there is little to suggest that 
these experiences triggered or motivated involvement or that they were central to planned and 
499 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 3,” 1.
500 De Koning and Meijer, “Going all the way,” 223-224.
501 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHA05/22: 1876.
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perpetrated acts of terrorism. In fact, various findings disavow this line of reasoning. Several 
participants spoke positively about their experiences as Muslims in the Netherlands, praising 
the country’s religious freedom.508 More importantly, the Hofstadgroup’s extremist elements 
advocated violence not because they felt alienated or discriminated, but as punishment for those 
who insulted Islam.509 Although the Dutch ‘debate on Islam’ had been gaining momentum since 
the 1990s, it did not really become a topic of conversation within the group until the release of 
the Islam-critical film Submission in August 2004.510 As one former participant put it, the debate 
on Islam was ‘secondary’; while Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh deserved to be killed, this individual was 
primarily focused on supporting Islamist insurgents in places such as Afghanistan.511
As the example given above illustrates, Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali became hated public figures 
because of how they spoke about Islam and its prophet, not because they engendered or 
exacerbated feelings of exclusion from Dutch society.512 Which is not to say to experiences of 
exclusion, or feelings of being second-rate citizens did not exert an influence on the group’s 
development. They contributed to the drawing of sharper boundaries between Muslim and 
non-Muslim citizens in the Netherlands and increased participants’ antagonistic views of the 
latter. The available data on the Hofstadgroup, however, does not allow relative deprivation to be 
ascribed more than such a supportive role when explaining how its participants became involved. 
Although the Dutch debate on Islam certainly had its influence on the Hofstadgroup, and despite 
the emphasis frequently placed upon it when explaining involvement in homegrown jihadism, it 
does not appear to have been a particularly important explanatory variable.
5.3.2 Political grievances
The perception that governments or their policies are unjust and lack legitimacy can provide a 
powerful impetus for participation in political violence.513 From this perspective, people turn to 
terrorism because they see it as a tool they can use to redress such grievances and exert political 
influence through violence. 
5.3.2.1 Political grievances among Hofstadgroup participants
The data reveals that numerous participants reacted strongly to armed conflicts involving 
Muslims. News about the suffering of co-religionists in places like Palestine or about terrorist 
508 Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 68, 94-95, 195; Dienst Nationale Recherche, „RL8026,“ AHA04/21: 
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of Law and Social Science 5(2009): 360-362; Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism,” 383-384; Ehud Sprinzak, “The 
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attacks carried out by Muslims had a range of effects. As vicarious experiences of injustice and 
shock, they helped bring about an interest in Islam and geopolitics, triggering searches for 
information that contributed to the adoption of radical and extremist interpretations of Islam.514 
As an interviewee recalled his reaction to the 9/11 attacks: ‘At first you think like “terrible, what 
happened there (…) No religion can justify that.” So you investigate. (…) And then I found a 
fatwa by [Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shuebi] (…) in which he approved of [the attacks] (…) and I 
thought it was nice to see how he explained all that and actually also presented evidence [of its 
permissibility]’.515
These geopolitical events also helped shape a Manichean outlook in which ‘true’ Muslims were 
assaulted by both external and internal enemies; principally, the United States, its Western-
European allies, Israel and what participants considered apostate or heretical Muslim regimes.516 
Particularly influential in this regard was the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror’, which many participants 
saw as a war against Islam.517 As one wrote, ‘I gained feelings of hate towards anyone who 
supported Bush in his crusade, not just the Netherlands, but also Arabic apostate leaders’.518 
Another important effect of these geopolitical grievances was their ability to justify violence by 
portraying it as a defensive and righteous response to Muslim suffering.519 One of the travelers 
to Pakistan or Afghanistan wrote his mother explaining that he had left because the ummah was 
under attack; he had gone to help expel the unbelievers from the land of jihad.520
In early 2003, the desire to help Muslims in conflict zones led one of the group’s most committed 
extremists to attempt to reach Islamist insurgents in Chechnya.521 Later that year, three others 
traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan, likely with a similar purpose in mind. By late 2003, however, 
the focus of the Hofstadgroup’s militant core began to shift towards possible actions within the 
Netherlands. This transition was partly practical; by this time the group had clearly attracted the 
attention of the police and AIVD, making foreign travel much more difficult. It was also influenced 
by political grievances; as a loyal ally of the United States and Israel, and as a contributor to the 
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interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Dutch government was increasingly seen as sharing 
responsibility for the harm that had befallen Muslims. In the eyes of some participants it had 
become a legitimate target.522 
Geopolitically-inspired grievances formed key explanatory factors. They were crucial to 
understanding how and why many participants came into contact with radical and extremist 
interpretations of Islam. The vicarious sense of outrage and injustice that images of their co-
religionists’ suffering induced were key to the establishment of a common cause between the 
Hofstadgroup’s (future) participants and the global ummah. For some, these grievances motivated 
and justified a desire to strike back, to avenge perceived injustices against fellow Muslims. Indeed, 
the Dutch role in the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq motivated some participants to 
pursue plans for terrorism in the Netherlands. In the absence of geopolitical events involving 
the perceived victimization of Muslim populations, the Hofstadgroup would arguably not have 
existed or developed in the way it did.
5.3.3 A clash of value systems?
Several authors have argued that European homegrown jihadism arose out of a fundamental 
incompatibility between radical Islam and liberal democracy.523 It is a line of reasoning that 
resembles Huntington’s thesis that the dominant source of post-Cold War conflict would be ‘[t]
he fault lines between civilizations’.524 The broader literature on political violence is, however, 
equivocal on the matter. For instance, while Senechal de la Roche argues that greater ‘cultural 
distance’ is positively associated with a higher probability of collective violence,525 Fearon and 
Laitin find no clear link between ethnic or religious diversity and the outbreak of civil wars and 
insurgencies.526 
5.3.3.1 The Hofstadgroup as a clash of value systems
At first glance, the Hofstadgroup’s radical and extremist views and its participants’ rejection of 
democratic laws, values and institutions certainly made them incompatible with Dutch liberal 
democracy. Furthering this divide, many participants did not see themselves as Dutch.527 A crucial 
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point to make, however, is that these attitudes do not appear to have motivated involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup but rather to have stemmed from it. Prior to their involvement in the group, most 
participants led apparently well-integrated lives; attending school, holding (part-time) work and 
enjoying recreational activities like other Dutch citizens their age. Several individuals did not 
become practicing Muslims until contact with Hofstadgroup participants led to a reorientation 
on their faith.528 Others were converts to Islam.529 Even among those who had had a religious 
upbringing, clear signs of hostility towards Western culture and politics did not manifest 
themselves until after they had adopted radical or extremist interpretations of Islam.530
These findings underline the importance of distinguishing between Islam and radical or extremist 
interpretations of the religion such as Salafi-Jihadism. The available data provide little to suggest 
that the Hofstadgroup was a manifestation of an inherent incompatibility between Islam and 
Western democracy. They do, however, show that such an adversarial relationship developed 
once radical and extremist views were adopted. This speaks to the power of the Salafi-Jihadist 
ideological narrative to instill or sharpen pre-existing in-group / out-group distinctions and thus 
lay the basis for intergroup hostility and violence.
5.4 Structural-level precipitants: Submission, part 1
Precipitants are ‘specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism’.531 Given 
that Van Gogh’s murder was the only terrorist attack to actually be carried out by a Hofstadgroup 
participant, can a precipitant event be identified in the time period leading up to it? It seems 
highly likely that the killer was triggered by the broadcast of the short film Submission, part 1 on 
29 August 2004 on Dutch national television.532 Although Van Gogh’s assailant never explicitly 
referred to the film in his writings or in court, he chose to murder its director and he left a note 
on his body threatening Hirsi Ali, who came up with the idea for the film in the first place. 
Additional, albeit circumstantial, corroboration for the conclusion that Submission triggered the 
murder of Van Gogh is that other Hofstadgroup participants also reacted strongly, if only in 
words, to the film. Death threats were posted on Hofstadgroup-administered forums,533 at least 
one individual told another participant that he wanted to see Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh killed 
because of Submission534 and several, while disagreeing with the murder, believed Van Gogh had 
asked for it.535 One interviewee claimed that the film helped swing the group’s focus towards 
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waging jihad in the Netherlands.536 Despite the shared antagonism, however, it was only Van 
Gogh’s killer who acted.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter focused on structural-level factors relevant to understanding how and why 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup materialized. It did so by utilizing Crenshaw’s distinction 
between ‘preconditions’ that enable or motivate involvement in terrorism and ‘precipitants’ that 
spark an actual attack.537 Structural factors not only provided opportunities for the Hofstadgroup’s 
emergence, but also motivated some of its participants’ to engage in violence and contributed 
to a change in those motives from becoming a foreign fighter to waging violent jihad in the 
Netherlands. Structural factors also played a key role in triggering the terrorist attack on Van 
Gogh.
With regard to facilitation, the role of the Internet was especially important. It exposed 
Hofstadgroup participants to geopolitical developments, militant interpretations of Islam, practical 
knowledge on the use of weapons and explosives and formed an easy-to-use communications 
tool and propaganda platform. Another facilitating factor was the openness of Dutch society, 
which afforded the group considerable freedom to organize, travel and propagate their views. 
Thirdly, it is likely that growing up in a social environment in which Islamic fundamentalist 
views were prevalent lowered at least some participants’ threshold to seeing the use of violence 
as a legitimate by instilling a sense of out-group hostility directed at the Western world. Finally, 
the AIVD’s misdiagnosis of Van Gogh’s killer as a peripheral group participant and, in particular, 
Van Gogh’s refusal to accept police protection increased the attacker’s opportunities to strike.
Looking at motivational preconditions, geopolitical grievances stand out. Conflicts involving 
Muslims populations, the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror’ and terrorist attacks such as those orchestrated 
on 9/11 had several influences. They triggered searches for answers that contributed to group 
participants’ eventual adoption of radical and extremist views, instilled the conviction that a war 
against Islam was being waged and made retaliatory violence seem both justified and necessary. 
Political grievances also motivated some participants to start thinking about conducting a 
terrorist attack in the Netherlands. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there are no clear indications that socioeconomic inequality, the harsh 
tone of the Dutch integration debate or lack of access to the democratic political system directly 
motivated involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Experiences with discrimination did, however, 
strengthen participants’ convictions and feed their hatred of unbelievers. Finally, the precipitant 
event that likely triggered the murder of Van Gogh was the broadcast of Submission, a short Islam-
536 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 23-24.
537 Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism.”
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critical film that he had directed and which caused considerable offense among Hofstadgroup 
participants.
Structural level factors were crucial to understanding how and why involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup’s emerged. Yet the present analysis falls short in that the factors described are 
experienced by many more people than those that actually become involved in the Hofstadgroup. 
Why, with so many other Dutch Muslims exposed to images of war and conflict involving their co-
religionists, and with similar opportunities for engaging in violence, did only the Hofstadgroup’s 
participants react by embracing radicalism and militancy? The inability of the structural level 
of analysis to account for the variable influence of factors such as political grievances or relative 
deprivation points to the need to utilize other analytical perspectives. This chapter has hinted at 
the importance of group dynamics on numerous occasions. It is to this topic that the discussion 
now turns.
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6. Group dynamics I: Initiating and sustaining 
involvement
6.1 Introduction
Terrorism is predominantly a group phenomenon.538 This draws attention to the second part of the 
multilevel analytical framework outlined in chapter 2; namely, the role of group dynamics. How 
do terrorist groups influence the worldview and behavior of their participants? In this first of two 
chapters on group dynamics and involvement in terrorism, the focus is on the group processes 
that draw and bind people to terrorist groups. Seven group-level hypotheses are analyzed and 
applied to the data on the Hofstadgroup to understand the role of group dynamics in bringing 
about participation and how they influenced participants’ adoption of radical and extremist 
beliefs. The second chapter on group dynamics discusses their influence on the commission of 
actual acts of terrorism.
6.1.1 Group dynamics and involvement in terrorism
For decades, group dynamics have attracted considerable attention from terrorism researchers.539 
In recent years, this level of analysis has been described as of above average explanatory potential 
when it comes to understanding involvement. Kleinmann, for instance, found that ‘[g]roup-
level processes are the most significant mechanism for radicalization of both convert and non-
convert homegrown Sunni militants in the United States.’540 In Leaderless jihad, Marc Sageman 
argues that both micro and macro perspectives on terrorism are limited in their ability to offer 
an understanding of terrorism and that a middle-ground analysis is needed, one in which ample 
attention is paid to the relationships between terrorists, such as leader-follower interactions.541 
A first step towards assessing whether group dynamics can also offer useful insights into how 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup came about, is inventorying relevant group-level explanations.
Several authors have conducted literature reviews of group-level explanations for terrorism.542 
These provide useful overviews of the most prevalent hypotheses, but generally do not 
organize them according to a particular logic. There is no equivalent to Crenshaw’s division 
of the structural-level causes of terrorism into preconditions and precipitants that can be used 
538 Nesser, “Toward an increasingly heterogeneous threat,” 440, 450; Ramón Spaaij, “The enigma of lone wolf 
terrorism: an assessment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 859.
539 Della Porta, “Recruitment processes,” 307-316; McCauley and Segal, “Social psychology of terrorist groups,” 331-
346.
540 Kleinmann, “Radicalization of homegrown Sunni militants in the United States,” 288.
541 Sageman, Leaderless jihad, 23-24.
542 Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I,” 7-36; LaFree and Ackerman, “The empirical study of 
terrorism,” 355-360; Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist radicalisation, 39-51.
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to organize the discussion of the group level of analysis.543 However, one of the assumptions 
underlying this research is that involvement in terrorism is the end result of a process in which 
multiple factors exert an influence. This draws attention to work by Taylor and Horgan, who 
apply criminological research to the study of terrorism to distinguish involvement decisions 
from event decisions, essentially arguing that the processes by which people become involved in 
terrorist groups are distinct from those that lead some group members to participate in actual 
attacks.544 Joining a terrorist group does not mean that the participant will also become involved 
in actual violence.
Following Taylor and Horgan’s argument, the group level of analysis has been divided into 
two parts. The first deals with group processes that influence how and why people join and 
stay in extremist or terrorist groups. The second focuses on group dynamics that influence the 
commission of concrete acts of terrorism. Because the literature on both of these subjects is 
extensive, each is discussed in a separate chapter. The current chapter focuses on the contribution 
made by group-level factors to bringing about and sustaining involvement in terrorism. A review 
of the literature on terrorism revealed eight group-level explanations other researchers have 
thought relevant to this discussion (Table 7). Only one hypothesis could be dismissed out of 
hand. The literature indicates broad consensus that ‘brainwashing’, the idea that people can be 
coerced to adopt ideas, does not constitute a credible, empirically substantiated hypothesis.545 
Despite being an explanation encountered with some frequency in journalistic accounts of 
involvement in terrorism, it is not given further consideration here.546 
Initiating and sustaining involvement in terrorist groups
Terrorist group formation
Social identity and the benefits of group membership
Socialization into a worldview conducive to terrorism
The underground life
Social learning theory
The influence of leaders
Peer pressures
Brainwashing
Table 7
543 Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism,” 381.
544 Taylor and Horgan, “A conceptual framework,” 592; Horgan, Walking away from terrorism, 13, 142-146; Taylor, 
“Is terrorism a group phenomenon?,” 125-126.
545 Lorne L. Dawson, “The study of new religious movements and the radicalization of home-grown terrorists: 
opening a dialogue,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 1 (2009): 3; David C. Hofmann and Lorne L. 
Dawson, “The neglected role of charismatic authority in the study of terrorist groups and radicalization,” Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 4 (2014): 351, 360; Sageman, Understanding terror networks, 124-125.
546 Steven Derix, “Volgelingen Syriër ‘opgefokt en gehersenspoeld’,” NRC Handelsblad, 29 April 2005; Casper Van der 
Veen, “Kijken: 10 jaar na de aanslagen van 7/7 in Londen kijken overlevenden terug,” NRC Handelsblad, 7 July 
2015.
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6.2 Terrorist group formation
Terrorist group formation is generally seen as either a top-down or a bottom-up process. The first 
revolves around premeditated attempts by recruiters to encourage or coax others into joining 
an established terrorist organization.547 Blazak, for instance, has found that such activities are 
prevalent among American Nazi skinheads.548 Bottom-up group formation is a much more 
autonomous process, whereby like-minded individuals come together without the intervention 
of recruiters linked to established terrorist organizations.549 Autonomous group formation is not 
random, however. Research shows that participation in radical or extremist groups is guided by 
pre-existing social ties.550 People become involved in groups, terrorist or otherwise, to a large 
extent because family members, friends or acquaintances are already participating who thus 
provide exposure and easy access to said groups.551 
The lack of recruiters does not mean that bottom-up processes are necessarily completely 
volitional. In the context of Italian left-wing extremism, Della Porta found that the desire to 
obtain the approval of companions already part of clandestine organizations influenced the 
involvement process of new members.552 This desire not to be seen remaining on the sidelines 
exerted a form of peer pressure that propelled non-committed friends towards participation. 
Similar sentiments, albeit much more strongly expressed, were found among members of 
Palestinian terrorist groups. As a participant of one such group stated, ‘[a]nyone who didn’t enlist 
during that period (intifada) would have been ostracized’.553 Even in the absence of conscious 
efforts at recruitment, terrorist groups can still exert a powerful pull on potential members.
Although the degree of autonomy is at times overstated,554 various studies indicate that the 
formation of homegrown jihadist groups is overwhelmingly a bottom-up process.555 Most 
homegrown jihadists are ‘connected by blood, marriage, and close friendships’.556 Yet autonomous 
547 Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “Psychological factors in terrorism and counterterrorism: individual, 
group, and organizational levels of analysis,” Social Issues and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (2009): 13.
548 Randy Blazak, “White boys to terrorist men: target recruitment of Nazi skinheads,” American Behavioral Scientist 
44, no. 6 (2001): 990-994.
549 Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist radicalisation, 48-49.
550 Della Porta, “Recruitment processes,” 309-310; John Lofland and Rodney Stark, “Becoming a world-saver: a 
theory of conversion to a deviant perspective,” American Sociological Review 30, no. 6 (1965): 862-875.
551 Ziad W. Munson, The making of pro-life activists (Chicago / London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
48-54, 187-189; McCauley and Segal, “Social psychology of terrorist groups,” 338.
552 Della Porta, “Recruitment processes,” 310.
553 Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny, “The terrorists in their own words: interviews with 35 
incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003): 178.
554 Crone and Harrow, “Homegrown terrorism in the West,” 521-524.
555 Bakker, “Characteristics of jihadi terrorists,” 142; Bartolo, “Decentralised leadership in contemporary jihadism,” 
52-54; Olivier Roy, “Al-Qaeda: a true global movement,” in Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge: 
European and American experiences, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Farnham / Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 22-23; Sageman, 
Understanding terror networks, 107-120; Sageman, Leaderless jihad, 66, 109; Vidino, “Radicalization, linkage, and 
diversity,” ix, 3-4.
556 Harris-Hogan, “Australian neo-jihadist terrorism,” 311.
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group formation should not be taken as an essential characteristic of European homegrown 
jihadism. Nesser’s research on jihadist groups active in Europe between 1995 and 2010 shows 
a mixture of top-down and autonomous patterns of group formation.557 The post-2004 rise of 
autonomously formed groups appears strongly related to intensified domestic and international 
counterterrorism efforts that seriously hampered the ability of groups like al-Qaeda to operate 
internationally and made it more difficult for Western citizens to travel to Afghanistan and Iraq.558 
The homegrown nature of entities like the Hofstadgroup may reflect geopolitical realities rather 
than a consciously chosen organizational format.
6.2.1 The Hofstadgroup’s formation
The Hofstadgroup was no exception to the autonomous group formation trend. One interviewee 
described it as a ‘circle of acquaintances’.559 Many participants had been long-time friends, 
had grown up together in the same neighborhood, attended the same schools or visited the 
same mosques. Others met each other in asylum seekers’ centers, were colleagues or became 
acquainted through an internet café they frequented.560 Those who did not have pre-existing 
ties to other participants got to know them through introductions by mutual acquaintances,561 
online discussion forums562 or by being brought along to a group meeting.563 As far as can be 
gleaned from the available data, peer pressure does not appear to have propelled involvement. 
Instead, group formation throughout the Hofstadgroup’s existence was driven almost entirely by 
individuals who came together, volitionally and by chance, through pre-existing social networks.
The Hofstadgroup’s largely autonomous formation begs the question whether recruitment played 
any role at all. The October 2003 attempts by two participants to entice other young Muslims to 
travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan do not count, as this recruitment effort was not geared towards 
enlarging the Hofstadgroup itself or forming a separate terrorist cell in the Netherlands. Several 
group participants did, however, use the Internet to spread their views and engaged in online chat 
557 Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 523-525.
558 Sageman, “Confronting al-Qaeda,” 22-24.
559 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, “Personal interview 1,” 4.
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19994, 20079, 20112, 20115, 20174; GET: 18215, 18312-18313, 18374-18375, 18414, 20348; 19401/19417: 14176; 
AHA19403/19420: 11227; Dienst Nationale Recherche, “PIRANHA,” 11520; Van der Hulst, “Terroristische 
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561 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4001, 4004, 4086-4087; AHA4005/4022: 2566; Dienst Nationale 
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18410; 18401/18417: 14001-14003, 14084, 14124; Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 22.
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conversations with people in the hope of converting them to their point of view.564 On the whole, 
however, the evidence suggests that these online outreach activities were principally focused 
on conveying the ‘right’ religious views rather than deliberate attempts to form or enlarge an 
extremist organization. As such, they seem better described as a form of outreach or missionary 
zeal.
An anecdote that more clearly raises the possibility of recruitment involved one of the middle-
aged Syrian men, detailed in chapters 3 and 5, who appeared on the group’s edges. An interviewee 
recalled speaking with this individual at a mosque several times. During those talks, the Syrian 
man explained that the interviewee’s failure to get an internship was due to the ‘unbelievers’ not 
granting Muslims anything. Recognizing that he had struck a chord, the Syrian man suggested 
at a later meeting that the interviewee meet with someone to discuss this topic further and gave 
him the phone number of a Hofstadgroup participant. Following this suggestion, the interviewee 
soon found himself in the house of Van Gogh’s to-be killer and attending lectures given by Abu 
Khaled, an acquaintance, moreover, of the Syrian man who suggested the interviewee make 
contact with the group.565 
While this series of events is suggestive of recruitment, two factors advocate caution in using 
this description. First of all, there is no evidence that the first of the two Syrian men mentioned 
above had a hand in referring other individuals towards the group. This raises the possibility 
that it was a chance encounter that provided the Syrian man with the opportunity to put like-
minded individuals in touch with one another. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the 
Hofstadgroup’s religious instructor was himself making deliberate efforts to enlarge the group 
through recruitment. His role appears to have been limited to conveying a fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam.566 It is unlikely, therefore, that the two Syrian men were working together 
as part of a deliberate effort to enlarge the Hofstadgroup.
Recruitment may have played a role in 2005’s Piranha case. Two participants claimed in court 
that they were coerced into providing assistance.567 However, the truthfulness of these assertions 
is questionable. Other participants have claimed that the couple, who became key witnesses for 
the prosecution, presented themselves as helpless victims only to avoid being sentenced.568 A 
judge labeled the couple’s testimony as ‘untrustworthy’ for similar reasons.569 In lieu of more 
convincing or concrete evidence to the contrary, the conclusion remains that the Hofstadgroup’s 
564 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4002-4003, 4020, 4026-4031, 4047-4051, 4084-4085, 4128; GET: 
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565 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 2-5.
566 A[.], “Deurwaarders,” 24; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 1,” 2-3; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 8-9; Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/13: 136-140; 101/117: 4002, 
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567 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “PIRANHA,” 209-214, 218-227.
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formation was an overwhelmingly autonomous process. Its participants were not vulnerable 
youngsters who were sought out by recruiters with the specific aim of turning them into Islamist 
extremists. Instead, group formation depended predominantly on preexisting social ties, with a 
lesser role for introductions through friends or acquaintances and the transmutation of virtual 
connections begun on the Internet into ‘real-life’ ones.
6.3 Social identity and the benefits of group membership
People have a universal desire to attain a satisfactory self-image, and an important part of that 
image is shaped by the ‘social identity’ derived from group membership.570 Through a process of 
‘social categorization’, individuals impose order on a complex social environment by subjectively 
dividing it into a multitude of groups. These groups are not necessarily formal organizations but 
may also include ‘cognitive entities’ based, for example, on social class, ethnicity or religion.571 
People tend to identify themselves with numerous groups simultaneously, with contextual 
factors influencing when a certain group-based identity is activated. For instance, someone’s 
social identity as a supporter of a soccer team will be more prominent during match attendance 
than in a work environment. But some social identities can become so important that they are 
‘chronically salient’, influencing all aspects of life.572
Terrorist groups provide chronically salient social identities through the demands placed on 
members. Participants are not only required to risk life and liberty but to re-imagine themselves 
according to the group’s particular reality, be that as holy warriors, a revolutionary vanguard 
or nationalist freedom fighters.573 But with social categorization providing individuals with a 
veritable marketplace of groups to choose from in their pursuit of self-fulfillment, why would 
someone be drawn to those involved in political violence in the first place?574 As Dalgaard-Nielsen 
writes, the success of a movement depends on its ability to promote a worldview that resonates 
with potential recruits.575 What benefits can terrorist groups offer their members that outweigh 
the very real risks of imprisonment and death? 
570 Henri Tajfel, “Social identity and intergroup behaviour,” Social Science Information 13, no. 2 (1974): 68-69.
571 Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict,” in The social psychology of intergroup 
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573 Arie Kruglanski, Xiaoyan Chen, and Agnieszka Golec, “Individual motivations, the group process and 
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People may join a terrorist group because they value the cause it strives for, essentially engaging 
in terrorism for strategic reasons.576 The strategic rationale of terrorism is explored in more detail 
in chapter 7. For now, it is sufficient to note that a considerable body of research indicates that 
such instrumental motives are overshadowed by other benefits of membership. Participation in 
terrorism can provide emotional satisfaction, such as the ability to violently avenge perceived 
wrongs, cognitive benefits, such as the idea that one is fighting for a worthy cause, social assets like 
increased status and comradeship and, finally, opportunities for personal gain simply by taking 
under threat of violence what would otherwise have remained beyond reach.577
These rewards of group membership can explain not only why people become involved in terrorism 
but also why they remain involved. The benefits outlined in the previous paragraph can become 
so important to participants that they perpetuate their involvement, make disengagement more 
difficult and stifle criticism of group norms or behavior.578 In extreme cases, individuals’ social 
identity can have such a powerful influence on their worldview and behavior that they subjugate 
themselves entirely to the aims and well-being of the group, even willingly sacrificing their own 
lives.579 Can social identity and the benefits of group membership explain the attraction of the 
Hofstadgroup?
6.3.1 Social identity and the Hofstadgroup
Part of the Hofstadgroup’s appeal was that participants could imagine themselves as one of the 
few righteous Muslims in a country filled with unbelievers, sinners and apostates. For many 
participants, the group was an alternative to a Dutch Islamic community ‘tainted’ by imams who 
refused to discuss jihad in order to appease the Dutch government and by fellow-believers who 
failed to live and worship as ‘true’ Muslims.580 The group’s religious nature was not just some 
superficial gloss but its central appeal.581 This is aptly illustrated by an interviewee who adamantly 
dispelled the idea, put forward in Dutch media, that the group practiced a ‘cut-and-paste Islam’582, 
insisting that religious beliefs were not only taken extremely seriously but rigorously studied 
576 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of terrorism: instrumental and organizational approaches,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 10, no. 4 (1987): 14-15.
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581 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 1,” 1; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, “Personal 
interview 2,” 3; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, “Personal interview 1,” 1-2.
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during gatherings.583 Such statements suggest that by enabling self-perception as a ‘true’ Muslim, 
the cognitive benefits of participation were an important part of the group’s appeal.
Participation in the Hofstadgroup also provided social and emotional benefits. Many participants 
valued simply being among friends; chatting, playing some soccer or sharing a meal.584 One 
interviewee recalled feeling a strong sense of belonging and friendship during his very first 
encounter with other participants and that this motivated him to keep going back.585 Another 
participant, an illegal immigrant, supposedly said that he greatly missed his family in Morocco, 
but that his ‘brothers’ had become his new family and that he loved them very much.586 In jail 
after the murder of Van Gogh, one participant bragged about his Hofstadgroup ‘membership’, 
indicating participation could also bring the benefits of status.587 An emotional benefit for 
participants was their ability to enter into short-term ‘marriages’, officiated by the groups’ 
religious authority figures, which enabled them to have sex without breaking Islamic injunctions 
against casual relationships.588
An important finding is thus that the cognitive, social and emotional benefits sustained 
participation. However, there are no indications that they also initiated involvement. No-one 
seems to have consciously sought out the Hofstadgroup because they wanted so share in the self-
perception of being a ‘true believer’ or because they were looking for comradeship. Partly this can 
be explained by the group’s lack of a clear organizational structure and the fact that it was largely 
anonymous and unknown until Van Gogh’s murder; few people were aware of its existence and 
outsiders had no clear point of contact to facilitate entry. Although the group became a household 
name after November 2004, it also became much more secretive during 2005’s Piranha case, again 
precluding easy access by potential newcomers. Instead, preexisting social networks brought like-
minded individuals together, after which group identity-related processes bound them together 
and worked to prolong their involvement.
6.4 Socialization into a worldview conducive to terrorism
As Della Porta argues, ‘conversion to violence requires a specific redefinition of reality’.589 In other 
words, an individual’s willingness to commit acts of terrorism is a process that is generally not 
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completed by the mere act of joining a terrorist group. An important next step is formed by 
members’ internalization of worldviews and group norms conducive to the use of violence.590 
Before the next paragraphs discuss the group-based mechanisms that led the Hofstadgroup’s 
participants to adopt such views, it is instructive to briefly revisit what those views were. How 
were they conducive to seeing terrorism as a legitimate form of behavior?
6.4.1 Revisiting the Hofstadgroup’s ideology
Chapter three concluded that it is problematic to speak of a single or broadly shared ‘Hofstadgroup 
ideology’. Yet broadly shared ideological themes existed which could provide justifications and 
even imperatives for the use of violence. The most important of these were a sense of crisis 
which mandated participation in violent jihad and a dichotomous worldview that made clear 
distinctions between a small rightly-guided in-group and a much larger and threatening out-
group. For instance, Van Gogh’s killer believed the Islamic world was beset by both external 
enemies (American imperialism, Western materialism, corrupt Middle-Eastern regimes) and foes 
within (apostates, Shiite heretics, ‘Westernized’ Muslims). Only an ‘awakening’ to these realities 
and a willingness to fight and sacrifice in defense of ‘true’ Islam could stave off the imminent 
destruction of true Islam and the persecution of its adherents.591
Participants also placed considerable emphasis on their beliefs’ normative aspects. Only polities 
structured and run in accordance with a strict and dogmatic interpretation of Islamic law 
(‘Sharia’) were seen to suffice.592 The group could also be very inward looking. De Koning aptly 
described participants as engaged in a ‘competition of piety’.593 Not only did they harshly judge 
Muslims outside of the group’s boundaries, their critical eye did not spare compatriots who failed 
to adhere to group norms, such as growing a beard, or who were deemed to have committed 
transgressions such as accepting the aid of a lawyer, thereby undermining Allah’s status as the 
sole source of legal authority.594 Some went so far as to refuse to participate in a game of soccer 
as doing so would implicitly mean accepting the man-made and therefore tawhid-undermining 
rules of the Dutch soccer association.595
The normative aspects of the Hofstadgroup’s ideology also fed participants’ adversarial 
relationship with out-groups. Most notably in the case of takfir, as excommunication carries 
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with it the justification to murder the apostate.596 Extremist elements within the group also took 
their understanding of tawhid to mean that non-Islamic laws could and should be flaunted and 
that unbelievers’ property and, in some cases, even their lives were free for the taking.597 In short, 
while the Hofstadgroup lacked a clearly defined and commonly-held ideology, the group’s more 
extremist participants in particular held to and conveyed beliefs that could provide motivations 
and justifications for the use of violence. These beliefs also provided normative standards by 
which Muslims both in and outside of the group were judged, creating behavioral and ideological 
rules to which participants were expected to adhere. The next sections discuss how these views 
were spread and upheld.
6.5 The underground life
A group’s ‘social reality value’ is its ability to define moral standards for its members and enforce 
their compliance.598 For example, groups with high social reality value are better able to influence 
their members’ thinking on such matters as what constitutes ‘good’ and who or what is ‘evil’.599 
An important variable that determines a group’s social reality value is the degree of ‘competition’ 
it faces from other groups. As section 4 explained, people tend to have numerous social identities 
whose salience is often context dependent; a person’s professional attitudes and behavior will 
tend to dominate in a work setting, affiliation with a certain sports team during matches, etcetera. 
When numerous group memberships ‘compete’ for influence on a person’s values and behavior, it 
is unlikely that any one in particular will become predominant. However, when all but one group 
identity remains, its ability to exert such control increases markedly.600
The criminal nature of terrorism forces those who engage in it to lead a covert existence. As 
authorities deploy more means to apprehend or kill terrorists, the latter’s need for secrecy 
increases. The necessity of maintaining operational security can force terrorist groups to ‘go 
underground’, that is to lead an entirely secret and withdrawn existence. Once underground, their 
members have only each other to rely on, leading to increased interdependence, the strengthening 
of interpersonal bonds and a heightened desire to protect comrades and the larger group.601 
‘Having entered a world of conspiracy and danger, the [terrorists] are bound together before a 
common threat of exposure, imprisonment or death.’602 In such a setting, the group’s social reality 
value increases dramatically and its ability to influence members’ worldviews and behavior along 
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with it. Isolation can thus increase a terrorist group’s ability to fashion the worldviews of its 
adherents, facilitating their acceptance of political violence as necessary and legitimate.603 
6.5.1 The Hofstadgroup’s increasing isolation
The Hofstadgroup’s participants gradually withdrew from society. Mosque attendance was largely 
supplanted by privately held discussions and prayers.604 The group became the focal point of 
social interactions, in some cases supplanting old friends and family.605 A number of participants 
saw each other on an almost daily basis and several of them even lived together for varying 
periods of time.606 One of the travelers to Pakistan or Afghanistan quit a part-time job because 
he felt it clashed with his religious convictions. Some others abandoned school or jobs for similar 
reasons or were encouraged to do so.607 The numerous arrests, the knowledge that the group 
had attracted the AIVD’s attention and the inability or unwillingness of imams to discuss jihad-
related topics formed external pressures towards isolation.608 In the words of an interviewee: 
‘[y]ou were at home or at [Van Gogh’s to-be killer’s] home. That was it really.’609 The latter even 
described a diminishing social circle as the abandonment of an old life filled with unbelief and 
therefore as the sign of a true believer.610 
Yet the Hofstadgroup’s withdrawal from society fell short of what could be considered ‘going 
underground’. Many participants, including members of the extremist inner circle, continued 
to hold (part-time) jobs or attend school.611 Their participation in online discussion forums 
and their attempts at convincing other young Muslims of the validity of their views occasionally 
exposed them to dissenting opinions.612 Although the authorities’ interest in them sparked a 
degree of watchfulness bordering on the paranoid, with participants removing the batteries 
from cell phones during meetings, none of them went ‘off the grid’ until 2005’s Piranha case.613 
603 Egerton, Jihad in the West, 155.
604 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4002, 4004, 4016, 4049, 4054, 4092, 4177-4179, 4199; Former 
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Even then, only two individuals did so; the person who evaded arrest in November 2004 and his 
Islamic wife.614 By contrast, the other ringleader of the Piranha case continued to live at home 
with his family until his apprehension in October 2005.
Because the Hofstadgroup as a whole never went underground, the degree to which isolation 
influenced its internal cohesion and social reality value was limited. Nevertheless, the trend 
towards increasing isolation, one that was particularly noticeable among the more extremist 
participants, had two important consequences. First of all, it made participants relatively more 
exposed to people with radical and extremist ideas while lessening their contacts with individuals 
who could have challenged their increasing extremism. Secondly, by cutting ties to former friends, 
the Hofstadgroup rose in importance as the center of participants’ social life. Isolation therefore 
sustained involvement by increasing the group’s importance as participants’ foremost sources of 
social ties. It also catalyzed participants’ adoption of views that saw the use of violence as justified 
and necessary.
6.6 Social learning theory
Social learning theory essentially holds that ‘criminal behavior is learned through interactions 
with others, especially in intimate, primary groups’.615 While specific attention is given to the role 
of primary groups such as family and close friends as the setting in which the mechanisms that 
constitute social learning theory are at their most influential, this form of learning is not exclusively 
reliant on face-to-face interactions. It can also take place through exposure to extremist materials 
encountered on social media or the emulation of attitudes or behavior seen on television.616 
Although developed as an explanation for deviant forms of behavior, social learning can be used 
to explain pro-social as well as criminal attitudes and actions.617 Whether social learning leads to 
one or the other depends on a range of factors. 
Several circumstances make it is more likely that social learning will contribute to violent behavior. 
The first is ‘differential association’ or relatively greater exposure to individuals or groups who 
commit violence or justify its use. When others are seen to engage in criminal or violent activities 
without suffering negative consequences, or even benefiting from it, the observer’s previously 
acquired inhibitions to delinquent behavior may be lowered. Second, violence is more likely 
when individuals hold beliefs that portray such behavior in neutral or positive terms. Third, 
violence is more likely when its perceived benefits outweigh perceived costs, a calculation that can 
614 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4062.
615 Christine S. Sellers, John K. Cochran, and L. Thomas. Winfree, Jr., “Social learning theory and courtship violence: 
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(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 109.
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be influenced, for instance, through religious beliefs or political convictions that portray violence 
as necessary for the attainment or defense of a greater good. Finally, violent behavior becomes 
more likely when individuals have violent ‘role models’ they can observe directly or indirectly, 
such as through the Internet.618
6.6.1 Social learning in the Hofstadgroup
The Hofstadgroup was a prime setting in which social learning could exert its influence for two 
reasons. First of all, the group was increasingly the main or even exclusive source of social contacts 
for many participants. Secondly, social gatherings were the group’s most frequent communal 
activity. Socializing with friends was an important aspect of these meetings, but they were also 
used for lectures and discussions on fundamentalist, radical and extremist interpretations of 
Islam.619 These gatherings were not formal seminars dedicated to religious indoctrination, 
however. They appear to have been organized largely on an ad hoc basis, without mandatory 
attendance and with little in the way of a syllabus to structure the discussions and lectures.620 
While some participants showed up several times a week or even every day, others attended 
only once or twice per month.621 Given these conditions, how did social learning contribute to 
initiating and sustaining involvement in the Hofstadgroup?
Social learning exerted a notable influence on Hofstadgroup participants in several ways. First 
of all through direct association with individuals who supported the use of violence in principle 
and practice.622 Several witnesses and an interviewee mentioned or implied that the intensive 
contacts they had with other Hofstadgroup participants led them to adopt their points of view, 
even if only for a time.623 For instance, one witness explained that she may have become willing 
to use violence had the group’s influence not been restrained by the contacts she still maintained 
with ideologically non-radical individuals.624 Likewise, a former participant explained that his 
ultimate disavowal of extremist Islam only came about after he had physically distanced himself 
618 Ronald L. Akers and Adam L. Silverman, “Toward a social learning model of violence and terrorism,” in Violence: 
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from the Hofstadgroup and was thus no longer exposed to the ideas and norms propagated by his 
erstwhile peers.625 Two interviewees’ recollection of the Van Gogh murder is especially striking. 
One admitted initially feeling a sense of awe for the murderer, while another explained that he 
was inspired to plan an attack of his own.626 
Social learning also influenced Hofstadgroup participants by exposing them indirectly to ‘role 
models’ of violent behavior and radical or extremist interpretations of Islam. Police investigators 
found that participants shared (parts of) a large digital ‘library’ containing books and treatises by 
Salafist thinkers and theologians who justified violence, such as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
and Sayyid Qutb.627 Furthermore, participants exchanged various digital media that included 
video and audio files in which jihadist militants or ideologues practiced and preached religiously 
justified violence. These included grisly videos of war crimes perpetrated by Chechen jihadists 
that were occasionally watched during group gatherings.628 Finally, there was the Internet which 
facilitated access to numerous jihadist role models; most notably men like Osama bin Laden, the 
9/11 hijackers and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq until his death in 2006.629
Social learning also made a contribution to the adoption of militant beliefs and some participants’ 
willingness to use terrorism by helping instill the notion that the use of violence would be met 
with reward. The clearest example of this concerns the 2004 Madrid bombings. To the group’s 
more militant elements, the attack demonstrated that terrorism in Europe was feasible, legitimate 
and effective, as the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq was seen as a direct consequence of 
the attack.630 The attack helped shift the motivation of some of the most militant participants 
from joining jihadist insurgents overseas to conducting terrorism in the Netherlands. Social 
learning again played a role in instilling the view that death in the service of Islam would be 
rewarded with martyrdom. This occurred partly through exposure to ideological materials and 
role models mentioned in previous paragraphs, and partly in a far more direct fashion.631 One 
female participant was promised a ‘beautiful martyr’s death’ by a male group member who 
suggested they drive a car filled with explosives into a shopping center.632
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Social learning forms a key explanatory factor for how participants adopted extremist views 
and, in some cases, planned or perpetrated acts of terrorism. It shows that extremist views and 
behavior were in large part taught. Direct interactions with individuals who justified terrorism, 
including some who tried to join Islamist insurgents overseas and one committed an actual 
terrorist attack, were key to the conveyance of attitudes favorable to the use of violence and 
provided role models of militancy to be emulated. Indirect exposure to jihadist role models, 
terrorist attacks and extremist materials, principally via the Internet, further taught participants 
to see terrorism as justified, necessary and effective. Through the notion of martyrdom, they 
were brought to believe that death in the service of Islam held distinct personal advantages that 
outweighed the costs of forfeiting life on earth. In short, social learning constituted a particularly 
important small-group dynamic.
6.7 The influence of leaders
Leaders are individuals with the ability to harness their followers’ energy ‘in a concerted 
coordinated effort to achieve the organizational mission and objectives’.633 Within the specific 
context of terrorist groups, leaders’ influence allows them to do more than exert operational 
control and guidance. They can also play an important role in safeguarding the group’s cohesion 
and in socializing its members into an extremist worldview.634 Leaders’ ability to function as 
such depends on their credibility and authority, which can stem from several sources, such as 
ideological knowledge, operational expertise or personal charisma.635 Keeping to the division of 
the group-level analysis over two chapters, the following paragraphs deal with leaders’ ability to 
shape terrorist groups organizationally and ideologically. The next chapter looks at their ability 
to instigate actual acts of violence.
6.7.1 Leaders and authority figures in the Hofstadgroup
Abu Khaled, the middle-aged Syrian man who provided religious instruction until he fled the 
country on the day of Van Gogh’s murder was the most important ideological authority among 
participants.636 There are, however, no indications that this man actively sought to create a 
common group ideology or harness its participants’ energy for particular ends, as the above-
mentioned definition of leadership requires.637 This may not have been possible even if he had 
633 Bruce E. Winston and Kathleen Patterson, “An integrative definition of leadership,” International Journal of 
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wanted to; participants appear to have seen him as good teacher, but not as a leader, as someone 
who had to be obeyed or even as a particularly inspiring individual.638 His role is best described 
as an ‘epistemic authority’; an individual whose perceived knowledge enabled him to provide an 
authoritative interpretation of religious and political matters to the other participants.639 
Van Gogh’s to-be murderer certainly gained the respect of other participants for his knowledge 
of Islam.640 His writings and teachings at group gatherings began to include clear incitement 
to violence from March 2004 onward.641 But like Abu Khaled, Van Gogh’s murderer does not 
seem to have actively tried to force the group into a certain ideological mold or to shape it 
organizationally. Descriptions paint him as quiet, withdrawn and as someone who was neither 
seen as a leader nor assumed such a role.642 Essentially the same conclusion is reached with regard 
to other individuals whom the group held in high esteem, some of whom acquired status through 
their greater knowledge of Arabic or their outspoken militancy. While their higher status meant 
that they were relatively influential in the conveyance of fundamentalist, radical or extremist 
interpretations of Islam, none appear to have had the ability or inclination to consciously shape 
the group, whether ideologically or organizationally.643 
At least as far as the ideological and organizational development of the group was concerned, 
the Hofstadgroup lacked clear leaders. While its social pecking order clearly included individuals 
with more influence over matters of ideology than others, these persons are more accurately 
described as authority figures than as leaders. It could be argued that participants saw men like Bin 
Laden or al-Zarqawi as their leaders, but this does not change the group’s essentially leaderless 
nature. While such jihadist role models certainly had a major influence, it was indirectly 
and unconsciously exercised. There is no reason to believe that foreign jihadists knew of the 
Hofstadgroup’s existence, let alone tried to exercise control over its activities to accomplish a joint 
goal, as is required of any individual who would meet the criteria of ‘leader’.
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6.8 Peer pressure
Peer pressure plays an important role in upholding and inculcating group norms,644 which 
Pynchon and Borum define as the ‘implicit and explicit expectations for the conduct and opinions 
of individual members’.645 In Crenshaw’s words, ‘peer pressure can induce people to perform acts 
that they would ordinarily be prevented from doing by moral restraints’.646 Peer pressure is of 
course not a mechanism unique to terrorist groups, but its influence in that particular setting 
is notable. For groups involved in illegal or violent activities, internal dissent can be dangerous, 
making them especially susceptible to producing strong internal pressures towards conformity.647 
The following paragraphs discuss four forms of peer pressure found in the literature and assess 
whether they played a role in the Hofstadgroup’s development.
Extremity shift (also known as ‘risky shift’648 or ‘group polarization’649) is a process whereby a 
group’s ‘average’ opinion becomes increasingly extreme over time. The first reason for this is 
what McCauley and Segal label ‘variance decrease’; the tendency of groups to become more 
homogeneous as individuals with deviating views leave or are expelled.650 Secondly, ‘social 
comparison’ plays a role. Individuals may vie for their peers’ approval or pursue status by 
championing the group’s values. In the process, they create an incentive for their compatriots to 
do the same, as no-one wants to be seen to be lagging behind in enthusiasm. This creates a process 
whereby individuals trigger each other to voice ever more extremist positions in order to stand 
out positively, thus steadily moving the group as a whole to more militant points of views. Finally, 
there is the ‘relevant arguments’ mechanism, whereby group discussions will be biased in favor of 
views that support group norms, thereby contributing to their acceptance.651 
Another way in which peer pressure can exert its influence is through the ‘majority effect’. Over 
the course of several experiments, Asch found that many individuals will adjust their opinions 
to correspond to the majority view expressed by the group in which they are participating, even 
if that view is clearly wrong.652 During one such experiment a research subject was asked to 
compare a line with several other lines of varying length and to judge which of those matched the 
first. When the other study participants, who were actually working together with the researcher, 
suddenly and unanimously started giving wrong answers to this simple task, more than a third 
of the research subjects felt compelled to go along with the majority. Those who did stick to their 
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opinion experienced self-doubt, felt uneasy about their conspicuous deviance and feared the 
group’s disapproval.653 Asch’s research is testament to both the power of the group in shaping the 
views of individuals and the difficulties of maintaining a contrary opinion. 
Two forms of peer pressure specific to terrorist groups are public commitments to violence 
and what Crenshaw calls the ‘blood price’ of involvement.654 Some terrorist organizations make 
their members publicly commit to carrying out an act of violence. Videotapes of would-be 
suicide bombers announcing their intentions and bidding farewell to friends and families are 
an especially strong example of this practice.655 Although ostensibly framed as an inspirational 
message, the public distribution of such videos creates strong pressures on the would-be terrorist 
to follow through. Once such a statement of intention has been recorded and publicized, there 
can be no going back without considerable loss of face. Finally, there is the ‘blood price’ to be 
reckoned with; the death or capture of comrades may prompt remaining group members to 
strengthen their adherence to the norms the fallen represented as a coping mechanism for dealing 
with their loss.656 
6.8.1 Peer pressure among Hofstadgroup participants
Peer pressure had a notable influence on Hofstadgroup participants’ adoption of fundamentalist, 
radical and extremist views although not all participants were equally exposed to it.657 However, 
of the mechanisms identified above only evidence of the extremity shift and, to a smaller degree, 
the majority effect was found in the data. While one of the Piranha ringleaders did record a video 
that, in tone and content, strongly resembled a statement of intent to commit violence, there are 
no indications that he was pressured in any way to do so. Similarly, witnessing the arrest of group 
participants does not seem to have noticeably led the remainder to strengthen their ideological 
convictions. It could be argued that these arrests did contribute to group solidarity, however, as 
they prompted several instances of participants collectively donating money to their arrested 
friends’ wives.658
Variance decrease was the most notable aspect of extremity shift within the Hofstadgroup. 
Newcomers were questioned about their interpretation of tawhid to assess whether it corresponded 
with the group norm of denouncing democracy and its supporters.659 This provided a basic 
degree of homogeneity by keeping out individuals with markedly different opinions on the 
653 Solomon E. Asch, “Opinions and social pressure,” Scientific American 193, no. 5 (1955): 31-35.
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matter. For instance, an old friend of Van Gogh’s to-be killer stopped visiting him because he did 
not agree with the increasingly extremist views being espoused at his friend’s house.660 It seems 
that extremity shift was also taking place via the relevant arguments mechanism. Hofstadgroup 
participants fanned each other’s radicalism by constantly talking about fundamentalist Islam and 
jihad and because there were few divergent opinions on these topics.661
Such like-mindedness was further established by the importance attached to takfir. According to 
one interviewee, it was an almost daily practice for participants to ask each other whether they 
were willing to excommunicate a wide range of Muslims who failed to live up the group’s extreme 
views.662 Given that acceptance of takfir was the majority opinion, this practice is reminiscent of 
the majority effect described above. As the ‘correct’ answer was clearly to support a very broad 
application of takfir, holding on to divergent opinions became more difficult. This emphasis on 
an unbridled interpretation of takfir also contributed to further variance decrease; in late 2004, 
several participants broke with the Hofstadgroup because they felt the use of takfir had gone too 
far.663 
On several occasions, pressure was deliberately exerted to engender acceptance of group norms 
and to maintain the group’s organizational integrity. A female participant was repeatedly shown 
videos of suicide bombers and told that she would one day commit a similar attack. She was also 
given a knife to hold and made to watch footage of people having their throats cut, while another 
participant told her she would learn how to slaughter too.664 In another example, a participant 
who questioned the group’s use of takfir was met with verbal aggression; some of the other 
participant’s present went so far as to demand this individual retake the confession of faith.665
There were also less sinister instances of peer pressure. One male participant was questioned 
about his lackluster participation in prayer sessions and repeatedly lectured about his refusal to 
grow a long beard to the point that he no longer felt welcome.666 Another was told he was not 
allowed to talk with girls.667 Although attendance of Hofstadgroup gatherings was not mandatory, 
anyone who showed up infrequently was liable to get a call from other participants asking them to 
explain their absence. Those who persisted risked becoming the subject of malicious rumors that 
he or she had become an apostate.668 Several women, who disengaged from the group because 
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4125-4127, 4129, 4204; Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 37, 93.
664 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/13: 35, 134, 162; Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 81-82.
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they felt the use of Takfir went too far, expressed fear of reprisals.669 Two of them were threatened 
for cooperating with the police.670
These examples show that peer pressure influenced the Hofstadgroup’s development in two ways. 
First, it played an important role in propagating and maintaining adherence to fundamentalist 
and extremist group norms (growing a beard, readiness to use takfir). Second, peer pressure 
made it harder for individuals to cease participation by making such a decision costly in terms 
of reputation damage and personal threats. Like the trend towards isolation, peer pressure 
contributed to the Hofstadgroup’s cohesion and facilitated the spread and radical and extremist 
views.
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted that the Hofstadgroup’s formation was heavily reliant on preexisting 
ties of friendship, rather than conscious attempts at recruitment. Once initial participation had 
come about through these social networks, various group processes began to bind participants 
together, giving the Hofstadgroup a degree of organizational substance. The application of 
social identity theory revealed the key role of that the social, cognitive and emotional benefits 
of participation had in sustaining involvement. Participants did not seek out the Hofstadgroup 
because they wanted to become extremists or terrorists. Instead, it appears that they found their 
way into this group and were then motivated to stay for reasons such as friendship and the sense 
of being among ‘true’ Muslims.
Social learning theory provided a key explanation for how fundamentalist and extremist ideas 
and models of behavior were transmitted among members of the group. This occurred both 
directly (e.g. during lectures) and indirectly (e.g. by watching jihadist videos that glorified 
violence) through exposure to justifications for violence and to violent role models like Bin 
Laden and al-Zarqawi. Another important dynamic was the group’s voluntary isolation from 
Dutch society which increasingly cut its participants off from opinions and norms contrary to 
their own. Over time this increased the Hofstadgroup’s social reality value, or the degree to which 
participants were influenced by commonly held views and norms, and strengthened its cohesion 
as participants’ social circle gradually excluded anyone outside of the group’s boundaries. 
Some group-level factors influenced the Hofstadgroup through their absence. The Hofstadgroup 
lacked clear leaders who could shape the group ideologically or organizationally. While several 
authority figures existed whose lectures and writings were important to the group’s adoption 
of fundamentalist, radical and extremist views, none appear to have had the ability or desire to 
purposefully mold the group. Ideological conformity and a degree organizational integrity were 
669 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4018-4020, 4029, 4052, 4092; Groen and Kranenberg, Women 
warriors, 91, 101.
670 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4122, 4113; Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 98-102.
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safeguarded largely autonomously through various forms of peer pressure. Group extremity shift 
and the majority effect induced some individuals with contrary views to leave the group. The 
considerable importance placed on the themes of tawhid and takfir compelled participants to 
adopt these views as their own. Peer pressure also threw up barriers to disengagement from the 
group and was on occasion exerted on specific individuals to gain their compliance with group 
norms. 
These conclusions underwrite the importance of the group-level of analysis for understanding 
involvement in terrorist groups is initiated and sustained. What the preceding analysis has left 
unanswered, however, is whether group processes can shed light on the Hofstadgroup’s actual 
and intended use of violence. That discussion is the subject of the next chapter.
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7. Group dynamics II: Involvement in acts of 
terrorist violence671
7.1 Introduction
An individual’s participation in a terrorist group, the mere act of ‘joining’, does not necessarily lead 
to their involvement in terrorist attacks.672 As Taylor and Horgan argue, ‘involvement decisions’ 
are distinct from ‘event decisions’.673 As such, any attempt to understand the commission of 
terrorist acts must go beyond explanations for why people join and remain in terrorist groups to 
look specifically at how the decision to use violence came about. The previous chapter discussed 
the group-level factors that initiated and sustained involvement in the Hofstadgroup. The 
following pages complete the group-level analysis by analyzing whether it offers answers to why 
some participants became involved in actual terrorist violence or intended to do so.
7.1.1 Group-level explanations for terrorist violence
The literature reveals several group-level explanations for the use of terrorist violence, all of 
which will be discussed in the following paragraphs (Table 8). The most common assumption 
is that terrorism is strategic; a consciously chosen means to achieve certain (political) ends.674 A 
second and perhaps less widely acknowledged perspective states that terrorism can stem from 
organizational motives for violence such as the desire to avenge killed or captured comrades.675 The 
literature also reveals two other subjects relevant to a group’s ability and inclination to use such 
violence. The first is the relationship between a terrorist group’s organizational structure and its 
lethality.676 The second consists of various social-psychological factors that can lower individuals’ 
inhibitions towards harming or killing others. These are the diffusion of responsibility that can 
take place in group settings, the closely related phenomenon of deindividuation and the role of 
authority figures in ordering or legitimizing violence.677
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674 Martha Crenshaw, “The logic of terrorism: terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice,” in Psychology 
of terrorism: classic and contemporary insights, ed. Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (New York / Hove: 
Psychology Press, 2009), 371-382.
675 Crenshaw, “Theories of terrorism,” 13-31.
676 Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The nature of the beast: organizational structures and the lethality of 
terrorist attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 2 (2008): 437-449.
677 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 48-49.
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Committing acts of terrorism
Organizational lethality Overcoming barriers to violence Rationales for terrorism
Organizational lethality Diffusion of responsibility Strategic
Deindividuation Organizational
Authorization of violence
Table 8
7.2 Organizational structure and lethality
Research has found several organizational characteristics that increase a terrorist group’s 
lethality.678 The first is rallying around a religious or ethno-nationalist ideology, which is seen as 
leading to stronger ‘othering’ of out-groups perceived to be inferior. The second characteristic 
is a positive correlation between group size and lethality, possibly due to larger groups having 
access to more human capital in the form of people with the skills required for organizing and 
executing terrorist attacks. Ties to other terrorist organizations and control of territory make up 
characteristics three and four, which are respectively explained as providing increased access to 
relevant information, means and expertise and as conveying resources and shelter conducive to 
organizational growth and longevity.679 Later research by Asal et al. also underscored terrorists’ 
technical expertise as a lethality increasing factor.680
7.2.1 Organizational lethality and the Hofstadgroup
The Hofstadgroup could count on few of the above characteristics. It had no territorial control 
whatsoever. It did have international links to several individuals who may have been involved in 
terrorism. But as chapter 5 argued, these ties did not provide the Hofstadgroup with significant 
benefits in terms of increasing its ability to plan and execute a terrorist attack, beyond the 
possibility that two participants had undergone basic paramilitary training overseas. Neither did 
the Hofstadgroup’s fairly large size of approximately forty participants provide it with much in 
the way of terrorism-relevant human capital. None of the group’s participants were experienced 
militants and the largely unsuccessful trips abroad did little to alter this fact. Neither did the group 
contain people knowledgeable about such terrorist essentials as the construction of explosives.
The one organizational characteristic conducive to increased lethality that the Hofstadgroup had 
was a religious ideology based on an extremist interpretation of Islam. This allowed a dichotomous 
‘us versus them’ worldview to take hold, especially among the more militant participants. This 
sharp distinction between a small in-group of the righteous and various out-group enemies, 
ranging from apostate Muslims to Western states engaged in a perceived ‘war against Islam’, 
678 Asal and Rethemeyer, “The nature of the beast,” 437-449.
679 Ibid., 437-441, 443-444, 446.
680 Victor Asal et al., “Killing range: explaining lethality variance within a terrorist organization,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 59, no. 3 (2015): 401-427.
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lowered the threshold to seeing the use of violence as acceptable. On the whole, however, the 
Hofstadgroup’s organizational characteristics conferred upon it a relatively low level of inherent 
lethality. This is a potential explanation for why so few participants actually became involved in 
(preparations for) terrorism and why Van Gogh’s murder was the only successful attack to be 
carried out by a group participant.
7.3 Group influences that lower barriers to violent behavior
In his review of the relevant literature, Borum identifies four group effects that can lower 
individuals’ thresholds to using violence.681 One of these, group norms that legitimize the use 
of violence, will not be repeated here as both the previous paragraph and the last chapter have 
affirmed that such norms existed. Instead, the next paragraphs focus on the diffusion of individual 
responsibility, the related concept of deindividuation and, thirdly, obedience to authority. 
7.3.1 Diffusion of responsibility and deindividuation
Soccer hooliganism and mass looting show that crowds can bring out antisocial behavior in the 
individuals that constitute them.682 Given the propensity for large groups to behave violently, early 
social scientists described such collective behavior in terms of irrationality and anarchy.683 While 
recent research has shown such qualifications to be inaccurate,684 group participation can affect 
individuals’ behavior by ‘diffusing’ their personal sense of responsibility to the collective.685 When 
everyone is responsible for what happens, no one person can be held accountable.686 In such a 
setting, individuals’ internal barriers to otherwise prohibited behavior, including involvement in 
acts of violence, are lowered.687
The lowering of inhibitions to deviant behavior can also result from ‘deindividuation’. Postmes 
and Spears define it as a ‘psychological state of decreased self-evaluation and decreased evaluation 
apprehension causing antinormative and disinhibitive behavior’.688 Put another way, people are 
more likely to act in otherwise prohibited ways when they lose the sense that they will or can 
be held accountable for their actions. Silke has argued that anonymity-induced deindividuation 
681 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 48-49.
682 Gordon W. Russell, “Sport riots: a social-psychological review,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 9, no. 4 (2004): 
367-368.
683 Stephen Reicher, “The psychology of crowd dynamics,” in Blackwell handbook of social psychology: group processes, 
ed. Michael A. Hogg and R. Scott Tindale (Malden / Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 185-186.
684 Ibid., 182-208.
685 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 49.
686 John Garnett, “The causes of war and the conditions of peace,” in Strategy in the contemporary world: an 
introduction to strategic studies, ed. John Baylis, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 81.
687 Pynchon and Borum, “Assessing threats,” 345-346.
688 Tom Postmes and Russell Spears, “Deindividuation and antinormative behavior: a meta-analysis,” Psychological 
Bulletin 123, no. 3 (1998): 238.
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is particularly likely to lead to an increased likeliness of violent behavior.689 His research on 
interpersonal assaults in Northern Ireland shows that masked attackers were significantly more 
likely to display higher levels of aggression and punitive treatment of their victims than those 
whose identities were not similarly concealed.690
7.3.1.1 Diffusion of responsibility, deindividuation and the Hofstadgroup
Hofstadgroup participants were involved in two acts of violence; the murder of Van Gogh 
and the throwing of a hand grenade at police officers. As neither of the two perpetrators was 
disguised or in any other sense unrecognizable, anonymity-induced deindividuation is ruled out 
as an explanatory variable. Likewise, there is currently no data to suggest that either of these 
individuals experienced a diffusion of responsibility based on their participation in a larger group. 
Van Gogh’s killer clearly acted alone and while the hand grenade thrower was accompanied by 
another Hofstadgroup participant at the time of the incident, there is no data to suggest the other 
person’s presence induced a diffusion of personal responsibility. A ‘group’ of two seems simply 
too small for its participants to experience such an effect. 
7.3.2 Authorization of violence
Milgram’s famous 1963 study dramatically highlighted humans’ willingness to use violence 
when ordered to do so.691 In the experiment, test subjects administered what they thought were 
increasingly strong electric shocks to other people on the instigation of a scientific authority 
figure, despite being able to hear the screams and pleas of the ‘victim’ (who in actuality was 
an accomplice of the experimenter).692 The test subjects clearly believed that their actions were 
causing pain to another human being and displayed high levels of stress while following the 
instructions given to them. Nevertheless, a majority of test subjects continued to perform as 
ordered. Milgram’s study highlights a mechanism known as ‘displacement of authority’.693 Most 
test subjects continued to give ‘electric shocks’ because in their perception it was ultimately not 
they who were responsible, but the experimenter issuing commands. Can obedience to authority 
explain why some Hofstadgroup participants planned or executed acts of terrorism?
7.3.2.1 Authorization of violence and the Hofstadgroup
The most notable authority figures were the middle-aged Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled 
and Van Gogh’s future murderer. As the previous chapter noted, the Syrian was crucial to the 
689 Andrew Silke, “The Internet & terrorist radicalisation: the psychological dimension,” in Terrorism and the 
internet: threats - target groups - deradicalisation strategies, ed. Hans-Liudger Dienel, et al. (Amsterdam: IOS 
Press, 2010), 33.
690 Andrew Silke, “Deindividuation, anonymity, and violence: findings from Northern Ireland,” The Journal of Social 
Psychology 143, no. 4 (2003): 493-494, 496.
691 Stanley Milgram, “Behavorial study of obedience,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 
371-378.
692 Ibid.
693 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 49-50.
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conveyance of fundamentalist and radical convictions that contributed to the delegitimization 
of Dutch society and politics. Although it is plausible that he was in some way involved with 
the murder of Van Gogh seeing as he left for Syria on the very day of the attack, and despite 
speculation to this end,694 there is no concrete data to suggest that Abu Khaled directly legitimized 
or encouraged the use of violence.695 It could well be that future research will convincing show 
this individual did have a role in the murder of Van Gogh or the other planned attacks. For now, 
however, there is no concrete empirical evidence to support this line of reasoning.
The writings of Van Gogh’s to-be murderer show that he developed extremist views from 
approximately March 2004 onward.696 One participant recalled that he preached that the ‘blood 
and money’ of unbelievers was fair game.697 As such Van Gogh’s future assailant certainly provided 
justifications for the use of violence, but he too never appears to have directly instigated other 
participants to commit such acts. Both Abu Khaled and Van Gogh’s assailant conferred ideas that, 
to different degrees, provided participants with legitimizations for the use of violence. However, 
they did not explicitly order its use.
In November 2004, just after Van Gogh’s murder, a listening device recorded one participant 
telling another to use a hand grenade should the police come to arrest them. ‘Because there will 
be a ring at the door before their arrival, what do you do? You make…you wait until they enter 
and then you throw one, yes?’698 In an earlier conversation, however, the ‘instructor’ uses ‘we’ to 
refer to how they would react to a police raid.699 Likewise, during the ‘siege’ of their apartment on 
November 10th, this individual spoke in the ‘we’ when phoning several friends to tell them they 
had thrown a grenade at the police.700 On that day he was also heard to say ‘[y]ou just need to 
get that thing and throw it outside’ to his compatriot.701 But none of the remaining three hand 
grenades were used. These conversations suggest that this individual either was not trying to or 
lacked the authority to command the use of violence, making it unlikely the authorization of 
violence was a factor in the use of the grenade.
Based on the above examples and the remainder of the empirical data, there is little to suggest 
that among the group’s participants were those with the authority, ability and desire to order the 
694 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, “Personal interview 2,” 4.
695 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/13: 136-140; AHA104/121: 1632-1635, 1646; 1601/1617: 4002, 4026, 
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execution of terrorist attacks.702 But what about those authority figures outside its borders? It has 
been noted several times that there is no concrete evidence that the Moroccan jihadist residing 
in Spain and the unnamed Afghan or Pakistani ‘emir’ authorized or instigated the use of violence 
by those participants they were in contact with.703 But they were not the only external authority 
figures.
In chat conversations dated to September 2003, two participants describe their separate encounters 
with a Dutch convert to Islam who became a radical preacher. In these chats, both participants 
claim to have received confirmation from this preacher that it was religiously justified to steal 
from or kill representatives of the Dutch government.704 The preacher in question has denied 
any involvement with the two Hofstadgroup participants and claims to have barely met them.705 
While the Hofstadgroup men may have given a more militant interpretation to his words than the 
preacher intended, the latter’s radical convictions seem in little doubt. During a November 2004 
television appearance, he said to have been pleased to hear of Van Gogh’s death and would not 
feel sorry if Wilders contracted a deadly disease.706 These remarks lend credibility to the idea that 
both participants were able to construe from the preacher’s words a legitimization for violence, 
although it is unlikely he ever issued any kind of direct ‘order’ to that extent.
One of the imams of the Salafist as-Soennah mosque in The Hague gained notoriety for a sermon 
he delivered shortly before the murder of Van Gogh. The imam provided various examples of 
the punishment reserved for those who mock the Prophet Muhammad and beseeched his god 
to give Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali deadly, incurable diseases. He was, however, careful to not openly 
incite to violence.707 Although Van Gogh’s killer does not appear to have attended this particular 
sermon, he and other participants in the Hofstadgroup were known to have frequented the 
imam’s mosque.708 The imam has claimed that his sermon was intended to channel his listeners’ 
anger and frustration over the activities of Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali as a means of creating a 
buffer against violence.709 Even if this surprising interpretation of his words is true, the incident 
suggests that participants had access to authority figures whose words could easily be interpreted 
as justifications for violence.
Extremist imams, ideologues and militants that influenced the Hofstadgroup through books, 
television and the Internet, provided the clearest justifications for and calls to violence. Yet their 
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influence was indirect. Men like Osama bin Laden or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi never specifically 
instructed or authorized the Hofstadgroup to carry out an attack. Van Gogh’s murderer found 
justification to murder blasphemers in the work of the fourteenth century Salafist scholar Ahmad 
ibn Taymiyya. Crucially, however, interpreting this work as a personal duty for the individual 
believer to act as judge, jury and executioner was something that the killer had to do himself.710 
To the previous chapter’s conclusion that the Hofstadgroup lacked leaders who shaped the group 
ideologically or organizationally, this section adds the finding that it also lacked what could be 
termed operational leaders.711 Authority figures both in and outside of the group, as well as jihadist 
‘role models’ provided plentiful (implied) justifications for the use of terrorism. But none actively 
moved participants from the conviction that violence was permissible to actual participation in 
violent behavior. The lack of direct personal contacts with people authorizing or ordering the use 
of terrorism was significant. It meant that the degree to which Hofstadgroup participants could 
displace responsibility for any harm they inflicted on others was limited, leaving a significant 
obstacle to the use of violence intact. It also supports a previous finding that the impetus for acts 
of terrorism was left to the initiative of individual participants. Planning or perpetrating acts of 
terrorism remained a predominantly personal rather than group-based undertaking. 
7.4 The rationality of terrorism
The remainder of this chapter addresses whether strategic or organizational rationales for terrorism 
can explain the Hofstadgroup’s planned and perpetrated attacks. This discussion, however, builds 
on the assumption that terrorism can be seen as the end-result of an essentially rational decision 
making process, that it is not the domain of the irrational fanatic or the mentally disturbed. The 
following paragraphs briefly outline this argument in order to support the analysis of strategic 
and organizational rationales that follows.
All rationality is ‘bounded’ in the sense that people seldom have perfect information on which to 
base their decisions or may simply not be able to accurately foresee all possible consequences of 
the courses of action available to them.712 Thus, the decision to engage in high-risk behavior such 
as terrorism does not necessarily imply irrationality; it may simply have seemed the best option 
available at the time. Secondly, although rational choice theory posits that decision making is 
motivated by the maximization of narrowly defined self-interest,713 in reality many people engage 
in collective action at considerable personal risk, such as strikes or rebellions.714 This indicates 
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that self-interest can extend to the pursuit of altruistic or collectively-held goals.715 Even suicide 
terrorism, seemingly the ultimate negation of self-interest, can be construed as rational behavior 
provided that the perpetrator believes death in pursuit of his or her cause will guarantee the 
bestowment of status, benefits to family or rewards in an afterlife that warrant the loss of life.716
A substantial body of empirical research lends further credence to the notion of terrorists’ 
rationality. Terrorists have been shown to adapt their behavior in response to the obstacles and 
opportunities provided by prevailing physical, social and political circumstances.717 For instance 
by adjusting operational methods or switching to different targets in response to heightened 
security measures,718 reserving suicide attacks for targets against which ‘conventional’ modes of 
attack are less likely to be successful719 and considering beforehand how the use of suicide attacks 
will affect their popular standing.720 Terrorist organizations have also been found to time their 
attacks in an attempt to maximize both their long-term and immediate effects.721
It has been noted that terrorism is seldom effective in the long-run722 and that the stated goals of 
contemporary religious terrorists are so utopian as to defy rational expectations of achievability.723 
However, there are examples of terrorism proving strategically effective,724 and its short-term 
benefits, such as limited concessions or simple recognition, may obscure its poor long-term 
chances of success.725 The literature also cautions against taking terrorists’ utopian rhetoric at 
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face value. While terrorist groups may claim to be driven by religious motives and otherworldly 
rewards, their behavior often belies realism and a focus on the here and now. For instance, the 
fact that Hamas videotapes would-be suicide bombers last will to reinforce their resolve, indicates 
that even these ideological extremists realize that when put to the test, their operatives may not 
hold to professed beliefs as closely as they claimed.726 In short, existing research makes a strong 
case for viewing terrorism as a rational form of behavior.
7.5 Terrorism as the result of strategic considerations
The academic literature widely considers terrorism to be a strategy; a means consciously chosen 
to achieve certain (political) ends.727 Despite projecting an image of irrational fanaticism, suicide 
terrorism is no exception in this regard, especially when viewed from the perspective of the 
organizations deploying such attacks.728 As Pape states, it is not simple fanaticism that explains 
organizations’ use of suicide terrorism, but a belief in the efficacy of this mode of attack.729 From 
the strategic perspective, terrorism is just one particular form of political violence whose adoption 
is dictated by circumstances.730 The strategic rationale brings to light that terrorism is a form of 
behavior rather than an inherent quality of certain types of people; it is something individuals 
can opt to do, not an expression of what they are.Any group may opt to utilize terrorist violence as 
a strategy for a variety of reasons.731 Some employ it as a form of psychological warfare, extracting 
concessions from opponents through the use and threat of indiscriminate violence.732 Groups 
might also utilize terrorist violence to demonstrate a government’s impotence,733 to advertize 
their goals and grievances to a (global) audience, to establish revolutionary conditions or to entice 
government over-reaction as a means of delegitimizing the authorities.734 Furthermore, terrorist 
attacks can be intended to alter the behavior of the groups) with which the perpetrators identify, 
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for instance by gaining popular support or new recruits or by convincing their supporters that 
armed resistance is feasible.735
Scenarios in which a cost-benefit analysis could swing in favor of terrorism include the exhaustion 
of non-violent options or seeing other groups successfully utilize this form of political violence. 
Alternatively, the narrow popular appeal of extremist groups’ goals or strong government 
repression may rule out political attempts at achieving change, making terrorism more attractive 
from the outset. There may also be a sudden opportunity that makes terrorism seem an appealing 
option, such as repressive government measures that (temporarily) provide popular legitimacy 
for striking at the authorities. Finally, terrorism can become attractive when a group is forced 
onto the defensive, turning it into a means of showing continued strength and ability to act 
despite state success or increased repression.736 
7.5.1 Strategic rationales and the Hofstadgroup
Van Gogh’s attacker left behind numerous writings that provide an interesting perspective on his 
views. In some of these texts, he threatened perceived enemies or called upon Muslims to rise up 
and fight in defense of their faith.737 But to what end? Beyond advocacy of religious dogmatism 
and general calls to militancy and resistance, concrete strategic goals are absent. While Van Gogh’s 
murderer does at one point declare that it is ‘but a matter of time’ before the Dutch government 
will fall to Islamist forces, there is no indication that he worked to hasten this ultimate victory or 
had any practical ideas about how to bring it about.738
The lack of strategic motives is also apparent in the final statement that Van Gogh’s murderer 
gave in court on 9 August 2005. ‘I acted out of faith. And I have even declared that had it been my 
father or my brother, I would have done exactly the same.’739 Neither is there a clear indication 
that he killed for political motives in any of the seven ‘open letters’ he wrote prior to carrying out 
his attack. The letters threaten the Dutch people as a whole with further acts of terrorism and 
single out several politicians known for their critical stance on Islam. The letters also admonish 
the (global) Muslim community for standing by in the face of oppression and encourage young 
Dutch Muslims to follow the ‘true’ path of (extremist) Islam.740 They suggest that the murderer 
was motivated by a strongly-held belief that it was his personal duty to kill blasphemers, as a well 
as a desire to avenge perceived injustices, rather than an ambition to attain political goals more 
specific than rallying potential supporters to his worldview.
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In 2005, another member of the group’s extremist inner circle made a videotape in which he 
threatens the Dutch government and its citizens for their participation in the Iraq war. He also calls 
upon his fellow believers to ‘attack or be attacked’ in defense of oppressed Muslims worldwide.741 
But other than a call for the Dutch to ‘keep your hands off of the Muslims everywhere in the 
world’, he does not formulate clear political goals in his taped message.742 A concrete strategic 
rationale was also absent from this individual’s 2003 attempt to reach Chechnya and, prior to 
that, his ambition to go to the Palestinian territories. Instead, both the videotaped message and 
his unfinished autobiography reveal an idealistic desire to help oppressed Muslims, the need 
to find a release for feelings of anger and revenge, a sense of personal religious duty and the 
emulation of jihadist role models. In a telling reference to his desire to go to the Palestinian 
territories, he writes ‘I did not think at all, about where I would go, what I would do, about 
nothing’.743 The need to ‘do something’ was all-important.
The motives of other Hofstadgroup participants with violent intentions follow a similar pattern. 
The letter a third inner-circle member left his mother before embarking for Pakistan or Afghanistan 
makes clear that he left to ‘drive out the unbelievers’ and ‘establish the Islamic state’.744 Although 
these are clear goals on paper they hardly appear outside of this one letter. When he mentions his 
travels in chat conversations during the fall of 2003, the emphasis is always on the action itself, 
rather than its significance as a means towards certain ends. Rather than stressing the need for 
an Islamic state in Afghanistan, for instance, this individual seemed almost singularly interested 
in discussing the specific weapons he used, the training he allegedly underwent, the hardships he 
faced and the people he met.745 Adventure and action trumped strategic considerations. 
Political-strategic considerations were not entirely absent from the motives of those Hofstadgroup 
participants who actually carried out or planned to carry out a terrorist attack. There are also some 
indications that the group’s most militant participants discussed – and disagreed – about how the 
use of violence could best suit their aims; some wanted to focus on attacks in the Netherlands 
while others wished to join Islamist insurgents overseas.746 But as the various examples given 
above have shown, strategic rationales were never clearly expressed. Instead, such ambitions to 
commit acts of terrorism as emerged from the group hinted at strongly held convictions and 
violent emotions as motivational forces. The next section considers whether organizational 
rationales for violence can shed light on their origins.
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7.6 Terrorism as the result of organizational dynamics
Semi-clandestine and ideologically oriented organizations such as terrorist groups face 
considerable constraints on decision making processes. Their social isolation or in some cases 
even completely underground existence makes them inherently inward looking. Among the 
effects of such an existence are increased cohesion among militants and a heightened desire to 
strike out at those who threaten the group.747 But studies reveal that by making the group the 
sole source and filter for information about the outside world, increased solidarity can skew the 
analysis of the likely consequences of attacks as well as the cost benefit calculation that led to the 
adoption of terrorism in the first place.748 
Furthermore, highly cohesive in-groups that need to make decisions in times of crisis and in 
conditions of considerable stress are vulnerable to ‘groupthink’. This refers to a setting in which 
loyalty to group norms and social pressures towards conformity override critical thinking and the 
voicing of doubts.749 Groupthink further deteriorates the ability of (terrorist) groups to objectively 
interpret reality, leads them to overestimate their own capabilities, to dismiss information or 
criticisms that do not fit their preconceptions and to hold stereotypical views of the enemy that 
prohibit a realistic assessment of their opponents’ capabilities and likely responses.750
The effects of group psychology surpass merely placing constraints on the rationality of decision 
making processes. Some authors propose that group dynamics override strategic considerations 
in contributing to the decision to use terrorist violence.751 Although terrorist groups often present 
themselves as ideologically driven organizations that use violence to achieve political aims, such 
strategic rationales are not necessarily the primary incentive guiding members’ participation. 
Instead, personnel may be drawn by a host of non-political considerations such as social solidarity, 
status or the personal gratification found in adherence to the group’s worldview.752 Through its 
ability to deliver these benefits, the group’s importance can become so great that its wellbeing 
becomes its members’ greatest priority.753 Over time, ‘proximate’ objectives such as group survival 
747 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of political radicalization,” 421-424.
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can supersede ‘ultimate’ political purpose, leading terrorist groups to persevere even in the face 
of outright failure and making terrorism a goal in itself.754
The literature review revealed six group-based motives for terrorist violence. The first is the 
incentive of redemption, whereby membership of violent groups that adhere to strict moral 
or religious codes offers individual participants a road to salvation.755 In such a setting, the 
‘motivation for terrorism may be to transcend reality as much as to transform it’.756 The second 
is the action imperative. Impatient for results and disillusioned with or otherwise dismissive of 
the path of non-violence, terrorist groups frequently develop a strong internal pressure towards 
carrying out a violent act. Such a need to ‘do something’ is not necessarily tied to instrumental 
reasoning.757 Thirdly there is the emulation of other terrorists held in high esteem by the group. 
Their modus operandi, their justifications for violence and even the manner in which these role 
models issue communiqués can become templates and incentives for admirers’ own actions.758
The fourth group-driven motivation for terrorism found in the literature sees such violence 
occur as a response to counter-terrorism measures taken by the authorities.759 Attacking the state 
is of course most readily associated with strategic rationales for terrorism. But as the state reacts 
to terrorist attacks and terrorist groups lose comrades to shoot-outs or arrests, what began as a 
politically-strategic use of force has a tendency to devolve into a highly personal struggle in which 
the desire for vengeance can override strategic considerations and instigate further violence.760 
Such a spiral of revenge is documented, for instance, by Della Porta in her research on the Italian 
and German left-wing terrorist groups that were active between the 1960s and 1980s.761 
The fifth and sixth organizational rationales for terrorism are competition with other extremist 
groups and intragroup conflict. When different terrorist groups emerge who share the same 
goals, appeal to the same ideology and (claim to) represent the same segment of a population, the 
likeliness of competition increases. In the struggle for such resources as media attention, recruits 
and popular legitimacy, terrorist groups may begin to use violence against their competitors as 
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well as their primary out-group enemy.762 Intragroup conflicts and disagreements, finally, have 
been hypothesized to lead to violence when they become so extreme that the projection of this 
disaffection onto external enemies is the only way of keeping the terrorist group from falling 
apart.763 
7.6.1 Organizational rationales for terrorism and the Hofstadgroup
The empirical data on the Hofstadgroup appears to match four of the six organizational 
rationales for violence outlined above. These are the ‘redemption’, ‘emulation’, ‘reactions to state 
countermeasures’ and ‘competition with other extremist groups’ hypotheses. 
7.6.1.1 The group as a vehicle for redemptive violence
Van Gogh’s murderer was clearly motivated by the incentive of religious salvation. His declaration 
in court and the farewell letter he left his family revealed a man driven by the desire to act 
in accordance with his religious convictions and the hope that he would gain a favored place 
in an afterlife.764 Although these themes are less prominent in the case of the individual who 
videotaped a threat to the Dutch public, he similarly stresses that waging defensive jihad is a 
religious duty. He also told his parents that he ‘commits this deed’ out of fear for disobeying his 
god’s commandments and his message appears to glorify self-sacrifice in name of Islam.765 A 
desire for martyrdom and its associated awards is also a commonly recurring theme in a third 
participant’s chat conversations about his motives for traveling to Pakistan or Afghanistan.766 
It is clear that group processes contributed to the adoption of such radical and extremist 
convictions. However, there is little to indicate that the aforementioned individuals’ desire 
to engage in religiously-inspired violence resulted directly from their participation in the 
Hofstadgroup. Neither is there cause to assume that they sought out the Hofstadgroup because 
they hoped it would enable them to engage in such violence. Instead, as the next chapter will 
detail, the available evidence points to the influential role of largely idiosyncratic personal 
factors. In the case of Van Gogh’s murderer these were the loss of this mother and his discovery 
of religious texts mandating the murder of blasphemers.767 For the videotaped individual, a desire 
to assist oppressed Muslims worldwide mixed with personal animosity towards the Dutch state. 
These findings once again hint at motives for terrorism that were primarily personal rather than 
group-based. 
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7.6.1.2 The influence of role models on the use of violence
Emulation of role models certainly formed an incentive for violence among some Hofstadgroup 
participants. Van Gogh’s murderer followed precepts mandating the murder of blasphemers set 
out in a centuries’ old work by a leading Salafist scholar.768 The videotaped message discussed 
earlier bore close stylistic resemblance to similar communiqués published by jihadists like Osama 
Bin Laden; studded with Quranic recitation and a firearm clearly displayed.769 However, in both 
examples the sources being emulated lay outside of the Hofstadgroup itself, meaning they cannot 
be earmarked as reflecting organizational rationales for violence. 
There is only one notable example where emulation of a Hofstadgroup participant contributed 
to another’s motivation for violence. One interviewee explained that he and his comrades saw 
the murder of Van Gogh as setting an example that they too needed to follow.770 Thus, Van 
Gogh’s murder inspired the interviewee to start considering an attack of his own. Fortunately, 
the individual in question was arrested before he was able to act on his intentions. Although only 
one example, it points to the potentially significant influence of copy-cat behavior in bringing 
about further acts of terrorism.
7.6.1.3 Interaction with the Dutch authorities
The organizational dynamic that most clearly contributed to some participants’ desire to use 
violence was the Hofstadgroup’s development of a sense of competition with the Dutch state. 
First of all, the experience of being arrested and imprisoned clearly increased the antagonism 
felt by some of those in and around the group towards the state and its representatives.771 For 
instance, one participant claimed that his arrest following an altercation with a police officer 
in 2002 strengthened his conviction that Muslims were being persecuted by unbelievers.772 
The female participants interviewed by Groen and Kranenberg were furious about the rough 
manner in which they had been apprehended and the authors noted the radicalizing effects of 
these experiences.773 Similarly, one interviewee mentioned that initially his incarceration only 
strengthened his convictions and his hatred.774 
Most importantly, the counterterrorism activities of the Dutch state seem to have engendered 
within some participants a desire to strike back. In chat messages dated to October 2003 an 
inner-circle member expressed anger at the drafting of new laws which, he claimed, would land 
him and his compatriots in jail.775 Although he does not specify them, he was probably referring 
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to the legislative proposals that would result in the 2004 Crimes of Terrorism Act.776 The sources 
also make clear that this person felt a strong antipathy towards the AIVD.777 Furthermore, in a 
letter likely written by this same individual, he responds to the then Deputy Prime Minister’s 
‘declaration of war’ against terrorism that was issued in the wake of Van Gogh’s murder. With 
those words, the letter warns, the ‘gates of hell’ have been opened and a total war begun that can 
only end in the victory of either the forces of unbelief or those of Islam.778 
No-one was more strongly affected by the Hofstadgroup’s increasingly antagonistic relations with 
the Dutch state than the participant who in 2005 would record a threatening video message. 
This person appears to have developed a particular hatred for the Dutch justice system and the 
AIVD.779 After his release from custody in early 2005, police intelligence revealed that he was 
driven to rectify the ‘1-0’ the Dutch state had scored against him, indicating that he was at least 
partly motivated by a desire for revenge.780 While the participants’ antagonistic interactions with 
the Dutch authorities were arguably the single most important organizational rationale for 
violence, the examples given in this paragraph once again hint that this sense of competition 
may have been as much personal as it was group-based.
7.6.1.4 Competition with other extremist groups
Rivalry with other extremist groups did not occur because of an absence of potential competitors 
with whom to vie for recruits, resources or standing. The Hofstadgroup was not one of many 
similar entities but, at the time, a relatively unique phenomenon in the Netherlands. However, 
if this line of reasoning is broadened slightly to encompass disagreements between an extremist 
group and the wider (non-violent) social movement to which it relates, then a new perspective 
comes to the fore centered on the Hofstadgroup’s discontent with the wider Dutch Salafist 
community and moderate Muslims in general. 
De Koning and Meijer attribute particular importance to this relationship. They argue that the 
progressively harsher tone of the public debate on Islam in the Netherlands, coupled with the 
increased public scrutiny of Salafist mosques after two young Dutch Salafists were killed in Kashmir 
in 2002, pressured representatives of mainstream Salafism to become more moderate. This 
accommodating attitude left the Hofstadgroup’s young radicals disappointed with mainstream 
Salafism, which contributed both to the group’s formation as well as to the conviction of its more 
extremist participants that jihad was the only legitimate way forward.781 
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The available empirical data partly supports this line of reasoning. Various sources reveal that 
Dutch Salafist imams’ unwillingness or inability to discuss jihad-related topics led to considerable 
frustration and resentment among the Hofstadgroup’s participants. This was exacerbated 
by the 2003 decision of influential Saudi-Arabian Salafist religious authorities to follow their 
government’s line in condemning jihadists such as Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. To at 
least several members of the Hofstadgroup, the Dutch Salafist mosques’ decision to adopt a similar 
stance epitomized their betrayal of ‘true Islam’ and its champions. Both of these developments 
led to a reorientation on other, more extremist, sources of information and to a stronger focus 
on the group as a venue for discussing and learning about Islam rather than the mosque, leading 
to the elimination of the latter’s potentially moderating influence.782
However, this falling out with the Salafist movement does not appear to have formed a direct 
motive for violence. While the group felt a strong disdain for Salafists, moderate Muslims and 
organizations claiming to represent the interests of Muslims in the Netherlands, clear indications 
that this sparked a strong desire to use violence against them are lacking. With the exception of 
an October 2003 chat message in which one participant expressed his desire to slaughter ‘fake 
Muslims’, and which reads more like bragging than an actual intention to use violence, the sources 
predominantly convey a sense of disappointment and disgust. For instance, one of the letters left 
behind by Van Gogh’s murderer shows his disappointment with Muslim scholars and religious 
leaders for concealing the truth of their religion from their followers. By contrast, the message to 
Dutch citizens and politicians is not one of disappointment, but of death threats.783
In conclusion, the empirical data reveals several motives for terrorism that resemble a number 
of the organizational rationales for terrorism identified in the literature. However, the most 
important conclusion to be drawn here is that the extent to which these motives truly had their 
basis in group dynamics is in most cases limited. Mirroring the conclusion reached with regard to 
strategic rationales, it seems that the motives for violence found among Hofstadgroup participants 
are more accurately explained as the result of factors at the individual level of analysis.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter assessed whether group-level explanations for terrorist violence could account for 
the Hofstadgroup’s planned and perpetrated attacks. The discussion began with an examination 
of the ways in which a terrorist group’s organizational structure can influence its lethality. Except 
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for adherence to an extremist interpretation of Islam that portrayed violence as necessary and 
justified, the Hofstadgroup lacked the characteristics thought to correspond with a higher degree 
of deadliness, such as skilled operatives.
Next, the analysis turned to group effects that can lower individual participants’ thresholds to 
engaging in violent behavior; diffusion of responsibility, deindividuation and displacement 
or responsibility to authority figures. Only the last of these factors was found to have exerted 
an influence, albeit in a very limited capacity. While the group had access to authority figures 
ranging from its Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled to jihadist role models like Bin Laden 
who provided (implicit) justifications for the use of violence, none directly authorized or ordered 
the use of terrorism. This meant that participants were limited in the degree to which they could 
displace responsibility for harming and killing others, leaving a significant obstacle to the use 
of violence in place and making the development of terrorist plots dependent on their own 
initiative.
The remainder of the chapter dealt with strategic and organizational rationales for terrorism. 
On the whole, neither rationale could provide a convincing explanation for the terrorist acts 
perpetrated or planned by Hofstadgroup participants. There is little to indicate that the group’s 
most militant participants did more than pay lip service to strategic motives such as establishing 
theocratic rule in the Netherlands or inspiring potential followers to copy their violent examples. 
Organizational dynamics had a more noticeable, if still minor, influence. The most salient being 
the Hofstadgroup’s competition with the Dutch state, which may have engendered the desire to 
commit attacks as a form of revenge within at least one participant, and the example set by the 
murder of Van Gogh, which inspired at least one other participant to plan an attack of his own.
This chapter’s most important contribution to understanding the factors that governed processes 
of involvement in the Hofstadgroup has been to highlight where group-level accounts for terrorism 
fall short. The Hofstadgroup’s planned and executed terrorist attacks cannot convincingly be 
explained as the result of either strategic or organizational rationales. Instead, they appear to have 
originated from these individuals’ personal backgrounds, experiences and convictions. Gaining 
a clearer understanding of why some participants (planned to) engage in terrorism therefore 
requires turning to the individual level of analysis. 
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8. Individual-level analysis I: Cognitive 
explanations
8.1 Introduction
In this first of two chapters on the individual level of analysis, the emphasis is on cognitive 
explanations for participation in terrorism. How can ways of thinking, a person’s idiosyncratic 
perception of events and people, contribute to their becoming involved in an extremist or terrorist 
group? After a brief explication of the individual level of analysis, the chapter opens by discussing 
‘radicalization’, the most influential cognitive explanation for terrorism to have emerged since 
the 9/11 attacks. It then moves on to the related concept of fanaticism before turning to how 
‘cognitive openings’ can trigger processes leading to involvement in terrorism. The chapter closes 
with an appraisal of the roles that cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement can play in 
bringing about such participation. The next chapter completes the individual-level analysis by 
utilizing various explanations centered on the idea of distinct psychological traits as contributing 
to the likeliness of involvement in terrorism.
8.1.1 Structuring the individual-level of analysis
As Crenshaw commented in 1998, ‘terrorism is not the direct result of social conditions but of 
individual perceptions of those conditions’.784 Similarly, Borum emphasizes that most violence 
is intentional; a wide variety of factors play a role in bringing it about, but at the end of the 
day it is still about individuals consciously engaging in this form of behavior.785 In other words, 
while the structural and group level factors discussed in previous chapters form an integral part 
of the puzzle of how and why people become involved in homegrown jihadist entities like the 
Hofstadgroup, any assessment of this question that does not take the individual-level perspective 
into account will remain incomplete. 
There is a large body of literature that studies terrorism from an individual-level perspective. 
Fortunately, literature overviews such as Borum’s and Victoroff ’s provide helpful insights into 
how this mass of explanations can be structured.786 The present author identified two broad 
thrusts in this literature; namely, explanations that take a cognitive perspective on involvement in 
terrorism and those that see it as related to distinct psychological characteristics, such as mental 
illness. As each of these areas of study contained numerous individual explanations and because 
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many of them were found to be applicable to the Hofstadgroup, each has been made the subject 
of a separate chapter.
The study of cognition is ‘concerned with the internal processes involved in making sense of the 
environment and deciding what action might be appropriate’.787 Victoroff highlights the distinction 
between cognitive capacity and cognitive style. The first ‘refers to mental functions, such as 
memory, attention, concentration, language, and the so-called “executive” functions, including 
the capacity to learn and follow rules, to anticipate outcomes, to make sensible inferences, and 
to perform accurate risk-benefit calculations’.788 Cognitive style ‘refers to ways of thinking – that 
is, biases, prejudices, or tendencies to over- or underemphasize factors in decision making’.789 
Reflecting the literature on terrorism’s focus on this latter aspect of cognitive psychology, this 
chapter assesses how ways of thinking can contribute to involvement in terrorism (Table 9).
A qualification that needs to be made is that it is not possible to provide a detailed look at 
every single Hofstadgroup participant. The sources currently available are simply not expansive 
enough to allow an in-depth reconstruction of the life history, motivations for involvement, 
psychological state and other relevant personal factors for each and every participant. The 
available information is also skewed in that relatively more is known about the group’s most 
extremist participants due to the police’s greater interest in those individuals. While the two 
chapters that form the individual-level of analysis draw upon as much data as is available in an 
attempt to provide insights relevant to the group as a whole, these limitations cannot be entirely 
overcome.
Individual level analysis I: Cognitive explanations
Radicalization
Fanaticism
Cognitive openings and ‘unfreezing’
Cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement
Table 9
8.2 Radicalization
Since the 9/11 attacks, ‘radicalization’ has become the most widely used explanation for 
involvement in terrorism.790 But despite its popularity, the concept suffers from several serious 
problems that limit its utility.
787 Michael W. Eysenck and Mark T. Keane, Cognitive psychology: a student’s handbook (London / New York: 
Psychology Press, 2015), 1.
788 Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 26.
789 Ibid.
790 Arun Kundnani, “Radicalisation: the journey of a concept,” Race & Class 54, no. 2 (2012): 7; Mark Sedgwick, 
“The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010): 480.
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A prime source of confusion is the lack of consensus on what radicalization is. Some scholars791 
and government agencies792 use it to designate the process leading up to involvement in terrorism. 
For Horgan, ‘violent radicalisation (…) encompasses the phases of a) becoming involved with 
a terrorist group and b) remaining involved and engaging in terrorist activity’.793 Similarly, 
Kruglanski and colleagues see radicalization as ‘a movement in the direction of supporting or 
enacting radical behavior.’794 McCauley and Moskalenko view it as ‘increased preparation for 
and commitment to intergroup conflict’.795 Several relatively complex models for involvement in 
terrorism, such as Moghaddam’s ‘staircase’ and McCauley and Moskalenko’s ‘pyramid’ models 
have also become subsumed under this interpretation of ‘radicalization’, even though some of 
their authors never used this terminology.796 Essentially, the above authors take a behavioral 
perspective on radicalization; encompassing everything that happens ‘before the bomb goes 
off ’.797 
A second perspective sees radicalization as a process of cognitive change which results in the 
internalization of radical or extremist beliefs.798 Neumann, for instance, argues that ‘at the most 
basic level, radicalization can be defined as the process whereby people become extremists’.799 
Similarly, Slootman and Tillie, as well as Buijs and Demant, see radicalization as a process 
centered on the ‘delegitimization’ of the established societal and political order, leading to 
a desire for radical change that in its most extreme form could include the use of violence.800 
Horgan contrasts ‘violent radicalization’ with ‘radicalization’, the latter signifying the ‘social 
and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or 
religious ideology’.801
791 Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, eds., Social science for counterterrorism: putting the pieces together (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2009), xxiv; Dawson, “The study of new religious movements,” 4; Donatella Della Porta and Gary LaFree, 
“Guest editorial: processes of radicalization and de-radicalization,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 
6, no. 1 (2012): 5; King and Taylor, “The radicalization of homegrown jihadists,” 603.
792 See Danish, Dutch and Swedish government definitions in: Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation,” 12.
793 Horgan, Walking away from terrorism, 152.
794 Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: how significance quest impacts 
violent extremism,” Advances in Political Psychology 35, no. Supplement S1 (2014): 70.
795 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of political radicalization,” 416.
796 Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism II,” 38-43; King and Taylor, “The radicalization of homegrown 
jihadists,” 605; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of political radicalization,” 416-428; Fathali M. 
Moghaddam, “The staircase to terrorism: a psychological exploration,” American Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 
161-169.
797 Sedgwick, “The concept of radicalization,” 479.
798 Randy Borum, “Understanding the terrorist mindset,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 72, no. 7 (2003): 7-10; 
Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, “Radicalization or rehabilitation: understanding the 
challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners,” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 2.
799 Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” 874.
800 Slootman and Tillie, “Processen van radicalisering,” 24; Buijs and Demant, “Extremisme en radicalisering,” 
173; Froukje Demant et al., “Decline and disengagement: an analysis of processes of deradicalisation,” in IMES 
Reports Series (Amsterdam: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, 2008), 12-13.
801 Horgan, Walking away from terrorism, 152.
150
A third set of definitions of radicalization explicitly link beliefs to behavior.802 Silber and Bhatt 
argue that radicalization is the ‘progression of searching, finding, adopting, nurturing, and 
developing [an] extreme belief system to the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act.’803 
Dalgaard-Nielsen sees ‘violent radicalization’ as a ‘process in which radical ideas are accompanied 
by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts’.804 Neumann 
writes of ‘the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and 
(ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims’.805 Other authors make a more 
implicit connection between extremist beliefs and involvement in terrorism.806 The key point 
is that radicalization is frequently interpreted as a process in which the adoption of radical 
ideas precedes or even leads to involvement in radical behavior. This implied or explicitly stated 
connection is radicalization’s biggest flaw.
To be clear, none of the authors mentioned in the previous paragraph argue that beliefs alone 
are sufficient to explain involvement in terrorism. Yet the centrality of this link in ‘radicalization’ 
based explanations is difficult to overlook. Indeed, the very term ‘radicalization’ implies that 
radical (or as is more often the case ‘extremist’) ideas are key to understanding terrorism. It is clear 
the beliefs can play a crucial role in motivating and legitimizing terrorism.807 Yet by raising beliefs 
as the key element to understanding terrorism, ‘radicalization’ often overstates the explanatory 
potential of this variable while leaving many others underemphasized.808
As Kundnani aptly summarizes the problem, ‘the radicalization literature fails to offer a convincing 
demonstration of any causal relationship between theology and violence’.809 Essentially, the vast 
802 See also: Michael Genkin and Alexander Gutfraind, “How do terrorist cells self-assemble: insights from an agent-
based model of radicalization,” in Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series (Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, 2011), 2; Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, “Countering radicalization in Europe,” 
(London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2012), 9.
803 Silber and Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West,” 16.
804 Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent radicalization in Europe,” 798.
805 Peter R. Neumann, “Prisons and terrorism: radicalisation and de-radicalisation in 15 countries,” (London: The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010), 12.
806 For instance: Amy-Jane Gielen, Radicalisering en identiteit: radicale rechtse en moslimjongeren vergeleken 
(Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008), 14; Lidewijde Ongering, “Home-grown terrorism and radicalisation in the 
Netherlands: experiences, explanations and approaches,” in Testimony to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee, 2007), 3; Louise E. Porter and Mark R. Kebbell, “Radicalization in Australia: examining Australia’s 
convicted terrorists,” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 18, no. 2 (2011): 213; Eteri Tsintsadze-Maass and Richard 
W. Maass, “Groupthink and terrorist radicalization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): 736. 
807 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 45-47; Arie Kruglanski, “Inside the terrorist mind: the relevance of ideology,” 
Estudios de Psicología: Studies in Psychology 27, no. 3 (2006): 274-275; Kruglanski et al., “The psychology of 
radicalization and deradicalization,” 76-78.
808 Aly and Striegher, “Examining the role of religion,” 850, 860; Bartlett and Miller, “The edge of violence,” 2; John 
Knefel, “Everything you’ve been told about radicalization is wrong,” Rolling Stone, 6 May 2013; Lene Kühle and 
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also comments by Horgan in: Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” 878.
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majority of people with extremist beliefs never act on them.810 Strikingly, research has also shown 
that not all those who do become terrorists are (primarily) motivated by extremist ideologies.811 
For instance, a study on American Muslims found radical Islamic beliefs to be unrelated with 
support for terrorism or the conviction that the U.S. was waging a war on Islam.812 Even Palestinian 
suicide terrorists are motivated by more than just extremist beliefs.813 In short, most radicals do 
not become terrorists and not all terrorists are (primarily) ideologically driven. Another reason for 
skepticism about the degree to which beliefs motivate behavior is that terrorists’ may have learned 
to describe their motivations in ideological terms during their socialization into the group.814 
Such justifications may obscure other motivating factors that could be of greater significance.
The overstated link between beliefs and behavior is the primary shortcoming of ‘radicalization’ 
based approaches to understanding involvement in terrorism. Yet there are more reasons why this 
particular concept is problematic. Some of the more detailed models of involvement in terrorism 
tend to be quite linear; suggesting a sequential progression through distinct stages that seems an 
overly neat categorization of a complex reality.815 As scholars and practitioners have remarked, it 
is inaccurate to view radicalization as ‘a “conveyor belt” that starts with grievances and ends with 
violence, with easily discernible signposts along the way’.816 Moreover, empirical data to support 
these models is often lacking.817 Finally, the utility of radicalization as a concept is hampered by 
the inherently subjective nature of how to define what views and behaviors are ‘radical’.818 
For all of these reasons, radicalization has neither been adopted as an overarching explanatory 
framework, nor as shorthand for the process leading up to terrorism. Its centrality in the debate 
on terrorism means, however, that it cannot be sidestepped. Previous chapters discussed the 
810 Borum, “Rethinking radicalization,” 1-2; Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I,” 8; James Khalil, 
“Radical beliefs and violent actions are not synonymous: how to place the key disjuncture between attitudes 
and behaviors at the heart of our research into political violence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 2 
(2014): 198-211; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 219-221; Max Taylor, “Conflict resolution and counter 
radicalization: where do we go from here?,” in DIIS Religion and Violence (Copenhagen: Danish Institution for 
International Studies, 2012), 1.
811 Abrahms, “What terrorists really want,” 98-99; Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle, Terrorist lives (London: 
Brassey’s, 1994), 37-38.
812 Clark McCauley, “Testing theories of radicalization in polls of U.S. Muslims,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public 
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Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 12, no. 1 (2012): 313-314.
813 Ariel Merari, “Psychological aspects of suicide terrorism,” in Psychology of terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar, et al. 
(Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 106; Ariel Merari et al., “Making Palestinian ‘martyrdom 
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Violence 22, no. 1 (2009): 109-110.
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into terrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 81, 86-87.
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816 Faiza Patel, “Rethinking radicalization,” (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2011), 9; McCauley and 
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contents of Hofstadgroup participants’ ideological convictions and the manner in which group 
processes contributed to the adoption of these views. Shared ideological convictions were the 
group’s most important defining characteristic and formed an important part of the ‘glue’ that 
held its participants together. What needs to be elucidated here is whether radicalization can 
explain involvement in the group and, most importantly, why some individuals planned and 
perpetrated acts of terrorism.
8.2.1 Radicalization and the Hofstadgroup
Cognitive-leading-to-behavioral radicalization appears well suited to explaining the behavior of 
Van Gogh’s to-be murderer. This individual was set on a quest for answers by the death of his 
mother in 2001 and quickly came to adopt a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.819 Contacts 
with like-minded individuals and the middle-aged Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled 
strengthened his new identity as a ‘true’ Muslim and catalyzed a process whereby he adopted 
ever more radical views.820 Van Gogh’s future assailant kept on radicalizing until he embraced 
clearly extremist convictions and concluded that violence against those who insulted Islam and 
its prophet was not only justified, but a personal duty.821 By actually murdering Van Gogh for 
blasphemy, the attacker represents a clear case of someone whose extremist convictions both 
motivated and justified his use of violence.822 
At first glance, the same appears to hold true for the individual who recorded a threatening 
video message in 2005. He too adopted extremist views after a negative experience, namely 
his perception that Muslims were persecuted the world over, and his growing extremism was 
also mediated by his involvement with like-minded individuals and authority figures like the 
Hofstadgroup’s Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled.823 But in contrast to the experience of Van 
Gogh’s murderer, this individual’s internalization of an extremist worldview and his involvement 
in the Hofstadgroup did not immediately lead to the intention to commit acts of terrorism. 
Instead, he initially wanted to join Islamist insurgencies in Palestine or Chechnya.824 Only after 
attempts to reach those regions had failed did this person begin to show an interest in what 
appear to have been plans to commit terrorist attacks in the Netherlands.825 
A more important difference is that while Van Gogh’s killer appeared to be strongly and singularly 
motivated by his convictions, this second individual’s desire to commit acts of terrorism was at 
least party driven by a personal desire for revenge. What is known of this person indicates that 
819 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHB03/27: 4040.
820 Ibid., AHA03/20: 861; Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling,” 8.
821 Peters, “Dutch extremist Islamism,” 145-159; Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling,” 1-87.
822 “Verklaring Mohammed B. in tekst.”; Peters, “Dutch extremist Islamism,” 155-156.
823 A[.], “Deurwaarders,” 3-10; A[.], “Deurwaarders van Allah,” 32.
824 A[.], “Deurwaarders,” 10-11; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke vrouwen, 258-259.
825 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/01: 25-26.
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he felt a very strong antipathy towards the Dutch justice system and the secret service AIVD.826 
In early 2005, just after his release from custody, police intelligence information indicated he 
wanted to rectify the ‘1-0’ that the authorities had scored against him.827 Undoubtedly, extremist 
convictions played a role in this individual’s violent intentions. But the strong hints of a more 
personal motive already diminish the degree to which ‘radicalization’ can provide a full explanation 
for his (intended) behavior. His is a case where it is difficult to assess whether extremist religious 
views motivated his intended violence or justified acts he felt compelled to undertake on more 
personal grounds. 
Studying the wider group’s involvement through the ‘radicalization’ lens underlines the problematic 
link between beliefs and behavior. Despite the fact that most Hofstadgroup participants held 
a Salafi-Jihadist worldview, the overwhelming majority of them never committed an act of 
terrorism, nor were they involved in preparations for one. As one of the group’s extremist 
participants recalled, most of his erstwhile compatriots turned out to be ‘wannabes’.828 The only 
attack to materialize was the murder of Van Gogh and, as previous chapters have detailed, even 
the intention to commit violence was limited to a handful of the group’s almost forty participants. 
Among this minority was one of the interviewees, who recounted that he only began to develop 
an interest in actually ‘doing something’ after the murder of Van Gogh made him and his friends 
feel it was now their turn to prove themselves.829 While Van Gogh’s murderer was guided largely 
by his extremist convictions, other participants’ motives for violence were to a significant extent 
non-ideological.
What about the notion that the adoption of radical beliefs precedes involvement in radical or 
extremist groups? This sequence of events did hold true for a number of individuals, including 
Van Gogh’s murderer and the person who in 2003 tried to reach Chechnya with a friend.830 
But in a significant number of cases, increased interest in radical and extremist Islam followed 
from involvement.831 The experiences of one interviewee were exemplary in this regard, as his 
initial attraction to the group was not the worldview he encountered there or his own ideological 
preoccupations, but rather the simple fact that he enjoyed the others’ company and friendship. 
Only gradually did he begin to adopt the worldview espoused by people like Van Gogh’s future 
assailant.832
826 Erkel, Samir, 35-40, 199-200, 206-208, 218-219, 227-228, 240-241; Calis, “Iedereen wil martelaar zijn,” 3; Dienst 
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829 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 27.
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Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/17: 4002; VERD: ; Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 20-25; 
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Finally, what of some radicalization theories’ implied determinism, whereby those who radicalize 
will adopt ever more extremist convictions over time? Again, it appears only partly applicable to 
the Hofstadgroup. Some participants ‘stopped’ at a certain level of ‘radicalness’, for instance by 
adopting a Salafist interpretation of Islam that did not see the use of violence as legitimate.833 
Three participants appeared to have little or no interest in radical or fundamentalist beliefs 
altogether.834 A small number of people also disengaged from the group because they came to 
disagree with the emphasis on takfir, even though they had previously supported it.835 For the 
Hofstadgroup’s participants, ‘radicalization’ was neither predetermined to end at the adoption of 
extremist views, nor an irreversible process.
In short, radicalization is of limited value when it comes to understanding involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup. Contrary to this concept’s central assumption, the vast majority of participants 
did not act upon the views they held. Conversely, at least two individuals with apparent intentions 
to commit acts of terrorism were motivated by more than ideology alone. Secondly, the idea that 
an initial adoption of radical convictions precedes involvement in an extremist group does not 
match the experiences of all Hofstadgroup participants. Finally, the deterministic nature of some 
radicalization approaches cannot account for the minority of participants who retained ‘merely’ 
radical or fundamentalist worldviews, or even abandoned previously held extremist beliefs. 
Radicalization’s biggest contribution as an analytical lens is that it underscores the heterogeneous 
and non-deterministic nature of involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
8.3 Fanaticism
Although ‘radicalization’ is a problematic explanation for involvement in terrorism for a variety 
of reasons, this does mean that the role that beliefs play in bringing about involvement in 
terrorism should be dismissed. What is needed is an explanation that allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of the role between beliefs and behavior. An explanation that meets this criterion 
is Taylor’s concept of fanaticism. 
Taylor is careful to stress that fanaticism and ‘normal’ behavior are different points on the same 
continuum; the fanatic is not intrinsically different.836 Instead, fanaticism is understood as 
behavior that displays ‘excessive enthusiasm’ for certain religious or political beliefs.837 According 
to Taylor, ideologies can influence behavior because they essentially prescribe a variety of rules 
833 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” GET: 4018–4020, 4129, 4132, 4146, 4148, 4159; VERD: 20083, 20567; 
Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 98–99.
834 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” VERD: 19477–19478, 19480, 19597, 19654, 20522, 20535, 20566.
835 Ibid., 01/17: 4002–4003, 4018–4020, 4030, 4062, 4048–4058, 4085–4086, 4092, 4100, 4125–4127, 4129, 4204; 
Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 36–37, 93.
836 Maxwell Taylor, The fanatics: a behavioural approach to political violence (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 14.
837 Ibid., 34.
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that link an individual’s current action to distant outcomes.838 For instance, religious belief can 
motivate specific behavior by connecting distant outcomes, such as salvation in an afterlife, to 
daily behavior such as prayer. For the vast majority of people, religious or political beliefs are not 
the only influence on their behavior. But for the fanatic, ‘the influence of ideology is such that it 
excludes or attenuates other social, political or personal forces that might be expected to control 
and influence behaviour’.839 
Fanaticism is a useful concept to identify individuals who are behaviorally very strongly influenced 
by their beliefs. Taylor’s list of ten qualities of fanatical behavior is a useful tool to assist in this 
process. These are 1) an excessive focusing on issues of concern to the fanatic, 2) a view of the 
world that is solely interpreted through and based on ideological convictions, 3) an insensitivity 
to others and to ‘normal’ social pressures, 4) a loss of critical judgment in that the fanatic is apt 
to pursue ends and utilize means that seem to run contrary to his or her personal interest and 
5) a surprising tolerance for inconsistency and incompatibility in the beliefs held. In addition, 
Taylor describes fanatical behavior as apt to display 6) great certainty in the appropriateness of 
the actions taken, 7) a simplified view of the world, 8) high resistance to facts or interpretations 
that undermine the convictions held, 9) disdain for the victims of the fanatic’s behavior and 10) 
the construction of a social environment that makes it easier to sustain fanatical views.840
Fanaticism alone, however, is insufficient to explain violent behavior. Taylor stresses three 
elements that make it more likely that fanatically held ideological beliefs will lead to violence.841 
The first is millenarianism, or the belief that the world is facing an impending and apocalyptic 
disaster or change. The very imminence of millenarian beliefs can strengthen their ideological 
control over individual behavior, as the consequences of the believer’s actions are no longer 
relegated to a distant future. Additionally, some ideologies advocate violent action as a way of 
hastening the advent of a new world order.842 The second factor is the totality of ideological 
control; when there is little to no ‘public space’ in which the ideology and its alternatives can be 
freely debated, the ideology’s influence over every aspect of its adherents’ lives will increase.843 The 
third factor is the militancy of the ideological belief itself.844 Taylor’s work provides a nuanced 
way of understanding how, under certain circumstances, ideological convictions can provide the 
impetus for violent behavior.
838 Ibid., 112-113, 269; Max Taylor and John Horgan, “The psychological and behavioural bases of Islamic 
fundamentalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 53-56, 58.
839 Taylor, The fanatics, 33.
840 Ibid., 38-55.
841 Ibid., 114, 181.
842 Ibid., 121-158.
843 Ibid., 160-178.
844 Ibid., 114.
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8.3.1 Fanaticism and the Hofstadgroup
Taylor’s concept of fanaticism is intended as an explanation for individual engagement in political 
violence. It therefore makes sense to limit this analysis to those persons in the Hofstadgroup who 
committed, or most clearly intended to do so, an act of terrorism.
Van Gogh’s murderer harnessed at least eight of the ten ‘qualities of the fanatic’ that Taylor 
describes.845 From 2003 onward, his life began to revolve entirely around his Salafi-Jihadist based 
convictions, which became the sole filter through which he interpreted the world. A world that he 
viewed in dichotomous terms; consisting of ‘true’ Muslims and their enemies.846 His abandonment 
of work and education imply an insensitivity to ‘normal’ societal pressures and his decision to 
murder Van Gogh and then claim complete responsibility for it in court appear contrary to his 
own best interests.847 The fashion in which he murdered Van Gogh and his statement in court that 
he would have done the same had family members been the blasphemers, indicate both a high 
degree of certainty in the justness of his actions and a dismissive attitude towards his victims.848 
Finally, by limiting his social circle to like-minded individuals, Van Gogh’s assailant constructed 
a ‘fanatical world’ that reinforced and sustained his views.849 
The individual who, among other things, tried to reach Chechnya and played a central role in 
2005’s Piranha case, also displayed signs of fanaticism. These included black-or-white reasoning, 
a preoccupation with ideological concerns and a worldview shaped by his Salafi-Jihadist beliefs.850 
Given these similarities, why did only Van Gogh’s assailant act on his convictions? Perhaps this 
second person was simply apprehended before he could strike. However, the available evidence 
suggests a different explanation. First of all, this person appears to have been less fanatical in the 
sense that his beliefs were not the alpha and omega of his existence. Instead, he was primarily 
motivated by a desire to aid and avenge what he saw as the Muslim victims of Western aggression. 
His beliefs certainly played a role in that quest, but as mentioned in a previous paragraph, their 
role may have been to justify violence as much as motivate it.
Two other explanations for this difference can be gained by considering the three factors that 
Taylor identifies as making it more likely that fanatically held beliefs will actually lead to violent 
behavior.851 As the Salafi-Jihadist views that both men held were clearly militant in content, this 
factor offers few answers.852 It is with regard to millenarianism that an important first distinction 
845 Ibid., 38-55.
846 Peters, “Dutch extremist Islamism,” 145-159; Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem, 43-49.
847 “Laatste woord Mohammed B.,” De Volkskrant, 9 August 2005.
848 Ibid.
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presents itself. Both men believed a global war against Islam was taking place.853 Yet it is only in 
the writings of Van Gogh’s killer that this struggle takes on an apocalyptic flavor and is presented 
as the violent apogee of an age-old struggle between the forces of Satan and those of Truth 
that demands immediate action on the part of ‘true believers’.854 By contrast, in the videotaped 
threat to the Dutch government and people, arguably the most militant expression of the other 
individual’s views, millenarian motifs are absent.855 
Taylor’s third factor that can lead fanatics to violence centers on the totality of ideological 
control, which is more likely in societies with limited ‘public space’.856 As chapter six noted, most 
participants, including extremists like the Piranha group’s ringleader discussed here, retained at 
least some connections to the world outside the group through old friends, school, work or the 
simple fact that they lived with their parents. Not so in the case of Van Gogh’s to-be murderer. 
He had lived on his own since 2000, quit his part-time job and his studies following the death 
of his mother in December 2001 and stopped his volunteer work for an Amsterdam community 
center in July 2003.857 Gradually he cut off contacts with his old friends and limited his social 
circle to fellow Hofstadgroup participants.858 He was ‘“always at home reading and translating”’.859 
Within these self-imposed confines, the convictions of Van Gogh’s to-be assailant could become 
all-encompassing and ever-present, exerting behavioral control to a degree not found among his 
compatriots.
Fanaticism is a concept specific enough to be able to explain why merely holding radical or 
extremist beliefs alone is unlikely to lead to violent behavior. Van Gogh’s killer and the Piranha 
group’s main ringleader both held extremist views but only the first acted on them. Fanaticism 
is able to account for this difference by making the likeliness that fanatical belief will lead to 
violence contingent on factors such as the totality of ideological control. Fanaticism therefore 
affords an understanding of how beliefs can lead to violence that is instrumental to explaining 
the murder of Van Gogh.
8.4 Cognitive openings and unfreezing
Wiktorowicz describes a ‘cognitive opening’ as a questioning of previously held beliefs, brought 
on by a sudden sense of crisis that can be economic, social, political or personal in nature.860 
Cognitive openings, or ‘trigger events’ more broadly, are seen by several authors as factors that can 
853 NOVA, “Videotestament Samir A. - vertaling NOVA”; Van San, Sieckelinck, and De Winter, Idealen op drift, 48; 
Peters, “Dutch extremist Islamism,” 145, 152-154.
854 Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling,” 3-6; Peters, “Dutch extremist Islamism,” 146-148.
855 NOVA, “Videotestament Samir A. - vertaling NOVA”.
856 Taylor, The fanatics, 114, 160-167.
857 Alberts et al., “De wereld van Mohammed B,” 1; Chorus and Olgun, In godsnaam, 53-58.
858 Alberts et al., “De wereld van Mohammed B,” 6.
859 Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 9.
860 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the cause: al-Muhajiroun and radical Islam,” in The Roots of Islamic Radicalism 
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kick-start the process by which people come to adopt extremist beliefs and participate in political 
violence.861 Once open to new ideas, an individual can become attracted to radical or extremist 
groups provided there is a sense of ‘frame alignment’, in which the group’s representation of 
reality matches the individual’s experience and preconceptions.862 The crises which can produce 
cognitive openings need not be personally experienced. People may empathize with the suffering 
of others, for instance through televised reporting on war and conflict, and experience ‘vicarious 
deprivation’ that can prompt them to reevaluate their convictions or take action.863 
In a similar argument, McCauley and Moskalenko posit that there is higher chance that people 
will become involved in terrorism when they are suddenly detached from their everyday 
commitments and acquaintances. Individuals undergoing such ‘unfreezing’ become more 
open to meeting new people and entertaining new ideas. For instance, moving to a new city 
may prompt people to make new friends or, more dramatically, government collapse might 
necessitate looking for other means or organizations to ensure personal safety.864 The unfreezing 
hypothesis is, in turn, reminiscent of what Munson refers to as ‘biographical availability’; his 
study indicated that a majority of people who became involved in pro-life activism were in a 
period of personal transition at the moment of contact with the pro-life movement, whereas 
those who remained uncommitted had stable life situations.865 Cognitive openings, unfreezing, 
and biographical availability all suggest that a sudden change or a period of personal transition 
can make individuals more amenable to becoming involved in activism, radical or extremist 
groups and even terrorism.
8.4.1 Cognitive openings, unfreezing and the Hofstadgroup
Cognitive openings and the trigger events that led to them played an important role in bringing 
about participation in the Hofstadgroup. For several individuals, these trigger events were 
political in nature. As a teenager, the individual who tried to reach Chechnya in 2003 was gripped 
by news footage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Balkan war. The start of the Second 
Intifada (2000) led to a burgeoning perception that Muslims specifically were being persecuted 
the world over.866 Then he saw the dramatic footage of the Palestinian boy Muhammad al-Durrah 
and his father being killed after getting caught in a cross-fire between Israeli and Palestinian 
861 B. Heidi Ellis et al., “Trauma and openness to legal and illegal activism among Somali refugees,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 27, no. 5 (2015): 857-883; Gaetano Joe Ilardi, “Interviews with Canadian radicals,” Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 9 (2013): 726-727; Porter and Kebbell, “Radicalization in Australia: examining 
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S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Transformative radicalization: applying learning theory to Islamist 
radicalization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 5 (2011): 423.
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Stoughton, 2014), 66-67; Sageman, Leaderless jihad, 72-75; Sageman, “The next generation of terror,” 40-41.
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865 Munson, The making of, 37.
866 A[.], “Deurwaarders,” 4.
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forces.867 This particular incident triggered a belief that ‘Muslims were being wronged’ and led 
him to question whether he should go and help the Palestinian people, ‘if necessary by fighting’.868 
The most influential trigger events of all were undoubtedly the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. These attacks prompted a number of future participants to search 
for answers about the attackers’ motives and Islam’s stance on such violence, searches that brought 
them into contact with political Islam and Salafi-Jihadist justifications for violence.869 As one 
future participant described this period; ‘I was on the internet so often and so long that I began 
to lose weight’.870 In addition, the attacks and the U.S.-led military response they evoked brought 
about a burgeoning political consciousness. One female participant described being shocked 
by what she saw as U.S. president George W. Bush’s declaration of war against Muslims. This 
compelled her to choose sides for ‘the Muslims’ and fueled her interest in Islam.871
Trigger events could also be distinctly personal. Van Gogh’s murderer’s adoption of a 
fundamentalist and extremist interpretation of Islam was initiated by two events. The first was 
his imprisonment from July to August 2001 for assaulting two police officers. It seems that 
this experience engendered a desire to make a fresh start and it was in prison that he began 
studying the Quran in earnest.872 The more important trigger event was the death of his mother 
in December 2001. Van Gogh’s future assailant would later write about the influence her death 
had on him in the farewell letter he left his family: ‘[i]t has not eluded you that I have changed 
since the death of my mother. In the wake of her death I have undertaken a search to uncover 
the truth’.873 These triggers awakened the ‘need for a new spiritual orientation’, setting him on a 
significance quest that, through the mediation of group influences such as the teachings of Abu 
Khaled, would lead him to religious fanaticism and terrorist violence.874
Other future participants were also set on a path towards involvement by similarly eye-opening 
personal experiences. One man told police that he reoriented himself on his faith two years earlier 
after coming to believe he was fatally ill.875 A female participant who was raised a Muslim realized 
she knew very little about her faith after meeting a Dutch convert. ‘“The convert laughed in my 
face, but then invited me to join her to go to the mosque one time. It took a while before I went, 
but that woman got stuck in my head: she is Dutch and knows everything about Islam, while I am 
Muslim and know nothing. From then on I went every Friday. I would put on a headscarf and it 
867 Ibid., 4-6.
868 Ibid., 4.
869 Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 18-19; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 10-
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felt great! I was so proud!’.”876 This young woman’s renewed interest in her faith led her to make 
the acquaintance of Hofstadgroup participants and from there to become involved in the group 
herself.877
Asked why he considered using violence, an interviewee listed several factors. One of them was 
his experience of watching a propaganda video. ‘And what really actually triggered me, was when 
I saw a Palestinian woman be mistreated by Israeli soldiers. So that was for me something, and 
and, and when you also heard that, you know with Islamic songs in the background, and and, 
and yes, that was very emotional. Because I, I saw actually my mother there in front of me. (…) 
Yes, that was… Look, when you a, a Palestinian woman, with headscarf, you know, then you see, 
then she is already something recognizable you know and then you saw her fall on the ground 
and when she wanted to get up she got a… (…) So that you can, you can see again in the film. 
And that was emotional. And, and uhh, that was then something that made me think “Fucking 
Jews”, you know.’878
With regard to ‘unfreezing’, there were at least two participants who experienced a marked change 
in their everyday life prior to becoming involved or turning to (fundamentalist) Islam. One was 
a young man who could not find the internship he needed to finish his education and suddenly 
had a lot of time on his hands, some of which he spent at a mosque. There he met a Syrian man 
who told him that his failure to get an internship was due to unbelievers’ hatred for Muslims. This 
conversation was the starting point of his search for information about (extremist) Islam and led 
to him being introduced to the Hofstadgroup by the same Syrian man.879 The second individual 
was an illegal immigrant from Morocco; it appears that the group took the place of the friends 
and family he dearly missed.880 
Cognitive openings and unfreezing constitute essential pieces of the Hofstadgroup puzzle as they 
can explain how the initial steps towards involvement came about. For a significant number of 
individuals, their first steps toward participation were initiated by a sudden period of uncertainty 
in which they were prompted to question their own beliefs and understanding of the world. 
A process that made them open to and interested in new friends and ideas. Furthermore, the 
examples of unfreezing illuminate the role that chance plays in bringing about involvement. Had 
the individual who could not find an internship been successful in his search, it is quite possible 
that he would never have become involved in the Hofstadgroup. Similarly, would the Moroccan 
illegal immigrant have become involved in the Hofstadgroup if he had made friends with people 
who were not interested in radical and extremist interpretations of Islam?
876 Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 24 (Italics added).
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8.5 Cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement
People’s opinions are continuously challenged by new information or contrarian views. For 
instance, a creationist who learns of the theory of evolution may be shocked to see his or her idea 
that the world was created in a number of days challenged by a completely different explanation. 
Such experiences can lead to ‘cognitive dissonance’; a psychological tension between previously 
held beliefs and the information or views that challenge them. Cognitive dissonance can also 
result from a disparity between beliefs and behavior; someone who smokes while knowing it 
poses a health risk or, closer to the topic at hand, willfully harming or killing others while being 
aware of the legal and moral prohibitions against such behavior.881
The unpleasant psychological tension gets stronger as dissonance increases.882 People who engage 
in terrorism and other forms of violent behavior are therefore especially likely to suffer its effects. 
Without ways in which to rationalize or ameliorate the tension that follows from the breach of 
legal and moral codes that the commission of terrorist acts entails, such behavior could well 
remain taboo or unsustainable for any prolonged period of time. As Maikovich argues, it might 
be the ability to overcome such cognitive dissonance that separates those who do become involved 
in terrorism from those who remain militant in thoughts only.883 The following paragraphs look 
at several strategies for coping with cognitive dissonance and pay particular attention to the 
mechanism of moral disengagement.
One way of dealing with the cognitive dissonance that may result from participation in terrorism 
is to justify present actions based on past behavior. If it was right to do something the first time, 
it cannot be wrong to do it again. If it was justifiable to lend logistical support to a terrorist attack 
in the past, why should it be wrong to become more closely involved in the execution of the next 
one? Isn’t the person supplying the bomb just as responsible as the one pressing the button? As 
past actions form the foundations for subsequent ones, this mechanism of dealing with cognitive 
dissonance through self-justification sets people on a ‘slippery slope’ that leads to ever greater 
involvement in terrorist activities. Self-justificatory arguments can also form an obstacle to 
disengagement, as ceasing this involvement means questioning the moral permissibility of past 
behavior.884
Involvement in terrorism comes at a significant price. Terrorists must deal with the death or 
capture of their comrades, abandon alternate career paths and live under the continuous threat 
of being arrested or killed. Over time, the price of involvement can add up to form a ‘sunk cost’ 
881 Leon Festinger, A theory of cognitive dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 1-31.
882 Ibid., 16.
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that is so high that continued participation is the only way to justify it. As long as the struggle is 
not abandoned, past sacrifices can still be justified as having been necessary contributions to the 
achievement of future goals worthy of the sacrifice. Abandoning the cause or group before those 
goals have been realized would mean accepting that such costs have been incurred for nothing.885 
Thus, when faced with failure or the realization that past sacrifices have been futile, renewed 
commitment to the terrorist group and its cause can be a (temporarily) effective way of avoiding 
this very unpleasant form of cognitive dissonance. 
A particularly powerful way of rationalizing the use of violence and overcoming inhibitions to 
harming and killing others is through moral disengagement. Bandura posits moral disengagement 
as a way of bypassing or selectively deactivating internally held moral standards that prevent 
inhumane behavior, thereby avoiding the self-condemnation that would otherwise follow 
when those standards of behavior are breached.886 Moral disengagement is itself made possible 
by several factors highlighted in Bandura’s work as well as the broader literature on terrorism. 
These include the availability of moral justifications for violence, the displacement or diffusion 
of personal responsibility, disregarding or distorting the consequences of violence, blaming the 
victims and dehumanizing opponents.887
Several factors affecting moral disengagement have already been discussed in previous chapters 
and will not be dealt with in detail here. For instance, it was established that the Salafi-Jihadism 
based worldview to which the Hofstadgroup’s extremist participants adhered, allowed them to 
see violence as morally justified and necessary. Chapter seven noted that the group had recourse 
to authority figures that provided them with (implicit) justifications for violence, but none that 
allowed for a displacement of personal responsibility to occur by ordering attacks to be carried 
out. Those participants who carried out acts of violence were therefore hard put to obscure their 
personal agency as a means of overcoming moral obstacles to the use of violence. What remains 
to be assessed is whether disregard for the consequences of violence, blaming the victims and 
dehumanization had a hand in bringing about participants’ (intended) acts of terrorism.
Disregard for the consequences of violence is a way of avoiding or minimizing personal responsibility 
for the harm inflicted on others by ignoring or downplaying the damage wrought. It is easier to 
use violence, for instance, when the results are not directly witnessed such as through the use of 
remote controlled weapons or when a chain of command distances the individual who orders an 
attack from those actually carrying it out.888 By portraying their violence as defensive, in response 
to provocation or as legitimate retribution, terrorists legitimize their acts by blaming their victims; 
885 Della Porta, Social movements, 181; Taylor, The fanatics, 75-77; Crenshaw, Explaining terrorism, 127.
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essentially arguing that they brought it on themselves.889 With regard to dehumanization, Bandura 
argues that when a deliberate effort is made to present the other as something reprehensible, 
dangerous and less than human, natural feelings of empathy wane and personal inhibitions 
against using violence are more easily overcome.890 
McCauley and Moskalenko view dehumanization as the result of ‘essentialist thinking’ which 
often takes hold among groups or individuals that are in conflict with one another. The first 
indicator of this way of thinking is over-generalization; for instance, by seeing the violent behavior 
of individuals as reflecting the ‘evil nature’ of the entire group, nation or culture they represent. 
The second tell-tale sign is fear that the in-group will somehow be contaminated by contact with 
out-group members. Third is the use of derogatory designations for out-group members that 
essentializes them as inherently evil and frequently denies them even their humanity; for example, 
by referring to enemies as ‘roaches’ or ‘pigs’.891 By contrast, when terrorists refer to themselves 
they tend to use words that convey legitimacy and heroism, such as ‘soldier’, ‘revolutionary’ or 
‘mujahid’ (warrior for the faith).892 
8.5.1 Cognitive dissonance, moral disengagement and the Hofstadgroup
For most of the Hofstadgroup’s participants, ‘involvement’ was limited to attending group 
gatherings, discussing radical and extremist interpretations of Islam and perhaps spreading such 
views online. In lieu of involvement in clearly illegal or morally questionable behavior, such as 
preparations for an actual attack, the likeliness that participants suffered significant cognitive 
dissonance was small. Their limited degree of involvement also came at relatively low personal 
cost; commitments outside of the group, such as study or work, did not necessarily have to be 
abandoned. Although many participants ultimately paid for their involvement with arrest and 
imprisonment, these costs were arguably not apparent during their involvement and thus did not 
trigger self-justificatory mechanisms that could lead to prolonged or intensified commitment to 
the group.
Those participants most likely to experience major cognitive dissonance were those who actually 
planned or perpetrated acts of terrorism. Most notably, Van Gogh’s assailant and the individual 
who tried to reach Chechnya in 2003 and who appeared interested in committing a terrorist 
attack in the Netherlands in 2004 and 2005. Both men rapidly embraced ever-more extremist 
views and eventually become involved in (plans for) acts of terrorism. They also incurred costs 
for their involvement in militancy; Van Gogh’s murderer gave up work, study and old friends to 
889 Ibid., 184-185; Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 51.
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focus entirely on his religious convictions and his new-found circle of acquaintances. The second 
individual was arrested multiple times in the 2003-2005 period and spent time in prison. Yet 
despite these outward signs reminiscent of the slippery-slope and sunk-cost mechanisms, there 
were no indications that either of them utilized such rationalizations. What they did do was rely 
on various forms of moral disengagement.
Both of these participants availed themselves of ideological justifications for violence. For 
instance, both referred to Quranic verses extolling the necessity and justness of violent jihad.893 
They also displaced their individual responsibility for violence by portraying their (intended) 
actions as religiously mandated.894 Van Gogh’s murderer explained his decision to his family by 
writing that he had ‘chosen to fulfill [his] duty towards Allah’.895 Likewise, the second individual 
addressed the following words to his family: ‘know that this is the right path and that I commit 
this deed out of fear for the punishment of Allah, the almighty, for he says (…) “If you do not 
sally forth, He shall punish you with a painful punishment”, and out of obedience to Allah, who 
says: “For you it is mandated to fight, irrespective of how much you dislike it”.’896 In other words, 
there was no place for personal feelings about the use of violence; it simply had to be done.
Neither of these individuals appears to have disregarded the (potential) consequences of their 
actions. They did, however, consistently blame their victims. Consider this phrase from the 
videotaped warning message one of them recorded in 2005: ‘Sheikh Osama bin Laden (…) sheikh 
Ayman al-Zawahiri (…) [a]nd our beloved sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (…) have warned 
you. But you have only committed more injustices, you crusaders. You supported Bush when 
he uttered his famous word: “Let the crusades begin.” I tell you that between us and you only 
the language of the sword shall apply until you leave the Muslims alone and choose the path of 
peace’.897 Van Gogh’s assailant uses the same reasoning in his ‘Open Letter to the Dutch People’. 
‘Millions and millions of Muslims have been raped and slaughtered like animals and there seems 
to be no end in sight. You, as unbelieving Dutch citizens, must know that your government is 
partly to blame for this. (…) Because the policy of your government is supported by your ballot 
and they govern on your behalf, your blood and possessions have become halal [permitted] for 
the Islamic Ummah.’898
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Both men dehumanized their opponents through the persistent use of derogatory religious 
signifiers. Consider what Van Gogh’s murderer told Van Gogh’s mother in court: ‘I don’t feel 
your pain. (…) Partly because I can’t sympathize with you because you are an unbeliever’.899 
Such dehumanization was widespread within the group. Non-Muslims were called ‘kuffar’ or 
simply ‘unbelievers’, underscoring their fundamental otherness.900 The words ‘zindiq’901 or 
‘mortad’902 (both mean apostate), ‘munafiq’903 (hypocrite / Muslim without true faith) and 
‘mushrik’904 (polytheist / one who recognizes other authorities than god alone, e.g. democratic 
governance) were similarly used against ‘false’ and ‘deviant’ Muslims.905 Given that in the group’s 
interpretation of Islam the penalty for apostasy is death, many of these terms carried a very 
clear connotation; these people deserve to be killed.906 Another important example of derogatory 
language is the recurring use of ‘taghut’ (idolater / idolatry) to refer to leaders, political systems 
or state institutions that claim authority based on anything other than Sharia law, as an attempt 
to paint their claims to power as illegitimate.907
Ideological justifications for terrorism, the displacement of personal responsibility for violence 
on divine mandates, blaming victims for the violence visited upon them and the use of 
dehumanizing signifiers for the group’s opponents. All of these mechanisms worked to lower 
psychological inhibitions to the use of violence and were especially important for the group’s 
most militant participants. The available evidence illustrates that moral disengagement was a key 
individual-level enabler of terrorist violence. It forms an important factor in the explanation for 
the group’s planned and perpetrated acts of violence by making it easier to consider the use of 
violence without seeing it as morally reprehensible.
8.6 Conclusion
Although radicalization has become the predominant cognitive explanation for involvement 
in terrorism in the post-9/11 period, the chapter’s findings challenge its explanatory potential 
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in numerous ways. Admittedly, Van Gogh’s murderer appeared to be a text-book case of 
radicalization as he was ultimately motivated by his convictions to commit a terrorist attack. 
The problem is that radicalization cannot explain why the vast majority of group participants 
who also held extremist views did not act on them. Further problematizing the explanatory 
potential of ‘radicalization’ was the finding that some participants only adopted radical views 
after becoming involved; disabusing the notion that radicalization precedes such participation. 
Finally, the findings belied the idea that radicalization is somehow linear or deterministic; some 
participants held radical views but never developed extremist ones and a small number even 
turned away from previously held extremist points of view. Radicalization, in short, does not 
provide a convincing explanation for involvement in the Hofstadgroup. 
Fanaticism provided a more nuanced understanding of the link between beliefs and actions. 
Unlike radicalization, it is specific enough to explain why not all of those who hold radical or 
extremist beliefs will act on them by making violent behavior contingent on several contextual 
factors. Although the Hofstadgroup’s extremists shared a militant belief system, only Van Gogh’s 
murderer wedded such views to millenarian beliefs that mandated action on the part of ‘true 
believers’ to stave off defeat. More importantly, Van Gogh’s killer led the relatively most isolated 
existence of the Hofstadgroup’s participants. Significantly less challenged by different opinions 
encountered at work, school or in family life, the to-be murderer’s beliefs came to exert a markedly 
higher level of control over his behavior. It was this context that allowed his fanatical convictions 
to lead to fanatical behavior.
The discussion also revealed the important role that ‘cognitive openings’ and the related concept 
of ‘unfreezing’ played in bringing about involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Triggered by a range 
of events from the 9/11 attacks to a personal loss, many future participants went through a 
period in which they questioned previously held beliefs, or were suddenly open to new ideas 
and acquaintances. These experiences were critical in making them interested in radical and 
extremist interpretations of Islam and the company of like-minded individuals and thus formed 
a key element in the Hofstadgroup’s formation. Unfreezing also drew attention to the role that 
chance plays in bringing about involvement in extremist or terrorist groups. Had some of the 
Hofstadgroup’s participants not run into individuals interested in extremist interpretations of 
Islam, it is quite possible they would never have become involved in the group. 
The last cognitive individual-level explanation discussed in this chapter focused on cognitive 
dissonance and the various ways in which it can be managed. Through such mechanisms as 
attributing the blame for their own violent intentions to the actions of their victims, emphasizing 
religious precepts that required violence and the dehumanization of opponents the Hofstadgroup’s 
most militant participants were able to prevent debilitating psychological discomfort that could 
otherwise result from the use of violence. Moral disengagement therefore played an important 
role in making possible participants’ planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism.
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These findings have made an important contribution towards understanding involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup from an individual-level perspective. But they represent only a part of the various 
explanations that this level of analysis has to offer. The next chapter completes the individual-level 
analysis by addressing whether explanations based on mental illness, psychoanalysis, personality 
characteristics and emotional states can yield explanations for involvement in homegrown 
jihadist groups.
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9. Individual-level analysis II: Terrorists as 
psychologically distinctive
9.1 Introduction
This chapter completes the two-part examination of the individual level analysis. The explanations 
discussed in the following paragraphs share a focus on explaining involvement in terrorism as 
resulting from the distinct psychological features. The first three paragraphs in particular embody 
the assumption that terrorists are somehow different from ‘normal’ individuals. They assess 
mental illness, psychological trauma and personality characteristics as factors that can increase 
the likeliness of involvement in terrorism. The chapter’s second half departs from the focus on 
abnormality to look at the role of emotions in bringing about involvement in terrorist groups 
and terrorist attacks. In particular, frustration-induced anger and fear of death are discussed as 
factors that can motivate such participation. 
9.1.1 Are terrorists abnormal?
Two recurrent trends in research on terrorism have been the search for a distinctive terrorist 
personality or profile and the idea that terrorism can be explained as the result of mental illness or 
psychological damage incurred during childhood. The debate about the presumed link between 
psychopathology and involvement in terrorism in particular has received considerable criticism. 
Numerous authors have lamented the empirically poorly substantiated nature of such claims.908 
The difficulty of accessing terrorists for research purposes, let alone carrying out clinical studies 
on them, means that explanations which hold that involvement in terrorism stems from distinct 
psychological qualities must be treated with care.909 Yet the ongoing popularity of many of these 
explanations means that they cannot simply be dismissed. On the basis of a literature review, the 
author identified five themes in this literature that form the main points of discussion (Table 10).
Individual level analysis II: Terrorists as psychologically distinctive
Psychopathology
Psychoanalysis, significance loss and identity-related alienation
Terrorist personality or profile
Anger and frustration
Mortality salience
Table 10
908 Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 3; Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 31; Andrew Silke, “Cheshire-cat 
logic: the recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research,” Psychology, Crime & Law 4, no. 1 
(1998): 52-53.
909 Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 3-4.
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9.2 Psychopathology
Perhaps because it is comforting to see terrorist violence as the work of mentally disturbed 
individuals, psychopathology has become a well-established explanation for this form of 
behavior.910 But as a multitude of authors attest, no matter how much the psychopathology 
argument makes intuitive sense, it lacks sufficient empirical support.911 Terrorists appear no 
more likely to suffer from major mental illness than the general population.912 Furthermore, 
psychopaths would make highly unreliable and dangerous operatives, making it likely that they 
would be shunned by terrorist groups.913 Neither is it convincing to argue that terrorism’s severe 
‘occupational hazards’ would only be acceptable to the mentally unstable. There is a wide range 
of people who hold dangerous jobs, such as police officers and soldiers, who are not considered 
mentally disturbed.914 For these reasons, psychopathology ranks among the most criticized 
explanations for involvement in terrorism.
While few authors continue to propagate the view that terrorists are psychopathic, the link 
between involvement in terrorism and mental health issues more broadly remains contested. 
Merari and colleagues raise the important point that some personality disorders are very subtle; 
thorough clinical tests are needed before they can be ascertained or dismissed.915 A study by 
Kleinmann claims evidence that terrorists are more likely to suffer from mental health issues such 
as schizophrenia than the general population.916 Lankford addresses this topic in considerably 
greater detail and reports that a significant percentage of suicide attackers suffered from 
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and ‘other mental health problems’.917 In an explorative 
study based on access to police files, Weenink writes that just under fifty percent of his sample of 
910 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 31; Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic,” 56-57.
911 Raymond R. Corrado, “A critique of the mental disorder perspective of political terrorism,” International Journal 
of Law and Psychiatry 4, no. 3-4 (1981): 295-304; Crenshaw, “The psychology of political terrorism,” 385; Hudson, 
“The sociology and psychology of terrorism,” 60; Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “What makes terrorism 
tick? Its individual, group and organizational aspects,” Revista de Psicología Social: International Journal of Social 
Psychology 24, no. 2 (2009): 140-141; Clark McCauley, “Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the 
response to terrorism,” in The psychology of terrorism: volume III, theoretical understandings and perspectives, 
ed. Chris E. Stout (Westport / London: Praeger, 2002), 5-6; McCauley and Segal, “Social psychology of terrorist 
groups,” 333; Merari, “Psychological aspects of suicide terrorism,” 107; Charles L. Ruby, “Are terrorists mentally 
deranged?,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 2, no. 1 (2002): 22; Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic,” 53, 60-62; 
Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 12-14.
912 Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic,” 62; Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 61.
913 J.T. Alderdice, “The individual, the group and the psychology of terrorism,” International Review of Psychiatry 
19, no. 3 (2007): 201; Aaron T. Beck, “Prisoners of hate,” Behaviour Research and Therapy 40, no. 3 (2002): 210; 
Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 32; Robin M. Frost, “Terrorist psychology, motivation and strategy,” The Adelphi 
Papers 45, no. 378 (2005): 42-43; Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation,” 21.
914 Ruby, “Are terrorists mentally deranged?,” 21.
915 Merari, “Psychological aspects of suicide terrorism,” 104.
916 Kleinmann, “Radicalization of homegrown Sunni militants in the United States,” 287-288.
917 Adam Lankford, “Précis of The Myth of Martyrdom: what really drives suicide bombers, rampage shooters, and 
other self-destructive killers,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37, no. 4 (2014): 354-355.
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Dutch jihadists displayed ‘problem behavior’ and that six percent had diagnosed mental health 
problems.918
While outright psychopathology has become less prevalent as an explanation for terrorism, 
relatively ‘minor’ mental health problems continue to figure prominently in the literature. Studies 
like Weenink’s cannot be seen as (nor claim to be) clinical diagnoses, yet their use of extensive 
empirical data lends considerable credibility to the notion that behavioral issues and mental 
health problems other than psychopathology may still play a role in bringing about involvement 
in terrorism. However, it remains to be elucidated how exactly factors such as depression or 
autism spectrum disorders can contribute to this outcome. After all, many people will suffer 
some form of depression during their lives yet the vast majority of these individuals will not 
become involved in any kind of violent behavior. Given the history of poorly supported claims 
of terrorists’ abnormality, caution is in order.
9.2.1 Mental health issues and the Hofstadgroup 
The only two participants subjected to extensive psychological and psychiatric assessments were 
Van Gogh’s killer and the individual who videotaped threats to the Dutch public in 2005.919 Van 
Gogh’s assailant steadfastly refused to cooperate with specialists at the psychiatric observation 
clinic Pieter Baan Centre (PBC) in Utrecht. Nevertheless, in the report presented during his 
trial, PBC experts concluded that there was no indication that he had refused cooperation on 
pathological grounds and that the little data they had gathered was insufficient to warrant the 
view that Van Gogh’s killer suffered from some kind of disorder.920 Initially, the participant who 
videotaped threats also refused to cooperate.921 But by early 2005, a psychological report was 
submitted to the court that concluded he too did not suffer from a personality disorder.922
Within the broader Hofstadgroup, reliable indications of mental illness are virtually absent. The 
one clear case concerns a young man on the edges of 2005’s Piranha group. In October 2007, he 
escaped from a psychiatric hospital and stabbed two police officers, one of whom then shot the 
assailant dead.923 While this individual clearly suffered from mental health problems, at present 
there are simply no indications that these issues contributed to his (peripheral) participation 
in the group. There is therefore little cause to amend the overall conclusion that mental health 
problems do not offer an explanation for involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
918 Anton W. Weenink, “Behavioral problems and disorders among radicals in police files,” Perspectives on Terrorism 
9, no. 2 (2015): 24-27.
919 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 2,” 3-4.
920 Amsterdam District Court, “LJN AU0025,” 8-9.
921 “Psychisch onderzoek naar Samir A. levert niets op,” De Volkskrant, 13 December 2004.
922 “Rechter wil meer getuigen, zaak Samir A. vertraagd,” NRC Handelsblad, 25 February 2005.
923 Janny Groen, Annieke Kranenberg, and Weert Schenk, “Bilal B. was bekende van Hofstadgroep,” De Volkskrant, 
16 October 2007.
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9.3 Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysis was pioneered by Sigmund Freud in the late nineteenth century. In explaining 
human behavior, it affords a key role to the influence of repressed or unconsciously held desires.924 
The origins of these desires are attributed to various phases of childhood mental development, 
with particular emphasis on ‘unresolved intrapsychic conflict’ that occurred during this period.925 
In the second half of the twentieth-century, psychoanalytical approaches began to be used to 
explain involvement in terrorism. Narcissism-aggression theory, for instance, holds that ego-
damage suffered during childhood or adolescence can lead individuals to terrorism as a way of 
projecting inner pain on external targets.926 Another approach posits that the inability to live up 
to societal expectations and norms can prompt the adoption of ‘negative identities’, whereby the 
damaged individual embraces precisely those values that society abhors and becomes somebody 
by embodying the ‘nobody’.927
Psychoanalytical approaches have lost ground in contemporary psychological and psychiatric 
research.928 One problematic aspect of these theories is their lack of strong empirical support.929 
Another issue is their embodiment of the ‘fundamental attribution error’. That is the human 
tendency to ascribe the behavior of others to innate qualities and to downplay the role of 
circumstances. Essentially, psychoanalytical approaches ‘overestimate the internal causes of 
terrorist behavior’.930 Finally, psychoanalytical explanations are hard to falsify; how can the 
assertion of an unconsciously held desire be refuted?931 
While Post acknowledges the absence of ‘major psychopathology’, he holds to the psychoanalytical 
approach essentially as a way of continuing the argument that terrorists are intrinsically different.932 
Likewise, Merari and colleagues assert in one publication that the suicide terrorists they studied 
showed no evidence of psychopathic tendencies, but argue in another that forty percent of 
the same sample did display subclinical (i.e. not definitely observed) suicidal tendencies that, 
924 Michael P. Arena and Bruce A. Arrigo, The terrorist identity: explaining the terrorist threat (New York / London: 
New York University Press, 2006), 3-4; Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 57.
925 Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 22.
926 Post, “Terrorist psycho-logic,” 27; Ross, “A model of the psychological causes,” 134; Victoroff, “The mind of the 
terrorist,” 23-24.
927 Hudson, “The sociology and psychology of terrorism,” 20; Crenshaw, “The psychology of political terrorism,” 
393.
928 Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 57; Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 26.
929 Arena and Arrigo, The terrorist identity, 24-25; Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 11; Corrado, “A critique of the 
mental disorder perspective,” 298-304; Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 57; Brooke Rogers, “The psychology 
of violent radicalisation,” in The psychology of counter-terrorism, ed. Andrew Silke (London / New York: Routledge, 
2011), 36; Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic,” 52-67; Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 22.
930 Arena and Arrigo, The terrorist identity, 4.
931 Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 26.
932 Post, “Terrorist psycho-logic,” 25-27. 
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moreover, the subjects themselves may have held without being aware of them.933 As Silke and 
Horgan point out, psychoanalytical approaches essentially provide a way of promulgating the 
questionable argument that terrorism results from some form of mental illness.934 
Given their empirical and theoretical deficiencies, ‘classic’ psychoanalytical approaches such 
as narcissism-aggression theory will not be used to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup. 
Instead, the discussion continues with two more recently coined explanations that depart 
from the psychoanalytical tradition of subconsciously held desires and psychological damage 
incurred during childhood and adolescence, yet also resemble it in their emphasis on (perceived) 
shortcomings in an individual’s sense of self as motivating behavior. These lines of inquiry focus 
on ‘significance quests’ and identity-related alienation.
9.4 Significance quests and identity-related alienation
The wish to attain and maintain a sense of personal significance has been identified by psychological 
research as a key human need.935 Kruglanski et al. present this ‘fundamental desire to matter, to 
be someone, to have respect’ as terrorists’ overarching motivation.936 Such a yearning may be 
triggered by real, perceived or potential significance loss, which itself may be brought about 
by, for instance, existential anxiety, social isolation, (group-based) humiliation or deprivation.937 
Significance quests are not envisioned as purely defensive reactions to (potential) significance 
loss, however. Involvement in terrorism may also come about as the result of an opportunity 
for marked ‘significance gain’, such as the chance to acquire social standing by committing a 
‘martyrdom’ (suicide) attack.938 
Research has provided empirical support for the notion that the desire to (re)gain a sense of 
personal significance can contribute to processes of involvement in terrorism.939 However, it 
should be noted that a desire for significance is not unique to terrorists. The likeliness that such 
quests will increase the probability of involvement in terrorism appears dependent on contextual 
factors. These are the perception of unjust personal or group-based deprivation, the ability to 
point to a hostile responsible party and the availability of justifications for violence.940 
933 Ariel Merari et al., “Personality characteristics of ‘self martyrs’ / ‘suicide bombers’ and organizers of suicide 
attacks,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 1 (2009): 95-96; Merari et al., “Making Palestinian ‘martyrdom 
operations’,” 118.
934 Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 61; Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic,” 64-67.
935 Arie W. Kruglanski and Edward Orehek, “The role of the quest for personal significance in motivating terrorism,” 
in The psychology of social conflict and aggression, ed. Joseph P. Forgas, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Kipling D. 
Williams (New York / London: Psychology Press, 2011), 154.
936 Kruglanski et al., “The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization,” 73.
937 Kruglanski and Fishman, “What makes terrorism tick?,” 142-145; Kruglanski et al., “The psychology of 
radicalization and deradicalization,” 74-76; Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “Fully committed: suicide bombers’ 
motivation and the quest for personal significance,” Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 331-357.
938 Kruglanski et al., “The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization,” 75-76.
939 Ilardi, “Interviews with Canadian radicals,” 717-718.
940 Kruglanski and Orehek, “The role of the quest,” 163.
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Identity-related alienation essentially holds that children of Muslim immigrants to Western 
countries can come to feel that they neither belong to the country and culture of their parents, 
nor to the country and culture of their birth. Too modern to fit into the first and too different 
in appearance and upbringing to fit seamlessly into the latter, these second and third generation 
immigrants may come to lack a clear sense of identity. Experiences with discrimination or 
exclusion can exacerbate this feeling of alienation and add a keen sense of frustration and anger 
towards their fellow citizens. In such a setting, radical and extremist interpretations of Islam 
can become especially attractive through their ability to offer straightforward explanations (‘you 
didn’t get the job because unbelievers hate Muslims’), provide a clear sense of identity (‘you’re not 
Dutch or Moroccan, but a Muslim’) and a militant purpose (‘you must defend your religion’).941 
9.4.1 Significance quests and the Hofstadgroup
The clearest and most consequential significance quest among Hofstadgroup participants was 
the one that Van Gogh’s future murderer underwent. The killer himself made this very clear in a 
farewell letter he wrote to his family. ‘It has not eluded you that I have changed since the death of 
my mother. In the wake of her death I have undertaken a search to uncover the truth. (…) I have 
chosen to fulfill my duty to Allah and to trade my soul for paradise’.942 The death of his mother 
triggered a cognitive opening that set Van Gogh’s killer on a quest for answers that led him, in 
rapid succession, to embrace fundamentalist, radical and extremist interpretations of Islam.943 
Ultimately, his desire to be a ‘true’ Muslim resulted in the belief that blasphemers should be 
killed and that it was his personal duty to carry out the punishment, thus restoring some of the 
significance lost by the Prophet Muhammad at the hands of Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali.
The partial autobiography written by the individual who tried to reach Chechnya in 2003 and 
who videotaped a threat to the Dutch public in 2005 also reveals his experience of a significance 
quest. In a revealing passage, he states: ‘[o]n the Internet, I went looking for answers about Islam, 
I looked at websites belonging to Hamas and later I discovered al-Qaeda. I no longer watched 
gruesome images [of Muslim suffering], I had seen enough. Now I went looking for answers; 
“how should a Muslim react to all this injustice?”’944 The desire for vengeance, explain Kruglanski 
et al., focuses on restoring an individual or group’s loss of significance.945 The quest to restore 
significance to Muslims affected by armed conflict, and to attain status as a ‘true’ Muslim in the 
941 Cottee, “Jihadism as a subcultural response,” 731, 738; Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent radicalization in Europe,” 
800; Loza, “The psychology of extremism and terrorism,” 150; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 85-88; Sam 
Mullins, “Iraq versus lack of integration: understanding the motivations of contemporary Islamist terrorists in 
Western countries,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 4, no. 2 (2012): 119; Olivier Roy, 
“Euro-islam: de jihad van binnenuit?,” Justitiële Verkenningen 31, no. 2 (2005): 28-30, 36-38.
942 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHB03/27: 4040-4041; Alberts et al., “De wereld van Mohammed B.”
943 Peters, “Dutch extremist Islamism,” 145-159.
944 A[.], “Deurwaarders van Allah,” 11.
945 Kruglanski et al., “The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization,” 73-74.
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process, would play a key role in this individual’s behavior throughout the 2002-2005 existence 
of the group.
With regard to the broader group, significance quests drew participants to the group and 
motivated their continued presence. Numerous individuals were searching for the ‘true’ or ‘right’ 
interpretation of Islam and were able to address such questions within the group.946 Groen and 
Kranenberg’s interviews with female Hofstadgroup participants also show that at least some of 
these young women were drawn to radical Islam by a search for identity and that, more generally, 
they were exploring what roles women were allowed or expected to fulfill in jihad.947 Lastly, the 
various recent converts in the group’s ranks are also considered to have undergone significance 
quests around the time of their involvement, as conversion to a religion suggests a search for 
meaning and answers to the larger questions of life and death.948 Indeed, one convert described 
how the desire to become a ‘perfect Muslim’ brought about the adoption of jihadist beliefs, which 
this individual saw as representing ‘true’ Islam.949
Many Hofstadgroup participants wanted to deepen their understanding of their faith and to 
ascertain what it meant to be a Muslim in a time when across the globe large numbers of co-
religionists were affected by armed conflict. The sense of injustice, the perception that Western 
state and ‘apostate’ Muslims were responsible for this state of affairs and the availability of 
ideological justifications for violence, both online and within the group, created a context in 
which significance quests led to an increased likeliness of involvement in extremism and even 
terrorism. For the group’s most militant participants, the significance quest concept suggests that 
the (intended) use of terrorism stemmed in part from their desire to become ‘true’ Muslims and 
to restore some of the significance they perceived their co-religionists and the faith as a whole 
had lost at the hands of Western military interventions in Muslims countries and the actions of 
blasphemers like Van Gogh. 
These findings complement chapter 7’s conclusion that strategic and organizational rationales 
for the group’s planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism were largely absent. The significance 
quest explanation suggests that these acts are better understood as distinctly personal in origin. 
They resembled what McCormick labels the ‘expressionist’ tradition of terrorism; rooted in a 19th 
century philosophy of revolutionary violence, it sees the use of violence as a means of personal 
expression and redemption, rather than as a means for achieving political objectives.950 The 
Hofstadgroup’s most militant participants were looking to restore significance lost by themselves 
946 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHA04/21: 1593-1594, 1604-1605, 1612-1613; VERD: 19849, 19917-
19918, 19935, 19945, 20004, 20012-20013, 20225, 20242; Vermaat, Nederlandse jihad, 208; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 5, “Personal interview 1,” 1.
947 Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 18, 65.
948 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” GET: 4084, 4145, 4177; VERD: 20461, 20518-20519.
949 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, “Personal interview 1,” 2.
950 McCormick, “Terrorist decision making,” 477.
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and their coreligionists, and in the process solidify their own sense of identity and purpose, rather 
than aiming to achieve strategic goals.951
9.4.2 Identity-related alienation and the Hofstadgroup
Several publications on the Hofstadgroup raise identity-related alienation as a possible 
explanation for the adoption of radical and extremist views by the group’s participants.952 It 
also features prominently in the autobiography of a young Dutch Muslim who was arrested 
on terrorism related charges in September 2004.953 Although not part of the Hofstadgroup, his 
background and convictions were similar to those who were, suggesting that identity-related 
alienation could have played a role in the Hofstadgroup. The available empirical evidence, 
however, paints a different picture. It is clear that some participants strongly identified with 
an imagined worldwide community of believers, an association that superseded their national 
identities.954 But there is simply insufficient evidence to suppose that this self-perception as a 
member of the global ummah stemmed from identity-related issues. 
Only one explicit reference to identity-related alienation was encountered. It stems from a chat 
session in which one of the men who traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan in 2003 reprimanded a 
chat-partner for indicating she struggled with reconciling her Moroccan heritage and her Dutch 
upbringing. Such problems were irrelevant, according to the traveler, as she should not see herself 
as Moroccan or Dutch but as Muslim.955 While it may be argued that his reply signified his own 
struggles with a lack of belonging, there is no actual evidence to support this possibility. In lieu of 
clear evidence to the contrary, identity-related alienation does not appear to offer an explanation 
for involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
9.5 The terrorist personality or profile
Another line of inquiry at the individual-level of analysis questions whether there is a particular 
‘terrorist personality’. This immediately raises objections on a conceptual level, as ‘terrorist’ is 
not a singular or clearly defined typology. Terrorists fulfill a variety of roles, adhere to different 
ideological convictions and come together in numerous organizational structures, ranging from 
951 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, “Personal interview 1,” 4.
952 Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem, 61-62, 218-228, 247; Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 121-
122; Spruyt, “Liberalism and the challenge of Islam,” 320-321; Transnational Terrorism Security & the Rule of 
Law Project, “The ‘Hofstadgroep’,” 12.
953 Kaddouri, Lach met de duivel, 24, 28, 35.
954 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” 01/13: 99, 163; 101/117: 4128, 18410; AHA18405/18422: 12228; Van 
San, Sieckelinck, and De Winter, Idealen op drift, 46-48; Erkel, Samir, 48; Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze 
ontwikkeling,” 4, 6, 16. 
955 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” AHD08/37: 8519.
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strict hierarchies to loosely constituted networks.956 It is therefore likely that, as Victoroff writes, 
‘any effort to uncover the “terrorist mind” will more likely result in uncovering a spectrum of 
terrorist minds’.957 In light of these considerations it comes as little surprise that attempts to 
compose a distinct terrorist personality profile have floundered.958 Personality factors alone 
simply do not offer a credible explanation for why some people become involved in terrorist 
groups and political violence. 
Neither does an examination of terrorists’ backgrounds reveal a distinctive profile; socioeconomic, 
demographic or otherwise.959 Writing of terrorists in the 1980s, McCauley and Segal characterized 
them as mostly male, mostly young, predominantly from middle-class families and usually in 
possession of at least some university education.960 These characteristics are too generic to offer 
explanations for involvement in terrorism. Similar research on twenty-first century jihadists has 
likewise failed to produce a profile specific enough to have much explanatory value.961 In his 
study on 336 European jihadists, Bakker concludes that ‘there is no standard jihadi terrorist’.962 
The individuals in his sample were mostly single males who were not particularly young, often 
hailed from the lower socioeconomic strata and often had a criminal record.963 In similar work, 
Sageman found that the jihadists he studied mostly led middle-class existences, a contrast with 
Bakker’s work that adds further diversity to the profile of the ‘average’ jihadist.964 
Recognizing the heterogeneity of terrorists’ backgrounds, several efforts have been made to 
differentiate between ‘typical’ members of jihadist groups based on their motivations for 
involvement instead.965 Nesser distinguishes between idealistic and militant ‘entrepreneurs’, their 
equally ideologically-motivated and loyal ‘protégés’ who occupy junior leadership positions, 
the ‘misfits’ who are motivated more by personal problems than ideological commitment, and 
956 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 35-36; Horgan, “From profiles to pathways,” 84, 86; Horgan, “Understanding 
terrorist motivation,” 110; Ligon et al., “Putting the ‘O’ in VEOs,” 110-117; Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 
5-7.
957 Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 7.
958 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 35-36; Horgan, “Understanding terrorist motivation,” 110; John Horgan, Divided 
we stand: the strategy and psychology of Ireland’s dissident terrorists (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 79; Hudson, “The sociology and psychology of terrorism,” 9, 60; Merari et al., “Personality characteristics,” 
96-97.
959 Nevertheless, the appeal of profiles is such that their use in a law enforcement setting has continued. See, for 
instance: Quirine Eijkman, “Has the genie been let out of the bottle? Ethnic profiling in the Netherlands,” Public 
Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice 5, no. 2 (2010): 1-21.
960 McCauley and Segal, “Social psychology of terrorist groups,” 332.
961 Silber and Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West,” 23, 57; Porter and Kebbell, “Radicalization in Australia: examining 
Australia’s convicted terrorists,” 226-227; Merari et al., “Personality characteristics,” 90-91.
962 Bakker, “Characteristics of jihadi terrorists,” 143.
963 Ibid., 140-142.
964 Sageman, Understanding terror networks, 73-74.
965 Petter Nesser, “Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe: exploring motivational aspects of recruitment and 
radicalization,” in Understanding violent radicalisation: terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe, ed. Magnus 
Ranstorp (London / New York: Routledge, 2010), 87-114; John M. Venhaus, “Why youth join al-Qaeda,” in 
Special Report 236 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 8-11.
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‘drifters’ who become involved more or less through chance.966 More recent empirical work on the 
Provisional IRA has disaggregated data on terrorists’ backgrounds based on the roles or functions 
they performed within that organization.967 One such study found that younger members were 
more likely to be involved in violent front-line activities.968 While these important efforts draw 
attention to the various roles that exist within terrorist organizations, they are not specific enough 
to provide an explanation for involvement based on particular personality characteristics. 
Some researchers have looked at personality characteristics as predisposing risk factors for 
involvement in terrorism.969 Aggressiveness, for instance, has been linked to an increased likelihood 
of involvement in criminal violence.970 Della Porta found prior experience with using violence for 
political means to be one of the most important factors in the backgrounds of Italian terrorists 
of the 1970s and 1980s.971 Several authors argue that terrorism might be especially attractive to 
highly authoritarian individuals.972 People for whom honor is an important value are more likely 
to favor an aggressive response to perceived external threats.973 Alternatively, individuals with a 
higher preference for social inequality (social dominance orientation) and hierarchical social 
relations are more likely to hold negative attitudes towards out-groups which, in turn, might 
signify a lower threshold to using violence or seeing its use of legitimate.974
Other characteristics that could potentially heighten the likeliness of involvement in terrorism 
are prejudice,975 youth and immaturity,976 a desire for action, glory, adventure or the thrill of war 
966 Nesser, “Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe,” 92-94.
967 Mia Bloom, Paul Gill, and John Horgan, “Tiocfaid ár Mná: women in the Provisional Irish Republican Army,” 
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 4, no. 1 (2012): 67-70; Paul Gill and John Horgan, “Who 
were the Volunteers? The shifting sociological and operational profile of 1240 Provisional Irish Republican Army 
Members,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 3 (2013): 451-453.
968 Gill and Horgan, “Who were the volunteers?,” 451-452.
969 Borum, Psychology of terrorism, 15-16, 36; Crenshaw, Explaining terrorism, 100; Horgan, “From profiles to 
pathways,” 84-85; Hudson, “The sociology and psychology of terrorism,” 60; Post, “Terrorist psycho-logic,” 27.
970 Silke, Terrorism, 67-68; Taylor, “Is terrorism a group phenomenon?,” 125.
971 Della Porta, “Recruitment processes,” 313.
972 Taylor, The fanatics, 70-71; Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman, “Terrorism,” 544; McCauley and Segal, “Social 
psychology of terrorist groups,” 333.
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and violence,977 the lack of a clear sense of purpose,978 impatience with words or a dissatisfaction 
with the efficacy of political activities,979 and a desire for status.980 Horgan also notes anger or 
alienation, identification with victims of injustice and the belief that violence is not inherently 
immoral.981 Doosje et al. add that personal uncertainty with regard to self and world views and 
perceived intergroup threat can contribute to support for a radical belief system.982 Some scholars 
argue that altruism should also be counted among these characteristics, as terrorists are liable to 
view their own actions as the selfless promotion of a common good.983 Finally, Pedahzur et al. 
find that suicide terrorism is partly motivated by fatalism.984 
The literature indicates that there is no such thing as a terrorist personality or profile. These 
findings once again underline the fallacy of seeing terrorists as people who are somehow distinct 
in terms of psychology, mental illness or character. However, the potential relevance of personality 
characteristics for understanding involvement in terrorism should not be ruled out altogether. 
There may be predisposing risk factors that increase the likeliness, however slightly, of certain 
individuals becoming involved in terrorism.
9.5.1 Personality characteristics and the Hofstadgroup
Several findings stand out which suggest that personality characteristics had a role to play in 
influencing the behavior of several leading Hofstadgroup participants. The clearest and most 
important of these is Van Gogh’s murderer’s history of violent behavior. In June 2000, this 
individual was detained after having been involved in a bar fight. A year later, he displayed 
threatening behavior to officers who visited his parental home on a matter related to his sister. 
In July 2001, he stabbed a policeman in an Amsterdam park and then threw the knife at another 
officer. These offenses resulted in a sentence of 12 weeks’ imprisonment. In May 2004, another 
incident involving Van Gogh’s future assailant was registered; this time he had threatened to kill 
a social services employee. Finally, on the 24th of September of the same year, he was arrested 
977 Bartlett and Miller, “The edge of violence,” 14-15; Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, “Terrorist (e)motives: the 
existential attractions of terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 12 (2011): 966-969; Crenshaw, “The 
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for aggressive behavior towards police officers after having been caught using public transport 
without a valid ticket.985
None of these observations form a clinical diagnosis of an aggressive predisposition. Yet it is 
striking that this person is the only Hofstadgroup participant who had such an extensive history 
of violent behavior and the only one to have committed an act of premeditated aggression.986 
Although it is hard to evaluate their accuracy, there are also several descriptions of Van 
Gogh’s murderer by former colleagues, friends and other group participants that paint him as 
someone who could be short-tempered and who was prone to (verbally) aggressive outbursts.987 
Furthermore, the professionals who sought to examine him at the PBC speculated that he may 
have suffered from an aggression disorder.988 At the very least, his history of violent behavior 
showed him to be an individual who could match the intention to use violence with a proven 
capability to do so. It is likely that this disposition contributed to his ability to commit murder.
One of the men who traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan was clearly influenced by a longing 
for adventure, excitement and a boyish fascination with weapons. The descriptions of his 
experiences that he gave to others frequently revolved around his self-described expertise with 
various weapons, the interesting people he met and the hardships he had to endure; from 
vigorous physical training to diets that allegedly included eating tree bark.989 Based on the degree 
of self-aggrandizement in his chat conversations with others, it also seems clear that this person 
sought and enjoyed the status of being (seen as) a warrior for his faith.990 Likewise, an interviewee 
described a longing for adventure and romantic notions of what it meant to participate in jihad 
as partly motivating his attraction Salafi-Jihadism and his involvement in the group. He also 
reflected that he had been driven by ‘youthful naiveté’.991 
While not so much a personality characteristic as an element of someone’s personal background, 
data suggests that being a recent convert made at least some participants more susceptible to 
adopting extremist views. As newcomers to Islam, converts’ lack of knowledge about their religion 
appears to have made them more likely to see the group’s ‘born Muslims’ as sources of religious 
authority, especially when they had (some) command of Arabic.992 Two final ‘predisposing risk 
985 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, “Toezichtsrapport met betrekking 
tot Mohammed B.,” 12-14; Alberts et al., “De wereld van Mohammed B.”
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factors’ found among a larger number of Hofstadgroup participants, were identification with the 
victims of perceived injustice, and the belief that violence is not inherently immoral.993 
None of the personality characteristics described in the previous paragraphs preordained these 
individuals’ future participation in the Hofstadgroup. Still, personality characteristics appear 
to have played a secondary, supportive role in bringing about involvement. That contribution 
was to make those who had these characteristics more likely to become interested in radical or 
extremist interpretations of Islam, the company of like-minded individuals and, in some cases, 
involvement in violent behavior.
9.6 The role of emotions
Emotions, in particular anger, have played a background role in many of the explanations 
discussed over the past several chapters. This final section delves deeper into how they can 
influence involvement in terrorism. It does so by highlighting two emotional states that the 
literature earmarks as being especially relevant; frustration-induced anger and fear of death.
9.6.1 Anger and frustration
Aggressive behavior can be instrumental or emotional. In the first case, aggression is consciously 
chosen as the means to achieve certain aims; in the latter, aggression is brought on by anger which 
in turn is a response to insult, physical pain or frustration.994 Anger is frequently encountered as 
a (contributing) factor in explanations for involvement in terrorism, particularly in the shape of 
a personal grievance and a desire for revenge.995 Of the triggers of anger, it is the link between 
frustration and aggression in particular that has become a frequently encountered explanation 
for terrorism and political violence. In its original incarnation, frustration-aggression theory 
held that frustration occurs when an individual’s expectancy of reward is thwarted, prompting 
aggression towards the source of that thwarting. However, if, for instance, fear of punishment 
makes such a course of action ill-advised, the intended aggression may also be displaced onto 
substitutes.996 
Frustration-aggression theory has found its way into numerous explanations for political 
violence, such as Gurr’s thesis that deprivation can lead to rebellion through the activation of 
993 A[.], “Deurwaarders,” 3, 5-8; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal interview 1,” 6; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke 
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AHB1601/1625: 3166-3168; GET: 4128, 18116; De Koning, „Changing worldviews and friendship,“ 385; Erkel, 
Samir, 65-67; Groen and Kranenberg, Women warriors, 18-21, 68-70, 169-170; Peters, „De ideologische en 
religieuze ontwikkeling,“ appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 33; Vermaat, 
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the frustration-aggression mechanism.997 Despite its popularity, the theory has also attracted 
considerable criticism, most notably based on the straightforward observation that virtually 
everyone experience frustrations but only very few people engage in violence because of it.998 This 
has led Berkowitz to propose a modification of the original theory which stresses the importance 
of situational and personal factors in bringing about an actual aggressive response to frustration, 
notably the degree to which the frustrating event is perceived as unpleasant, deliberate and 
personal.999 As it is largely subjective whether frustration leads to aggression, the presence of 
relative deprivation as an explanatory variable can be difficult to ascertain objectively. 
9.6.1.1 Anger, frustration and the Hofstadgroup
Anger forms a key explanatory variable when accounting for the behavior of the group’s most 
militant participants. Consider the vicariously experienced insult and pain in one future 
participant’s reaction to what he saw as the injustices being perpetrated against Muslims in places 
like Chechnya and Palestine. ‘[W]hy is a Muslim casualty worth less than a non-Muslim casualty? 
(…) Why do [the U.S. and Europe] only attack the Muslim world? (…) [E]ach time on television 
when they called the perpetrators of the attacks of eleven September terrorists, I always shouted 
at the television: “You are the terrorists!” (…) [T]he oppression, that gripped me, many videos 
were available, from babies with a hole of 10 cm in their stomach because a bullet came out there, 
to children who were taken from under the rubble, horrible things that were done with women, 
it was never warriors that I saw, the innocent were the target, they were hit’.1000
The desire to address these injustices by meting out vengeance to those he held responsible remained 
this person’s predominant motivation throughout his involvement with the Hofstadgroup.1001 
But his aggression was also fed by what appears to have been a personal vendetta against the state 
institutions that had monitored, arrested and imprisoned him, frequently in what he experienced 
as a hard-handed and humiliating fashion.1002 This may explain why this individual appeared to 
be conducting reconnaissance of the AIVD headquarters in 2004 and why he appeared interested 
in planning attacks against the same organization in 2005.1003 It also fits with a police intelligence 
report earmarked as ‘reliable’ which indicated that upon his release in early 2005 this participant 
was driven to rectify the ‘1-0’ in the unbelievers favor.1004 Essentially, his aggression appears to 
have been motivated by a desire to avenge both the injustices suffered by Muslims worldwide and 
the affronts he had suffered personally.
997 Gurr, Why men rebel, 9.
998 Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist,” 19; Horgan, The psychology of terrorism, 54-56.
999 Berkowitz, “Frustration-aggression hypothesis,” 60, 62, 71.
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1002 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “PIRANHA,” REL00: 29; NOVA, “Informatie AIVD en politie uit strafdossier”; 
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Aggression brought on by insult-induced anger appears the most likely explanation for what 
triggered the murder of Van Gogh. The assailant’s discovery of religious injunctions that 
mandated him to kill blasphemers occurred in the summer of 2004.1005 The Van Gogh production 
of Hirsi Ali’s movie Submission, part 1 aired on August 29th and was met with revulsion and anger 
by people in and around the Hofstadgroup, precisely because it was considered blasphemous.1006 
As one participant reflected on the murder during questioning; ‘I think that (…) Van Gogh 
apparently hurt [the killer] so much that this happened. This speaks of revenge.’1007 It seems likely 
that Van Gogh was killed not just because he had violated the murderer’s religious beliefs, but 
deeply insulted him in the process.
Within the broader Hofstadgroup there were a number of people for who anger factored into 
bringing about their initial involvement. For some, this anger was a response the perceived 
persecution of Muslims similar to the example given above, triggering a search for answers 
which ultimately led to the adoption of extremist ideas and the acquaintance of like-minded 
individuals.1008 Others were angered by Dutch mosques and imams’ unwillingness to address 
questions related to the legitimacy of violent jihad or to discuss the wars taking place in Muslim 
countries. Frustrated by what they saw as cowardice, these individuals looked for alternative 
sources of religious authority, finding it online and within the Hofstadgroup.1009 Anger also 
contributed to sharper in-group/out-group distinctions; the aforementioned individuals came 
to feel a strong disdain for ‘mainstream’ Salafism and several individuals came to hate the Dutch 
authorities after being arrested and imprisoned.1010
Anger played an important role both in bringing about involvement in the Hofstadgroup and 
contributed to (planned) acts of terrorism. As an explanatory factor, anger also underlines the 
need qualify the role that beliefs play in these processes. The individual who wanted to go to 
Chechnya was guided by a sense of idealism; a desire to help what he saw as the victims of 
oppression. Although his adoption of Salafi-Jihadist beliefs gave him a religious vocabulary in 
which to express and justify that desire, it was his anger at perceived mistreatment that initially 
sparked his interest in militancy and it remained a factor of influence throughout his involvement 
in the group. While data pertaining to the role of anger is limited to a relatively small number of 
participants, its influence among those individuals was considerable.
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9.6.2 Mortality salience
Terror Management Theory holds that thinking about the finality of life (‘mortality salience’) 
can give rise to considerable existential anxiety (‘terror’), and motivate people to look for ways 
of relieving these fears by imbuing their existence with meaning.1011 Religion and its promise 
of life-after-death is one way in which people can alleviate such stress. But worldly ideologies 
or straightforward membership of a group can also fulfill this function by making individuals 
part of something larger than themselves or by providing them with an opportunity to obtain 
a degree of immortality by contributing to something that will outlast their death. Terrorist 
groups’ trumpeting of clear ideological goals and a righteous cause, as well as their ability to 
offer members a chance to live on in communal memory as martyrs and the promise of a place 
in heaven, can make them powerful beacons to those looking for existential meaning.1012 
Mortality salience has been shown to lead to heightened esteem for an individual’s own group, 
culture and ideology.1013 This is directly related to such groups’ ability to lower the fear of death 
by providing their members with meaning and significance. Conversely, mortality salience can 
lead to heightened hostility towards out-groups and alternative ideologies, as their existence 
undermines the ability to the in-group or a particular ideology to alleviate the fear of death.1014 
Mortality salience may increase support for violent measures against out-groups perceived to 
be threatening.1015 An interesting aspect of mortality salience in the context of involvement in 
terrorism is that it can establish a feedback loop that traps members in loyalty to both the cause 
and the group. As participation in acts of terrorism increases the chance of death, existential 
anxiety is renewed, leading to a stronger focusing on the group and its ideology to alleviate this 
stress, thereby prolonging involvement in terrorism and prompting the next round of existential 
anxiety.1016
9.6.2.1 Mortality salience and the Hofstadgroup
Several participants feared punishments in an afterlife.1017 Those who experienced such anxieties 
appear to have become more closely tied to the beliefs they thought would save them from the 
tortures of hell. In a telling example, one female participant told police officers that during 
1011 Mark Dechesne et al., “Literal and symbolic immortality: the effect of evidence of literal immortality on self-
esteem striving in response to mortality salience,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84, no. 4 (2003): 
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her involvement in the group she experienced a period of great anxiety concerning the right 
interpretation of Islam. She was shocked by the extremist interpretation promulgated within 
the group, especially as it meant denouncing her own family as apostates. At the same time, she 
worried that it might actually represent ‘true’ Islam and that her failure to uphold such views 
would lead to terrible punishments in the afterlife.1018 Although she eventually disengaged from 
the group, these existential fears initially tied her more closely to the group and its extremist 
views.1019
It was not simply a fear of what an afterlife might hold that influenced the behavior of some 
Hofstadgroup participants. The obverse also applied. In at least one case, a participant was 
motivated to become what he saw as a ‘true’ Muslim not just to avoid eternal punishment, 
but to garner eternal reward. In addition to fear of hell there was the desire to gain a place in 
paradise.1020 This desire for personal salvation was also a factor in the acts of terrorism planned 
and perpetrated by the group’s militant inner circle. Van Gogh’s assailant and the individual who 
record a threatening video message 2005 both stated that their actions were driven by the desire 
to avoid god’s displeasure and to attain a place in paradise.1021 Fear of death and a longing for 
paradise were powerful and distinctly personal existential motives underlying several participants’ 
involvement process and, in some cases, the planning or perpetration of acts of terrorism.
9.7 Conclusion
A first clear conclusion to emerge from this chapter is that there is no current empirical basis 
to assume that major psychopathology or mental health issues more generally offer a viable 
explanation for Hofstadgroup participants’ behavior. Presently, the Hofstadgroup case presents 
another argument against the idea that terrorists are somehow intrinsically different from ‘normal’ 
human beings. Neither was there data to suggest that identity-related alienation formed an 
explanation for involvement. Quests to gain or restore both personal and communal significance, 
on the other hand, appear to have been a crucial element driving participation at the individual 
level of analysis. They led to political and religious awakenings, the desire to become a ‘true’ 
Muslim and, in some cases, the wish to avenge personal or communally experience ‘significance 
loss’ through violence. This concept suggests that the group’s planned and perpetrated acts of 
terrorism were a form of personal expression rather than a course of action deployed for strategic 
or organizational rationales.
The discussion then turned to the role of personality characteristics. It is dubious whether there 
is such a thing as a ‘terrorist profile’. However, research indicates that certain predisposing risk 
1018 Dienst Nationale Recherche, “RL8026,” GET: 4020, 4028, 4030, 4050-4051.
1019 Ibid., 4028-4032, 4051.
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factors may increase the likeliness of involvement in terrorism. Applied to the Hofstadgroup, 
this analytical perspective highlighted a keenness for adventure, identification with victims of 
perceived injustice and, in the case of Van Gogh’s future assailant, a history of violent behavior. 
Predisposing risk factors that played a supportive role in explaining what made at least some 
of the Hofstadgroup’s participants more susceptible to adopt extremist views and to plan or 
perpetrate acts of terrorism.
For some participants, frustration-induced anger influenced their initial involvement process. 
Unable to get satisfactory answers to their questions about jihad-related topics at their 
mosques, some of these young men and women became dissatisfied with ‘mainstream’ Islam 
and drawn towards venues where they could discuss the themes they were interested in, such 
as Hofstadgroup gatherings. Anger also features prominently in the acts of violence that were 
planned and perpetrated by the group’s most extremist participants. The individual who tried 
to reach Chechnya in 2003 was angered by the perceived injustices suffered by his co-religionists 
around the world, as well as his increasingly antagonistic relationship with the Dutch authorities. 
Likewise, it appears that the immediate trigger for the attack on Van Gogh was the anger and hurt 
that Submission’s release provoked in the filmmaker’s assailant.
One final factor that appears to have influenced at least several Hofstadgroup participants was 
a fear of death and of ending up in hell in particular. This formed a powerful existential motive 
that kept at least several participants closely wedded to their extremist beliefs, albeit in at least 
one case for only a brief period of time, as these beliefs were thought to offer the best way of 
avoiding punishments in the afterlife. Fear of displeasing their god and, conversely, a desire to 
attain paradise was also a factor in the planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism committed 
by the group’s militant inner-circle. This factor once again underlined the distinctly personal, 
as opposed to strategic or organizational, rationales for the use of terrorism found among the 
Hofstadgroup’s participants.
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10. Conclusion
10.1 Introduction
Following the 9/11 attacks, research on terrorism benefited from an influx of new researchers 
and funding. However, almost fifteen years and an untold number of publications later, many 
aspects of terrorism are still poorly understood. That also applies to the focus of this thesis; 
namely, how and why people become involved in European homegrown jihadism. Chief among 
the various reasons for this state of affairs has been the long-standing scarcity of primary-sources 
based research. The difficulties involved in accessing (former) terrorists for interviews or using 
data gathered by government agencies, has made researchers overly reliant on media reporting. 
A secondary source of information that is frequently very succinct, potentially biased and too 
often inaccurate; in other words, incapable of serving as the main, let alone the only, foundation 
for academic research. 
There are dozens of potential explanations for involvement in terrorism. Yet the scarcity of 
primary-sources means that most of these have been insufficiently empirically assessed, raising 
concerns about their validity. These issues shaped this thesis’ methodological approach in two 
ways. First, collecting primary-sources based data was seen as a prerequisite. Second, because 
no single theoretical perspective on involvement in terrorism could count on strong empirical 
support, a multi-theoretical analytical framework was adopted. This second decision also followed 
from the widely-held view that involvement in terrorism is the result of a complex process in 
which a multitude of factors, spread over multiple levels of analysis, play a role. Consequently, 
this thesis chose to study involvement by combing the breadth of existing insights, divided over 
the structural, group and individual levels of analysis, with extensive primary-sources based data.
Terrorism, the deliberate use of indiscriminate violence against civilians for propagandistic 
purposes and psychological effects, comes in many forms. This thesis focused specifically on the 
‘homegrown jihadist’ typology as it manifested itself in Europe from 2004 onward, most notably 
with the attacks in Madrid of that year and those in London in July 2005. The attacks in Paris and 
Brussels in 2015 and 2016, as well as the large number of Europeans who have joined terrorist 
groups in Syria and Iraq, have demonstrated that this form of terrorism continuous to be a pan-
European security threat. Research on European homegrown jihadism is therefore relevant for 
policy makers, counterterrorism practitioners and journalists as well as academics. From the 
European homegrown jihadist typology, one case was selected for in-depth analysis; the Dutch 
‘Hofstadgroup’ that existed between 2002 and 2005. 
Case selection was partly practical; the author was able to gain access to the Dutch police files 
on the group and managed to interview several former participants, thus addressing the lack 
of primary sources noted above. No less important, there are sufficient similarities between the 
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Hofstadgroup and the broader European homegrown jihadist trend, as well as the European 
‘foreign fighters’ who have left for Syria and Iraq over the past few years, to allow the case 
to inform the wider debate on this typology of terrorism. Finally, existing research on the 
Hofstadgroup reflects the issues present in the literature on terrorism remarked on above in that 
it is predominantly based on secondary sources. Work on the Hofstadgroup has also been largely 
descriptive, emphasizing that there is room for research on how and why participants became 
involved that is both empirically grounded and theoretically informed in its analysis.
Guiding the research was the following overarching question: What factors governed the 
involvement processes of participants in the Hofstadgroup during its 2002-2005 existence? The 
main research question was addressed through three subsidiary ones. The thesis looked first 
at structural, then at group-level and finally at individual-level explanations for involvement 
in the Hofstadgroup. For each of these levels of analysis, literature reviews identified existing 
explanations for involvement in terrorism which were then utilized as ‘lenses’ through which to 
view the empirical data, thus allowing relevant explanatory factors and processes to be identified. 
This concluding chapter draws together the various analytical strands to address the main 
research question. It then presents academic and policy-relevant implications that are relevant 
to homegrown jihadism more broadly and rounds off the discussion with a brief examination of 
the thesis’ limitations and fruitful avenues for future research. 
10.2 Key findings
Analyzing involvement in the Hofstadgroup using three levels of analysis allowed a multifaceted 
perspective on the participation process to emerge. Each level of analysis contained numerous 
relevant factors and found that they fulfilled different roles. Some contributed to the motive for 
involvement in the group or the use violence, others enabled this process. Yet others were triggers; 
setting individuals on a path toward participation in the group and, in some cases, the planning 
or perpetration of acts of terrorism. Furthermore, there was no single, commonly experienced 
process of involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Participants found and remained in the group for 
a variety of reasons. Additionally, the findings show that ‘involvement’ took on numerous forms, 
the majority of which did not include terrorism-related activities. Crucially, the factors governing 
the involvement processes were heterogeneous in nature. Even so, some generalizations can be 
made.
The structural level of analysis looked at the broader social and political context in which 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup came about. It revealed the crucial role of geopolitical 
events such as the 9/11 attacks and the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror’ that followed. In many future 
Hofstadgroup participants, these events triggered ‘cognitive openings’ that led them to study 
the motives of the terrorists and to scrutinize Western states’ foreign policies. These geopolitical 
events led many participants to become acquainted with radical and extremist interpretations 
of Islam and contributed to a political awakening that, rightly or wrongly, produced a sense 
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of Muslim victimization across the globe at the hands of Western imperialists and corrupt 
Middle-Eastern regimes. A sense of vicarious victimization and the desire to help and avenge co-
religionists in places like Palestine and Afghanistan became key motives for some of the group’s 
most militant participants’ desire to travel abroad as foreign fighters and, later, to plan acts of 
terrorism in the Netherlands. 
Structural-level factors were also important as enablers of involvement processes and as the likely 
trigger for the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Hofstadgroup participant. The Internet 
and its easy access to extremist views and jihadist ‘role models’ facilitated the adoption of radical 
and extremist views. The freedoms offered by the Dutch liberal democratic political system 
made it relatively easy to hold private meetings, to access and disseminate radical and extremist 
views and to travel abroad. Widespread conservative views within the Dutch Muslim community 
‘socially facilitated’ participants’ adoption of fundamentalist and radical convictions. Lack of 
police protection for Van Gogh made him an easy target. Finally, the airing of the Islam-critical 
film Submission, part one that Van Gogh had directed, was in all likeliness the structural-level 
factor that triggered the murderer to plan and prepare his attack.
Contrary to the assumption frequently made by politicians and the media, there were no clear 
indications that socioeconomic inequality played a role in motivating involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup or bringing about the adoption of extremist views. Neither did the harsh tone of the 
Dutch debate on integration and Islam feature as an important factor in motivating involvement 
or sparking a desire to utilize terrorist violence. Participants did indeed face discrimination and 
even physical violence based on their religious convictions, but these experiences were principally 
important in sustaining rather than motivating their involvement in the group. That the 
Hofstadgroup was not a response to grievances shared by the broader Dutch Muslim community 
was also apparent by its lack of popular support. This was not a vanguard movement, but an 
extremist cell that was as critical of its potential supporters as it was of non-Muslim ‘unbelievers’.
The group-level of analysis focused specifically on intra-group dynamics. It was able to account 
for how the Hofstadgroup formed, what kept it together and how radical and extremist views 
were adopted and maintained. Preexisting social ties brought like-minded individuals together 
who were then bound by friendship and a shared sense of identity that revolved around their 
interpretation of Islam. Within this setting, social learning increased participants’ exposure to 
views legitimizing and justifying the use of violence, strengthening their division of the world 
into a small group of the righteous threatened by a large and hostile out-group of unbelievers and 
apostates. Lectures, interaction with other participants and exposure to jihadist ‘role models’ in 
and outside of the group were crucial to the exploration and adoption of new identities as ‘true’ 
Muslims. The group’s isolationist tendencies increased its cognitive and behavioral influence 
over participants. Peer pressures toward ideological conformity served a similar purpose by 
engendering a degree of ideological homogeneity among participants.
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A key finding was that the group-level of analysis was unable to fully account for the acts of 
terrorism that some participants planned or perpetrated. The planned and perpetrated acts of 
terrorism were distinctly personal in origin, rather than the result of communal deliberations. 
This stemmed from the peculiar organizational characteristics of the Hofstadgroup and its lack 
of clear leaders in particular. There were numerous authority figures, but none of them tried to be 
or were seen as leaders who could mold the group ideologically, organizationally or operationally. 
The absence of leaders also meant that participants could not in any significant sense displace 
their personal responsibility for violence to others who had ordered or organized attacks. Any 
impetus for committing an act of violence depended predominantly on the initiative and ability 
of individual participants.
The individual level of analysis studied participants’ biographical backgrounds and personal 
characteristics. It helped explain what triggered involvement processes, what led some participants 
to consider or use terrorism, how those individuals were able to overcome inhibitions to the 
use of force and it shed light on what it was that made these particular individuals more likely 
to participate in violence than others. A small number of individuals became involved in the 
Hofstadgroup as a result of ‘unfreezing’; the dissolution of everyday commitments or old social 
networks that made them more amenable to making new acquaintances or considering new 
ideas. The majority, however, experienced cognitive openings that prompted a reexamination 
of previously held beliefs or a search for answers to the bigger questions of life, death and 
religious identity. Trigger events for these cognitive openings were a mix of the geopolitical and 
the personal, but in many cases they resulted in ‘significance quests’; attempts to find personal 
meaning in a reorientation on radical or extremist Islam. 
A key explanatory factor was found in the concept of fanaticism. Fanaticism not only accounted 
for the central motive in Van Gogh’s murder but was specific enough to explain why out of a 
group of several religious extremists, only one acted on those beliefs. The key to this distinction 
was the personal context in which extremist beliefs were adopted. The murderer stood out 
because 1) his life revolved around his beliefs to a degree not seen among his compatriots, 2) he 
infused those beliefs with a distinct apocalyptical edge and 3) he was the most socially isolated 
of all participants, minimizing the influence of countervailing opinions. These findings do not 
imply that extremist beliefs were absent from the acts of terrorism planned by other participants. 
But they do suggest that in those cases beliefs fulfilled a less central role as a motive to commit 
acts of terrorism.
The inability of beliefs alone to explain either involvement in the Hofstadgroup or the 
planning or perpetration of acts of terrorism by its militant inner circle, was a recurring and 
distinctly important finding. Even Van Gogh’s murderer’s violent actions cannot be entirely 
explained by his fanatical beliefs. The individual level of analysis also revealed the important 
role of cognitive mechanisms in overcoming psychological boundaries to the use of violence; 
namely, dehumanization, the attribution of blame to the victims of (intended) violence and 
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the relegation of personal responsibility to a higher authority. It further pointed to the role of 
powerful emotions in contributing to the motive for violence; anger brought about by perceived 
injustice, disappointment in ‘mainstream’ Islam, the deep hurt caused by blasphemy against a 
beloved religious figure and fear of God’s displeasure in an afterlife.
This latter point is particularly important in understanding why people became involved in the 
Hofstadgroup, why they adopted and held to extremist convictions and why some of them felt 
that violence was not only justified by a personal duty. Fear of ending up in the torments of hell 
for failure to be a ‘true’ Muslim and its obverse, a desire for the rewards of paradise, formed an 
existential motive that appears to have been at the core of at least several participant’s involvement 
experience. This existential anxiety led to a quest for answers about what it meant to be a ‘true’ 
Muslim and, especially among the group’s more militant participants, fed the conviction that 
jihad was a religious duty that could not be forfeited.
The individual-level analysis also uncovered several factors whose relevance lay in their inability 
to explain involvement processes, in particular the concept of radicalization. Its principal 
shortcoming was the finding that the majority of participants with radical or extremist views did 
not act on them. Similarly, participation in the Hofstadgroup did not stem from psychopathology 
and there were no diagnosed signs of ‘minor’ mental health problems. Neither did identity-related 
alienation offer a convincing explanation for involvement. The one personality-related factor of 
relevance was the discovery of several predisposing risk factors that appeared to make involvement 
in the group’s extremist inner-circle more likely. These were adventure-seeking, identification 
with victims of perceived injustice and a history of violent behavior.
The findings outlined in the previous paragraphs address the main research question by 
highlighting those factors that were most important to understanding the involvement processes 
of Hofstadgroup participants. But for a fuller understanding of the how and why of involvement 
in the Hofstadgroup, and to appreciate the relevance of these findings to the broader typology of 
European homegrown jihadism, it is necessary to look beyond the findings themselves to their 
broader implications. How can this study contribute to a better understanding of involvement in 
European homegrown jihadism?
10.3 Implications for research on European homegrown jihadism
To reiterate a general but important point of departure, it is striking that even in this one group, 
involvement processes took on a variety of shapes and that involvement was not a singular ‘end 
state’ but meant different things to different participants. This heterogeneity underlines the 
difficulty of generalizing about the factors governing involvement in extremism and terrorism.1022 
1022 For a similar conclusion, see: Fiore Geelhoed, Purification and resistance: glocal meanings of Islamic fundamentalism 
in the Netherlands (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 2012), 211-212.
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Secondly, the findings emphasize that gaining a comprehensive or holistic understanding 
of involvement in homegrown jihadism requires a broad analytical perspective that utilizes 
multiple levels of analysis. No one explanation or level of analysis offered a sufficient account for 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup. From this follows the first of seven key implications; namely, 
that the relative importance of particular factors to the involvement process is liable to change 
over time. 
10.3.1 The ‘driving force’ of involvement processes is liable to change
The findings illustrated that the factors which led to involvement in the Hofstadgroup were 
frequently different from those that sustained it, which in turn differed from those that triggered 
some participants to plan or actually carry out a terrorist attack. Van Gogh’s murderer, for 
instance, reoriented himself on his beliefs after time spent in prison and the death of his mother. 
His involvement process was sustained and catalyzed by the like-minded individuals he met, 
principally among them Abu Khaled, whose teaching influenced his burgeoning radicalism. The 
murder itself draws attention to yet another set of influential factors; among them the killer’s 
violence-prone personality, his belief that murder in the name of his religion was justified and 
mandated, and a deep-seated desire to avoid his god’s displeasure and achieve a favorable place 
in the afterlife.
Another participant’s involvement process began after experiencing job-market discrimination. 
Without an internship to complete his studies, he had large amounts of time on his hands, some 
of which he spent at his local mosque, talking with people he may otherwise have neglected. 
Through one of those people he was introduced to the Hofstadgroup. Once there, it was not 
the radical or extremist ideas being discussed that bound him to the group, but the sense of 
friendship he experienced. Only after becoming involved did he begin to internalize the extremist 
beliefs that his newfound friends discussed. His intention to plan an actual attack was predicated 
on different factors still. One of these was a propaganda video in which a Muslim woman who 
resembled his mother was mistreated by Israeli soldiers. Another was the murder of Van Gogh, 
which this participant saw as highly inspirational because it was perpetrated by a close friend. It 
also made him feel it was now his turn to show his commitment to shared values and carry out 
an attack of his own.
Numerous other examples could be given that would illustrate a similar process. What they 
underline is that what could be termed the ‘driving force’ behind an individual’s participation 
process is likely to shift over time. For instance, in the second example structural factors 
(discrimination against people of Moroccan descent) precipitated the involvement process, 
group-level factors sustained it (the social benefits of group membership) and a mix of individual 
and group-level factors (vicarious injustice and emulation of role models) contributed to this 
individual’s desire to plan a terrorist attack. 
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In her research on Italian and German left-wing terrorism, Della Porta found that different 
stages of the involvement process are governed by different levels of analysis.1023 The present 
study reiterates this conclusion for the European homegrown jihadist typology of terrorism. It 
adds two further points. First, a multicausal, multilevel and dynamic perspective on involvement 
processes in extremist and terrorist groups is a prerequisite for an accurate analysis of how and why 
participation comes about and is sustained. Secondly, even within a single extremist or terrorist 
group, the ‘driving force’ of involvement processes can differ markedly between participants. 
For instance, whereas one individual may be drawn towards extremism by geopolitical events, 
another’s entry in such a milieu may be primarily motivated by a personal crisis or preexisting 
friendships. 
10.3.2 Involvement in extremist and terrorist groups takes various forms
Not only are involvement processes in general characterized by a continuously shifting emphasis 
on particular explanatory variables, but the shape of these processes is likely to have distinct 
characteristics that vary between individual participants. Research is beginning to place 
considerable emphasis on the variety of roles and positions that members of extremist and 
terrorist groups may occupy.1024 Not all participants in such groups are directly involved in acts 
of terrorist violence; in fact, most will be preoccupied with questions of logistics, propaganda 
or recruitment. Appreciating the variety and fluidity of involvement processes even within 
one particular extremist or terrorist group is crucial to understanding how roles within such 
organizations are allocated. 
Indeed, one question raised in the introduction and returned to throughout the manuscript was 
what differentiated those Hofstadgroup participants who used terrorist violence or planned to 
do so from those that did not. Although no conclusive or broadly generalizable answer to this 
question was found, the use of a multicausal and multilevel analytical framework did reveal 
several noteworthy partial explanations. These included the fact that only Van Gogh’s murderer 
had a history of violent behavior, giving him a proven ability to match words with deeds, and 
that he adhered his extremist beliefs more fanatically than his compatriots. Particularly strong 
identification with Muslim victims of war across the globe and a personal hatred toward elements 
of the Dutch state were key elements setting apart a second individual in the group’s extremist 
inner-circle from the majority of participants who (apparently) did not plan to use actual violence. 
Additionally, this research has highlighted that involvement in extremist and terrorist groups 
should not be seen as having a singular end-state. Not all of those who became involved in the 
Hofstadgroup actually remained a part of it. In fact, several people chose to distance themselves 
from the group for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, those who did remain a part of the group 
1023 Della Porta, Social movements, 10.
1024 Nesser, “Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe,” 87-114; Bloom, Gill, and Horgan, “Tiocfaid ár Mná,” 67-70; Gill 
and Horgan, “Who were the volunteers?,” 451-453.
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displayed varying degrees of commitment to the religious convictions and political goals that 
formed the group’s shared interests and worldview. It would be interesting for future research to 
look more closely at the differences between those participants in extremists groups that do use 
terrorist violence and those that do not.
10.3.3 The nature of the group shapes the involvement experience
A third key implication is that the nature of the group itself directly influences the involvement 
experience. Most important in this regard were the Hofstadgroup’s lack of ideological and 
operational leaders and the virtual absence of communal efforts to achieve terrorism-related goals 
until the very end of its existence. There was never a particularly clear ‘Hofstadgroup ideology’ to 
which participants were socialized, creating a relative tolerance for divergent views. In addition 
to the Salafi-Jihadist majority, the group also contained ideological extremists who gave it sect-
like qualities and, on the opposite end of the spectrum, a small number of participants without 
clearly radical or extremist religious views or a complete lack of interest in religion altogether. 
Crucially, the absence of operational leaders meant that the development of terrorism-related 
plans was ad-hoc and highly dependent on the initiative of individual participants. 
These characteristics hampered the Hofstadgroup’s development into a more ideologically 
homogeneous and action-oriented entity. It never became a structured organization and only 
began to resemble a loosely-constituted network by the end of its existence. For the largest part 
of its 2002-2005 existence, it remained a group of friends and acquaintances, spread over several 
cities. As a result of this organizational ambiguity, Hofstadgroup participants were left with a 
degree of ideological and operational freedom that placed a premium on their own initiative. 
Had participants found themselves in an actual organization or network with clear leaders, 
one that tolerated no dissent from a particular worldview and that communally planned and 
executed terrorist attacks, their involvement experience would have been quite different. This 
finding suggests that in order to account for how and why participation in European homegrown 
jihadism comes about, the characteristics of the group in question form a set of contextual factors 
that cannot be overlooked.
10.3.4 Fanaticism rather than radicalization
This study found that ‘radicalization’ and its frequently implied link between radical beliefs 
and radical behavior was unable to provide a satisfactory account for participation in the 
Hofstadgroup. Primarily, it could not explain why of the numerous Salafi-Jihadist extremists, 
only a very small minority acted or planned to act on those beliefs. Secondly, the findings 
undermined the linear and deterministic notions frequently found in radicalization thinking. 
Some participants became involved in the group before adopting radical or extremist views, a 
number of them never went beyond ‘merely’ radical views and several participants disengaged 
even though they had previously held extremist views.
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None of which is to say that beliefs are not important to understanding involvement in homegrown 
jihadism. A shared set of core beliefs was the basis for the Hofstadgroup’s formation and allowed 
a dichotomous and militant view of the world to take hold. Furthermore, beliefs were crucial 
motivational components of the planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism. Just as important 
was their ability to justify the use of violence. But fundamental as beliefs are to understanding 
involvement in European homegrown jihadism, they are clearly incapable of accounting for 
participation in and of themselves. Radicalization has been the preeminent explanation for 
involvement in terrorism for more than a decade. This makes its overemphasis on the degree to 
which radical beliefs can motivate violent behavior all the more problematic. 
For a more accurate understanding of involvement in terrorism to emerge, the concept of 
radicalization needs to be reexamined. An alternative way of studying the role that extremist 
beliefs can play in motivating terrorist violence was found in Taylor’s concept of fanaticism.1025 
A crucial difference between the concepts of radicalization and fanaticism is that the latter is 
specific enough to explain why merely holding extremist beliefs is insufficient to explain the turn 
to violence. Fanaticism emphasizes the role of contextual factors, such as the degree to which 
extremist beliefs are challenged by contradictory points of view, in increasing the likeliness that 
the internalization of such beliefs will result in violent behavior. This makes it a theoretically 
and empirically robust alternative to ‘radicalization’ whose utility should be further explored in 
future research.
10.3.5 Involvement as personal expression rather than strategic calculation
Although terrorism is frequently understood as a form of violence that is utilized to achieve 
specific (political) aims, such instrumental or strategic considerations were virtually absent 
among Hofstadgroup participants. Instead, the motives underlying the planned and perpetrated 
acts of terrorism had a distinct personal edge; affirming the perpetrator’s identity as a ‘true’ 
Muslim, avenging the Muslim community, claiming retribution for insults and pain suffered 
personally and avoiding god’s displeasure through a commitment to violent jihad. This latter 
point in particular was found to have exerted a strong influence on several participants; fear of 
hell and a desire for paradise sustained both involvement in the group and adherence to extremist 
views. These powerful emotions also appeared to factor into several inner-circle extremists’ 
decisions to use terrorist violence. Although it arose in part as a response to worldly issues such 
as the 9/11 attacks and the War on Terror, participation in the Hofstadgroup was primarily a 
vehicle for finding, embracing and expressing a newfound identity as ‘true’ Muslims.
As such, understanding why people become involved in European homegrown jihadism, and 
in preparations for actual attacks, may be less about asking what they are hoping to achieve 
then it is about who or what they are hoping to be. This is not to argue that participants such as 
1025 Taylor, The fanatics.
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those found in the Hofstadgroup’s militant core never considered strategic issues, because they 
did. The point is that their desire to ‘do something’ in response to what they perceived to be 
Western aggression against Muslims or the insidious machinations of apostate regimes, was more 
about taking action then about whether or not those actions stood a chance of actually achieving 
something. Provided this finding can be replicated, it argues for a subtle reconsideration of the 
motives driving participation in European homegrown jihadism.
10.3.6 No victimization or psychopathology
Terrorists are frequently portrayed as psychopathological or as people who embrace violence 
after becoming victimized, for instance by political oppression, socioeconomic inequality or 
discrimination. With the exception of discrimination, which played a supportive role in sustaining 
some participants’ involvement in the group and which strengthened their dichotomous worldview, 
none of these factors were found to have influenced involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Perhaps 
most surprising given its prominence in the literature, the research found little support for the 
hypothesis that identity-related alienation played a significant role in motivating or sustaining 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Neither did socioeconomic deprivation offer a convincing 
explanation for involvement; the group’s participants came from a variety of backgrounds. Only 
a very small minority could be objectively labeled as unemployed or (relatively) uneducated.
Just as it can make intuitive sense to see homegrown jihadists as people who have in some way 
been victimized, it can be comforting to think of people who embrace extremist ideas or even 
participate in terrorist violence as individuals suffering from mental health problems. Yet the 
lack of empirical support for such positions found in this research, and echoed in the broader 
literature, should function as a caution against this line of reasoning. It may very well be that 
future clinical evaluations of homegrown jihadists will reveal that mental health problems do 
indeed offer explanations for their behavior. At present, however, attempts to explain involvement 
in the Hofstadgroup or homegrown jihadism more broadly as stemming from mental health 
problems can count on little to no empirical support.
What these results have to offer for an understanding of involvement in homegrown jihadism 
more broadly, is a warning against intuitively convincing but empirically poorly-supported 
explanations. Extremism and terrorism are subjects far too complex to be adequately explained 
by the ‘crazy or victimized’ dichotomy. Only through nuanced analysis and empirical validation 
of assumptions can our understanding of involvement in this form of political violence be 
significantly advanced.
10.3.7 The often-overlooked role of chance
A final research-relevant implication centers on the role of chance. In the study of war, chance 
and luck are understood to be factors that can exert a tremendous influence on the development 
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and outcome of conflicts.1026 Within the context of terrorism studies, however, these elements are 
seldom mentioned. This is surprising, as research on the backgrounds of terrorists has indicated 
that happenstance can play an important role in bringing about involvement. This study finds 
support for this point of view. The vast majority of participants did not make a conscious decision 
to become involved in the Hofstadgroup. More often than not their participation came about 
through people they happened to know or meet. The role of such chance encounters should also 
serve to demystify the involvement process. Participation in the Hofstadgroup was frequently not 
a conscious decision made by Islamist radicals and extremist with a view toward organizing for 
violence, but a much more unintentional process based on happenstance and a tenuous shared 
commitment to Salafi-Jihadist views.
10.4 Policy-relevant implications
With regard to policy-relevant implications, the study supports the notion that seeing involvement 
in terrorism as the result of underlying ‘root causes’ such as poverty, discrimination or radicalization 
is a dead end. No single factor has such explanatory potential. By acknowledging the multifaceted 
nature of the involvement process, more options for prevention, or for the reintegration of 
convicted offenders, can be identified. By focusing on more than radical and extremist beliefs, 
practitioners can develop interventions aimed at other aspects of the involvement process. For 
instance, the role played by the various attractions of group membership suggests not only the 
potential value of taking people from this social environment but also the need to provide them 
with alternatives that similarly offer benefits such as camaraderie and a positive self-image. 
Another potential avenue for preventing involvement or recidivism is taking seriously the 
perceived injustice and altruism that drives some of these individuals. As factually incorrect or 
uncomfortable as we may find the idea that Western intervention in Muslim countries equates 
with a war against Islam that justifies retaliatory violence, such ideas have considerable potential 
to motivate involvement and for that reason alone should be taken seriously. Because of the 
popularity of the radicalization concept, homegrown jihadist groups are frequently understood 
in terms of their religious convictions. What the results presented here have suggested, is that the 
motives both for involvement in these groups and the commission of acts of terrorism can be 
distinctly worldly; real or vicariously experienced political grievances tied to events in the Muslim 
world are a key explanatory factor. Interventions could focus on channeling the altruistic desire 
to help others that often lies at heart of these perceptions into non-violent avenues.
Another policy-relevant aspect of this thesis lies in its use of police files as primary sources. 
Although using police files for research purposes presents its own set of challenges, being able 
to access this material was a prerequisite for coming to a more empirically robust understanding 
of participants’ involvement processes. They were thus indispensable to moving beyond the 
1026 Carl Von Clausewitz, On war (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993), 101, 138-140.
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overreliance on secondary sources noted earlier as a longstanding issue in research on terrorism. 
The point is that this is not only a benefit for the academic community. As potential end-users 
of research on terrorism, policy makers and counterterrorism practitioners have a stake in 
ensuring that research is of the highest possible quality. It is to be hoped that the authorities in 
the Netherlands and other countries will recognize the importance of allowing researchers access 
to sources of information such as police files.
10.5 Limitations and future research
In closing, it is valuable to acknowledge this study’s limitations and the various avenues for future 
research. One particular limitation is that the thesis focused almost exclusively on proximate 
factors; those directly influencing involvement in the Hofstadgroup. It has largely remained unclear, 
for instance, what underlying factors made this group’s participants more likely than other young 
Dutch Muslims to experience cognitive openings that in many cases led to their involvement. 
Why were others not similarly affected by images of 9/11 or Muslim suffering? Secondly, the 
study focused primarily on the Hofstadgroup itself rather than the broader social, cultural and 
political environment from which it emerged. There is considerable room for research on the 
role of underlying factors in bringing about involvement, as well as the relationship between the 
Hofstadgroup and the broader environment from which it emerged.
The single case-study research design remains this thesis’ foremost limitation. A comparative 
approach was not taken because the emphasis placed on gathering and utilizing primary sources, 
and the in-depth qualitative nature of the analysis, would then simply not have been feasible 
within any reasonable amount of time. Nevertheless, it is argued that the findings presented 
in these pages are relevant not just for the Hofstadgroup itself but for the broader typology 
of European homegrown jihadism it represents. The Hofstadgroup was one of several similar 
groups that arose in other European countries in the early 2000s. Furthermore, single case-study 
research designs are useful for empirically assessing the validity of explanations held to be of 
general applicability, such as ‘radicalization’. By critically and empirically examining numerous 
commonly-found explanations for involvement in terrorism, the thesis was able to make a 
contribution to the larger debate about how to understand and study involvement in extremist 
and terrorist groups.
That being said, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to apply the multi-level analysis for 
understanding involvement to a wider selection of cases. Comparative research would be useful 
for distinguishing between factors of general relevance to the (European) homegrown jihadist 
typology and those unique to particular cases. As previously noted, such research could also 
usefully focus on what distinguishes those participants of extremist groups that do use (or plan to 
use) terrorist violence from those that do not. Can differences in their backgrounds, personality 
characteristics or involvement processes be identified that can explain how and why some take 
up violent roles in such groups while others do not?
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Another methodological limitation lies in the utilization of multiple theories spread over three 
levels of analysis. While the choice for breadth over depth provided a valuable appreciation of 
the multifaceted nature of involvement processes, it arguably did a disservice to the individual 
explanations. After all, many of them are sufficiently nuanced and well-developed to warrant 
chapters or even entire studies of their own. Future research could turn this emphasis on its head 
and study particular hypotheses in more depth.
The primary sources utilized here form both a unique strong point and a weakness. The police files 
and interviews with former participants in particular offered a wealth of detailed information, 
much of it never before utilized in research on the Hofstadgroup. While such primary sources are 
of fundamental importance to reaching an empirically supported understanding of involvement 
processes, they also pose several issues. The police files in particular focused primarily on the 
participants (deemed) the most violent, leaving many others relatively understudied. Similarly, 
interviews could only be held with the relatively small number of former participants willing to 
talk. The end-result of both these issues is that a lot is known about some (key) participants while 
others remain relatively poorly understood. 
A more fundamental issue is that these sources are not freely available, hampering the transparency 
of the claims presented here. Although this issue could not be fully resolved, several measures 
were taken to minimize its impact. First of all, references to the police files and interviews were 
complemented with publicly available sources wherever possible. Secondly, links to those parts 
of the police files that had been leaked to the press and subsequently published online were 
provided wherever relevant. Finally, readers were asked to keep in mind that the use of restricted 
information is quite common in the social sciences. Interview transcripts, for instance, are rarely 
made freely available for reasons of privacy. The primary sources used in this study are thus less 
of an exception with regard to transparency than might first be apparent.
10.6 Toward a more empirical study of terrorism
Improving our understanding of how and why people become involved in European homegrown 
jihadism and indeed in terrorism more broadly, requires two things. The first is an analytical 
approach that recognizes involvement as a process in which numerous and interrelated factors, 
spread over multiple levels of analysis, play a role. The second are primary sources that allow 
the researcher to acquire detailed, reliable and new information on the involvement process. By 
applying both of these elements to a study of the Dutch Hofstadgroup, this thesis has aimed to 
make a contribution to a better understanding of this particular typology of terrorism. Hopefully, 
future studies on involvement in homegrown jihadism will similarly be able to utilize primary-
sources and thereby gradually but finally overcome one of the oldest obstacles to progress in 
research on terrorism.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Deelname aan jihadisme van eigen bodem in Europa: een meervormige analyse van participatie in 
de Nederlandse Hofstadgroep, 2002-2005
Hoe en waarom komt deelname tot homegrown jihadistische groeperingen in Europa tot stand? 
Dat is de overkoepelende vraag die dit proefschrift stelt. De analyse richt zich specifiek op de 
zogenaamde ‘Hofstadgroep’ die in Nederland actief was tussen circa 2002 en 2005. Deze groep 
geldt nog altijd als het meest beruchte voorbeeld van ‘jihadisme van eigen bodem’ in Nederland, 
een status dat vooral te danken is aan de moord op filmmaker en columnist Theo van Gogh die 
in november 2004 werd gepleegd door een deelnemer aan de Hofstadgroep. Dat het hier ging 
om méér dan een groep jonge mensen met radicale ideeën werd nogmaals onderstreept tijdens 
de arrestaties die volgden op de moord op Van Gogh; één verdachte gooide een handgranaat 
naar het arrestatieteam waardoor vijf agenten gewond raakten. In 2005 wisten de resterende 
Hofstadgroep deelnemers zich te hervatten en leken er voorbereidingen te worden getroffen voor 
meerdere aanslagen op personen en gebouwen in Nederland.
Meer dan tien jaar na de gebeurtenissen die de Hofstadgroep typeerden blijft het een boeiende 
en relevante casus om meer te weten te komen over jihadistisch terrorisme van eigen bodem. 
Ten eerste doordat de Hofstadgroep niet een specifiek Nederlands verschijnsel was maar één van 
vele soortgelijke groeperingen die zich vanaf grofweg 2004 in Europa openbaarden. Hoewel de 
bevindingen over de Hofstadgroep zeker niet één op één te vertalen zijn naar dit bredere Europese 
fenomeen, bieden deze wel inzichten die relevant zijn voor deze grotere ontwikkeling. Daarnaast 
is de Hofstadgroep uitgegroeid tot een bekende casus in de wetenschappelijke literatuur over het 
zogenaamde homegrown jihadisme in Europa. Veel inzichten over deze vorm van terrorisme zijn 
deels aan de Hofstadgroep ontleend, waardoor het interessant is om enkele jaren later en met 
toegang tot nieuw bronnenmateriaal de zaak opnieuw onder de loep te nemen.
De vraag wat mensen tot deelname aan terroristische groeperingen drijft houdt onderzoekers 
al decennia bezig. Er zijn tientallen theorieën en verklaringen ontwikkeld, maar het is niet 
zondermeer duidelijk of en in hoeverre die van toepassing zijn op een groep als de Hofstadgroep. 
Dat komt doordat terrorisme als wetenschappelijk vakgebied al jaren wordt geteisterd door een 
hardnekkig en aanhoudend probleem; namelijk, een tekort aan betrouwbare en uitgebreide 
bronnen over terrorisme en terroristen. 
Terroristen laten zich doorgaans niet zomaar vinden en het kan voor onderzoekers ook gevaarlijk 
zijn om dit soort organisaties te benaderen. Dit maakt het bijzonder moeilijk, en soms ook ethisch 
onverantwoord, om interviews, participerende observatie, klinisch onderzoek of vragenlijsten 
in te zetten om data te verzamelen. Bovendien zijn dossiers met relevant informatie van 
politie- en veiligheidsdiensten vaak niet toegankelijk voor buitenstaanders. Het resultaat is een 
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onderzoeksveld dat erg sterk leunt op krantenartikelen als de belangrijkste bron van empirische 
gegevens. Een secundaire bron van informatie die doorgaans te beknopt en vaak te onnauwkeurig 
is om als voornaamste, laat staan als enige, bron van data te fungeren.
Het tekort aan onderzoek gestoeld op hoogwaardige primaire bronnen heeft er onder andere toe 
geleid dat veel van de gangbare verklaringen voor deelname aan terrorisme niet of nauwelijks zijn 
getoetst aan empirisch bewijs. Dit geldt ook voor de literatuur die specifiek over de Hofstadgroep 
gaat. Enkele uitstekende studies die gebruik maken van interviews met voormalige betrokkenen 
daargelaten, is de meerderheid van de artikelen en boeken over deze groep gebaseerd op 
mediabronnen. De keerzijde van deze problematische stand van zaken is dat er nog veel ruimte 
bestaat voor onderzoekers die wél over primair bronnenmateriaal beschikken om een bijdrage 
te leveren aan het debat over de oorzaken van terrorisme in het algemeen en de Hofstadgroep in 
het bijzonder. 
De bovenstaande problematiek leidde tot een belangrijk methodologisch uitgangspunt van dit 
proefschrift; namelijk, dat het vergaren en gebruiken van primaire bronnen over de Hofstadgroep 
een absolute voorwaarde was om de overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag te kunnen adresseren. 
De twee belangrijkste vormen van primaire bronnen die worden gebruikt zijn de uitgebreide 
opsporingsdossiers die de Nederlandse politie over deze groep samenstelde en interviews met 
zowel medewerkers van de politie en het Openbaar Ministerie als enkele voormalige deelnemers 
aan de Hofstadgroep. Hoewel aan beide typen bronnen specifieke nadelen kleven, bovenal het feit 
dat ze niet openbaar gemaakt kunnen worden, bieden ze unieke inzichten in de Hofstadgroep en 
maken ze het mogelijk om enkele veelgebruikte en als algemeen geldig beschouwde verklaringen 
voor deelname aan Europees homegrown jihadisme kritisch tegen het licht te houden.
Het voornaamste theoretische uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift, ontleend aan een uitgebreide 
literatuurstudie, is dat deelname aan terrorisme een proces is waarin een veelvoud aan factoren, 
verdeeld over verschillende niveaus van analyse, een rol spelen. De drie niveaus van analyse 
die worden gebruikt richten zich op structurele, groep- en persoonsgebonden verklaringen. 
Structurele verklaringen kijken naar de invloed van omgevingsfactoren zoals staatsvorm, 
geopolitiek en de mate van economische ontwikkeling van een land op de mogelijkheden en 
motieven voor deelname aan terrorisme. Het groepsgebonden niveau van analyse neemt 
een smaller perspectief en bestudeerd hoe sociaalpsychologische processen zoals de invloed 
van charismatische leiders, groepsdruk en sociale identiteit kunnen verklaren dat mensen 
terroristische groeperingen betreden en er deel van uit blijven maken. Dit niveau van analyse 
biedt ook inzichten in de motieven van terroristische groeperingen om daadwerkelijk tot geweld 
over te gaan. Het persoonsgebonden niveau van analyse, tot slot, onderzoekt in hoeverre factoren 
zoals mentale gezondheidsklachten een verklaring kunnen bieden voor deelname aan terrorisme.
Geen van deze verklaringen of niveaus van analyse kan op zichzelf een compleet antwoord geven 
op de vraag hoe en waarom deelname aan de Hofstadgroep tot stand kwam. Maar samen bieden 
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deze niveaus en de tientallen verklaringen die ze ieder herbergen een analytisch kader dat een 
breed en genuanceerd beeld kan bieden van deelname processen. Deze benadering heeft ook de 
structuur van het proefschrift bepaald; deelname aan de Hofstadgroep werd achtereenvolgens 
bestudeerd vanuit structurele, groepsgebonden en individuele perspectieven. Deze analyse beslaat 
in zijn geheel vijf hoofdstukken en vormt het hart van dit proefschrift. Die wordt voorafgegaan 
door twee introducerende hoofdstukken die de onderzoeksvraag en het theoretisch kader 
uiteenzetten, en twee hoofdstukken die de nodige achtergrondinformatie over de Hofstadgroep 
zelf bieden. Het geheel wordt met een concluderend hoofdstuk afgerond waarin de belangrijkste 
bevindingen worden samengevat.
Er kon geen enkelvoudig antwoord worden gegeven op de vraag hoe en waarom deelname aan 
de Hofstadgroep tot stand kwam. Daarvoor waren de achtergronden en motieven van de circa 40 
deelnemers te divers. Zeven overkoepelende bevindingen vatten samen wat dit proefschrift heeft 
bijgedragen aan kennis over deelname aan Europees homegrown jihadisme zoals het zich in de 
Hofstadgroep uitte. Op de eerste plaats werd duidelijk dat de verschillende deelname processen 
getypeerd werden door niet alleen een veelvoud aan factoren verdeeld over verschillende niveaus 
van analyse, maar dat de drijvende kracht van deze processen fluïde was. Dat wil zeggen dat 
de redenen waarom mensen initieel betrokken raken bij groepen als de Hofstadgroep andere 
zijn dan die hen aan dit type groepen binden en dat dit wederom andere factoren zijn dan die 
waardoor sommige deelnemers daadwerkelijk tot geweld overgaan. 
De diversiteit aan deelname processen, zelfs binnen één jihadistische groepering, maakten 
bovendien duidelijk dat ‘deelname’ verschillende vormen en eindstadia kent. Het is geen 
onomkeerbaar proces; sommige Hofstadgroep deelnemers haakten na verloop van tijd op eigen 
initiatief weer af. Anderen werden uit de groep gezet omdat ze de extremistische waarden die 
werden aangehangen niet voldoende omarmden. De verscheidenheid van deelnamevormen 
sprak vooral uit het gegeven dat slechts een minderheid binnen de Hofstadgroep daadwerkelijk 
geweld gebruikte of dat wilde gaan doen. Bovendien waren de motieven voor deelname zeer 
divers; voor sommigen stond simpelweg gezelligheid en een gevoel van religieus ‘broeder- of 
zusterschap’ voorop. Anderen waren vooral politiek geëngageerd terwijl weer anderen bovenal 
belang hechtten aan de extremistische interpretatie van de islam die de groep samenbond. 
Een derde bevinding was dat de aard van de groep van grote invloed was op de aard en vorm 
van deelnameprocessen. In tegenstelling tot sommige andere typeringen van de Hofstadgroep 
concludeerde dit proefschrift dat het noch een organisatie noch een netwerk was en dat 
het feitelijk niet beschikte over leiders in de zin van individuen die de groep operationeel 
aanstuurden of een eenduidige ideologische lijn uitzetten. Dit had tot gevolg dat er nauwelijks 
als groep terrorisme gerelateerde activiteiten werden ondernomen en dat er een mate van 
tolerantie was voor divergente interpretaties van de islam, zolang die min-of-meer voldeden 
aan het fundamentalistische (maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs geweld goedkeurende) Salafistisch 
gedachtegoed. Deze specifieke eigenschappen van de Hofstadgroep zorgden ervoor dat er relatief 
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weinig van deelnemers werd verlangd en dat initiatieven voor terroristisch geweld grotendeels 
moesten voortkomen uit individuele deelnemers.
Het proefschrift kon ook enkele als algemeen geldig beschouwde verklaringen voor deelname aan 
Europees homegrown jihadisme ontkrachten. Vooral het zeer gangbare concept ‘radicalisering’ 
werd op empirische en theoretische gronden bekritiseerd. Radicale ideeën alleen waren 
onvoldoende om de gang tot de Hofstadgroep te verklaren omdat er onder de participanten 
uiteenlopende motieven bestonden voor deelname en terroristisch geweld, waarbij extremistische 
ideologische overtuigingen lang niet altijd de boventoon voerden. Bovendien kon ‘radicalisering’ 
niet verklaren waarom er binnen de extremistische harde kern van de groep slechts één individu 
daadwerkelijk zijn overtuigingen in gewelddadig handelen omzette. 
Een alternatief voor radicalisering werd gevonden in het concept ‘fanatisme’, dat precies die 
discrepantie tussen opvattingen en gedrag wel op genuanceerde wijze kon verklaren. Fanatisme 
wijst namelijk op de invloed van contextuele factoren, zoals de mate waarin een fanaticus in 
aanraking komt met tegengeluiden, als verklaring voor de uiteenlopende mate waarin mensen 
handelen naar hun extremistische opvattingen. De moordenaar van Van Gogh toonde niet alleen 
de grootste toewijding aan een extremistisch gedachtegoed maar was bovendien het meest sociaal 
geïsoleerde individu binnen de groep. Hierdoor omarmde hij zijn overtuigingen op een wijze 
die niet bij zijn groepsgenoten werd waargenomen en werd de stap van woorden naar daden 
aanzienlijk verkleind.
Een vijfde belangrijke bevinding was dat deelname aan de Hofstadgroep, en dus waarschijnlijk 
ook aan gelijksoortige groeperingen, in veel gevallen beter gezien kan worden als een expressie 
van persoonlijke identiteit dan als middel om concrete politieke of religieuze doelen na te streven. 
Hoewel terrorisme vaak wordt geconceptualiseerd als een gewelddadig instrument om bepaalde 
veranderingen te bewerkstelligen, kwam uit de analyse van de Hofstadgroep naar voren dat het de 
meeste deelnemers aan de groep er niet om te doen was om concrete doelen te behalen, maar om 
uitdrukking te geven aan hun (hervonden) identiteit als ‘ware’ moslims. Daarbij was ‘iets’ doen 
belangrijker dan de vraag of die (vaak gewelddadige) handelingen daadwerkelijk een bijdrage 
zouden leveren aan specifieke doelstellingen. 
Op de zesde plaats kwam uit het proefschrift naar voren dat er geen aanwijzingen waren om aan te 
nemen dat deelname aan de Hofstadgroep voortkwam uit geestesziektes of significante deprivatie. 
Dat is van belang, omdat terrorisme in de media maar ook binnen de politiek nog te vaak wordt 
verklaard vanuit het idee dat terroristen óf gek zijn, óf slachtoffer van sociaaleconomische 
achterstelling en discriminatie. De uitkomsten van dit proefschrift sluiten wat betreft deze thema’s 
aan op de bredere literatuur over terrorisme, waar al jaren sceptisch tegen deze verklaringen 
wordt aangekeken omdat ze niet of nauwelijks op empirisch bewijs zijn gestoeld, hoe intuïtief 
plausibel zo ook mogen overkomen. Dat wil overigens niet zeggen dat geestesziektes of deprivatie 
geheel weg te cijferen zijn als verklaringen voor deelname aan Europees homegrown jihadisme, 
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maar wel dat deze factoren eerder een (marginale) ondersteunende rol speelden dan een primaire 
drijfveer vormden.
Tot slot sprak uit de resultaten de rol van het element kans. Hoewel dit aspect in de militaire 
wetenschappen vaak wordt benadrukt als een cruciale invloed op het verloop van gewapende 
conflicten, wordt kans in de literatuur over terrorisme nauwelijks genoemd. Toch had het een 
onmiskenbaar effect op deelname processen binnen de Hofstadgroep. Zo kwamen meerdere 
individuen toevalligerwijs bij de groep uit, bijvoorbeeld omdat ze met een andere deelnemer op 
school zaten of in dezelfde buurt waren opgegroeid en via hem of haar werden geïntroduceerd. 
Kans en geluk zijn wellicht onbevredigende verklaringen voor deelname aan extremisme en 
terrorisme, maar in een gedetailleerde analyse zijn deze elementen simpelweg niet over het hoofd 
te zien.
Door unieke primaire bronnen te combineren met een breed analytisch kader, kon dit 
proefschrift een genuanceerde en empirisch onderbouwde bijdrage leveren aan het debat over 
hoe en waarom deelname tot Europees homegrown jihadisme tot stand komt. De gedetailleerde 
analyse van de Hofstadgroep vormde tegelijkertijd een punt van kritiek; door slechts naar één 
casus te kijken konden de verkregen inzichten niet zondermeer als algemeen geldig worden 
beschouwd. Een logische stap voor vervolgonderzoek zou zijn om met een soortgelijke benadering 
vergelijkend onderzoek uit te voeren om zo vast te stellen welke eigenschappen specifiek waren 
voor de Hofstadgroep en welke ook voor de bredere typologie gelden. Ongeacht de vorm die 
vervolgonderzoek krijgt, hoopt dit proefschrift bijgedragen te hebben aan de overtuiging dat 
primaire bronnen onontbeerlijk zijn om onze kennis over terrorisme daadwerkelijk te verbeteren.
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